

THE Deception Game

Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare

Ladislav Bittman

$9.95

THE

Deception Game

Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare

LADISLAV BITTMAN

They call it the "Department of Dirty Tricks." What does it do? And how?

A U.S. questionnaire is sent to important people in Latin America; the questions arouse furious anger at the United States. A letter from an American embassy reveals U.S. participation in a conspiracy against Tanzania's government. An Indonesian ambassador receives documentary evidence that a trusted American import executive is actually the CIA's chief agent in Indonesia. A letter from J. Edgar Hoover cites the FBI's role in Operation "Overhaul," a plan to overthrow Goulart's Brazilian government.

What do these documents have in common? Every one is a forgery conceived and executed by the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service's Department D. Their purpose? To foment fear and suspicion of the United States in countries around the world. Their method of operation? That is the story revealed here for the first time—the inside story of Department D and its deception games, told by the man who was its deputy chief from 1964 through 1966 when these tricks were played.

Ladislav Bittman's fascinating and candid account is rich in lively word pictures of intelligence personnel—agents, officers, government ministers—and the Soviet supervisors whom

(*Continued on back flap*)

The Deception Game

Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare

LADISLAV BITTMAN

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Preface

The drama and secrecy surrounding espionage operations have a romantic fascination for the general public. Most people are not aware, however, that espionage activities include not only the gathering of secret information but also the distribution of disinformation or "black" propaganda designed to provide half-true, misleading, or wholly false information to deceive the enemy.

Every day thousands of propaganda messages are drummed into the heads of readers, listeners, viewers, consumers and producers, and citizens and rulers of the world. The continuous game of political warfare between Communist and non-Communist systems takes the form of economic, military, scientific, cultural, and ideological rivalry, in which even intelligence services play a role. Soviet-bloc countries export their ideas not only through official channels but also with the help of "special operations"—games and intrigues that are occasionally successful in their immediate aims and often amusing for their primitive ingenuity. Such operations seek mainly to discredit the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and West Germany in the eyes of the world and to influence the narrow circle of individuals involved in the decision-making processes of those target countries. This book, based on my experience as a former Czechoslovak disinformation officer, describes the structure and operations of Department D, Prague's bureau of black propaganda. I have attempted to analyze Czechoslovak and other Soviet-bloc intelligence services and to reveal the formulation, scope, and effects of their special operations.

From 1954 to 1968, as an officer of the Czechoslovak political intelligence service which was designated First Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior, I witnessed and actively participated in Soviet-bloc intelligence activities.

In 1964, occupying the rank of major, I became deputy chief of Prague's newly established Department Eight which was entrusted with the production and coordination of special operations, generally known among Communist intelligence personnel as "active measures." For two years I helped to strengthen this department before leaving for Vienna in 1966 as a member of the Czechoslovak intelligence station there. My involvement in the democratization movement in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and my refusal to accept the Soviet invasion brought me into exile in the United States.

For a long time I was a disciplined Communist intelligence officer, speaking the same language and thinking along the same ideological lines as my fellow intelligence officers, praying with them to the same god named Lenin, admiring the majestic panoramas of the Charles Bridge and Prague's Hradcany Castle from the headquarters of the Czechoslovak intelligence service, or carrying out secret missions abroad, believing such work was the best way to serve the Revolution.

I assume that a military court convicted me in Czechoslovakia in 1970 in closed trial since only then were my property and personal belongings officially confiscated. I have been informed of neither the charges nor the verdict. Actually, it was not necessary because already on that September day in 1968, when I tore off the fetters that had bound me for fourteen years to the Czechoslovak intelligence service, I knew the price that must be paid.

Even before World War II the Czechoslovak Communist Party commanded a strong position, with members and sympathizers among workers as well as prominent writers, journalists, and artists. The bitter experience of the Munich treaty signed by England, France, Italy, and Germany in 1938, which presented Hitler with a part of Czechoslovak territory, the subsequent Nazi occupation, and the liberation of Prague by the Red army further enlarged the number of pro-Communist elements in Czechoslovakia.

My initial approach to communism was more emotional than rational. Both my father, who was a welder, and my mother, a housewife with no formal education, had been Party members since 1945. They did not want me to become involved in politics. My mother used to say that politics was a dirty, risky business and I should avoid it. She did not realize that the everyday experience of the proletarian family carried more influence than her occasional attacks against politics. In 1946, as a fifteen-year-old student, I entered the Communist Party without asking my parents' permission or even telling them about it. When they discovered it they were not enthusiastic but did not object.

My entering Charles University in 1950 was a disappointment to them; my mother had wanted me to become a physician, but I was interested in international law. My university days were an exciting period of learning, delivering idealistic speeches at Party meetings, working as a volunteer during my vacations—as a miner one summer, a steelworker and bricklayer another—and dreaming of my future as a soldier in the Revolution. It is true that there were some points in the Marxist-Leninist theory I could not understand, such as the assumption that the worker is a modern slave who has no property and sinks ever lower instead of rising as industry develops; or the theory that the proletariat alone is revolutionary while other classes decay and perish. I tried to explain away these problems with a rather strained logic because seriously to question a professor on them would be an embarrassing violation of Party discipline. So I gave up at that time.

In 1954, several weeks before my university graduation, the Secretariat of the Communist Party's Central Committee made an appointment with me. I tried to remember if there had been something in my past the Party would consider a sin, and with the exception of several student love affairs I could find nothing. I was sure that these affairs represented no threat to the socialist system in Czechoslovakia, but I entered the Central Committee building with a queasy stomach.

A guard accompanied me to the office where I was expected. Two men welcomed me with the official Party greeting, "Honor Work," and with friendly smiles. The older one asked me to sit down and opened a two-hour question-and-answer period, still

with no explanation. They asked me about my parents, friends, Party activities, health; they were even acquainted with the love affairs I had considered secret. After the interrogation, the younger one asked me whether I would be willing to serve the Party in a most important and dangerous field. I agreed readily. Only then did they explain that I had been selected as a candidate to become an officer in the Czechoslovak intelligence service. I was delighted; it was a great reward and I went home deeply moved. My excitement cooled when I entered our apartment. Mother was cooking dinner while berating the Party because potatoes had not been on the market for several weeks. That was not fair of her, I thought; her emotional attack showed that she desperately needed additional Party indoctrination. I tried to explain the newest Party line. She refused to listen and called me an idealistic young blockhead.

After six months of intelligence training I was appointed research officer in the department for research and analysis. The daily routine was not very exciting. A visitor to my office could hardly see me behind a mound of papers—papers from West German agents that I was supposed to evaluate and compose into daily reports for selected members of the Politburo. For three years I remained in that place, where the word *bureaucratic* did not carry the negative connotations it had in the operational sector, which dealt more with people than papers. When I met friends from operational departments—the upper-middle class of the intelligence service—they would tap my shoulder, teasing me with the frustrating question: "Have you seen a real agent yet?" No, I had not, but I did not admit it.

It was my own fault that I was relegated to the bureaucratic section of the intelligence service for those first few years. The reason was my marriage. Intelligence authorities encouraged their officers to marry, and parties were arranged for single officers and secretaries as a natural way of bringing them together. There were many marriages between intelligence service employees inspired more by Party discipline and security interests than deep emotions, but most of them dissolved several years later. My trouble was that the girl of my heart was Jewish. Leading officers from the personnel department tried to change my mind, arguing that such a

marriage would endanger intelligence service security, because a Jew could not be trusted and must be considered a potential traitor. I, however, could not understand why I should marry someone I did not love. The strong anti-Semitism which existed at the time in Czechoslovakia's state security forces had been transplanted from and enforced by the Soviet Union with the help of Soviet advisors. "If your feelings for her are so strong," they said, "you can visit her and even sleep with her from time to time, but don't marry her." I told them that in that case I would rather leave the service. Finally they gave me permission to marry, but I was not to be trusted to work in the operational sector of the intelligence service for at least three years. I accepted that stipulation gladly, deciding to show them that their mistrust was completely unfounded.

When the three-year probation was over in 1958, I was appointed junior officer of the German-Austrian operational department, whose primary task was to recruit agents in German-speaking countries and, of course, to gather information from them. Slowly I realized that my job was just the opposite—in fact, counterproductive—to that of a specialist in international law, but I regularly visited the Soviet advisor who had been assigned to our department. I respected him, listened to his instructions, wrote memoranda, and was delighted when my suggestions proved successful.

Major Michel, chief of the department, was one of those I secretly admired. He was only four years older than I, but his conspiratorial genius was astonishing. When his subordinates groped for workable operational plans, he would ask them to his office and overwhelm them with new imaginative solutions, larded with dirty words. He did not like to speak at Party meetings, but when he did so, his speeches were short, matter-of-fact, and based on logical, incontestable assumptions. I was too idealistic and naive to recognize that he enjoyed the taste of power more than anything else.

Once in 1959 I sat in Michel's office when Major Molnar entered the room. Molnar belonged to the elite of the Czechoslovak intelligence service. He had just returned from Austria where he had served as the station chief. His professional success and per-

sonal connections led him to the second-highest position in the service, that of the deputy chief. His name evoked respect and fear at the same time. Of middle height, his head deeply set into broad shoulders, with the face of a butcher, he was not a romantic figure. He had no extensive formal education but was equipped with natural intelligence and the qualities of an intriguer capable of deceiving almost anybody at any time.

Molnar came to Michel's desk, took one of the chairs, and sat down. His face showed that he was relaxed and enjoying himself.

"I have just talked to Uncle Molchanov," he said, "about Karl." (Soviet advisors were nicknamed uncles or perfumed uncles because they used strong Russian perfumes which betrayed their presence even long after they had departed.)

"Do you remember Karl?" he asked Michel.

"Certainly, why do you ask?" Michel said. "That idiot was sent to Germany as an agent several years ago. It is true that he did a good job, but imagine, after his mission ended he went back to Czechoslovakia over the barbed-wire fence, was caught by our border guards, and put into prison as a Western spy. He followed our instructions too strictly in not telling *anyone* about his mission in Germany. His message from prison got lost and so he spent more than a year behind bars. Isn't that funny?"

Molnar and Michel laughed. I looked at them, embarrassed. I wanted to laugh but could not. The whole story sounded not at all funny. Molnar must have realized my confusion because he looked at me and said: "What's wrong with you?"

"Nothing, Comrade Molnar, nothing," I replied, trying to smile and convince myself that something was wrong with me. I was not yet equipped with that degree of cynicism necessary for survival in the espionage environment.

Michel tried to help me out of the situation. "Don't pay any attention to him," he said to Molnar, "he's an overpolitical child." He was right, espionage is no business for romantic dreamers. I looked at the wall behind his desk decorated with a large poster quoting the words of Felix Dzherzhinski, the first commissar of the Soviet secret police:

A cool head,
A burning heart,
And clean hands at all times.

Major Michel helped me to overcome my naive romanticism. When a West German circus artist died of a heart attack in a hotel room in Prague, Michel sent me there to examine the body and the dead man's belongings and write a detailed account of how his papers and identity could be put to good use by the Czechoslovak intelligence service. He sent me abroad for appointments with second- or third-class agents and was pleased when something went wrong. Once he sent me to Linz to contact an agent in a railway station, giving me only a brief description of the man and a password. The man was supposed to have a beard and be wearing a green ranger suit. I found over twenty individuals there who fit that description. As time passed I had to act. With a silly password, "Didn't we meet in Salzburg in 1956?" I approached one after another. Only the eleventh was the right one, leaving the other ten in doubt about my mental health. Another time Michel told me to keep appointments with two agents in Salzburg. The problem was that both appointments were scheduled for the same time, and there was a distance of a half-mile between the places I was supposed to meet each agent. I ran several times from one place to the other, fearful that I would miss them. I did, both of them.

In 1961 intelligence authorities concluded that I had successfully completed my apprenticeship and they sent me to Berlin. They thought I was sufficiently adjusted to the espionage environment and had lost my political romanticism. I tended to believe it, too.

Major Jaroslav Antos, the station chief in Berlin, was Molnar's friend. He welcomed me with a smile, hoping that he had been sent a submissive subordinate. Two months later we were enemies because I could not be silent after discovering his frauds which victimized both the state and his subordinates. One of the officers stationed in Berlin wanted to buy an inexpensive car, and Antos offered to help him. Several days later an old Opel-Record stood in front of the embassy building, and the officer paid Antos what seemed to be a reasonable amount of West German marks. Nobody knew that Antos bought Western cars from the East German Ministry for State Security for East German marks and sold them for West German marks at a remarkable profit. These cars had been confiscated from West German citizens accused of spying against

East Germany. Divided Berlin, with two currencies, was an ideal location for Antos, who was protected by a diplomatic passport which made him immune to West Berlin police, and by his good contacts with the highest East German state security officials.

Discussion on that topic was long and dramatic. He threatened to report me to Molnar and promised revenge. The authorities in Prague preferred to bury the affair quietly, but the facts were too obvious. In 1961 Antos was recalled, subjected to a disciplinary inquest, and released from the service. He found a position in the counterintelligence service, and waited for his chance for revenge. He could not foresee that it would come very soon.

Prague sent a new station chief, and I was directed to take over an agent who was actually a protégé of Antos. His cover name VTIP (which means "joke" in English) reflected his accomplishments and the game he played with several intelligence services. VTIP had offered himself as an agent, and Antos had accepted him. He was an independent journalist who published an obscure bulletin in Frankfurt and boasted about his personal contacts with West German politicians. For about two years he had supplied the Czechoslovak service with partially fabricated political articles before it concluded that something was wrong. Two months after I had taken him over the intelligence service discovered that he worked not only for Czechs, but for East Germans and Americans as well. East Berlin became angry and arrested him a short time later. VTIP's confession to the East Germans that he really worked for the CIA was a turning point of my Berlin mission. West Berlin, the main battlefield of the Czechoslovak intelligence service against Germany, was closed to me for security reasons, and in East Berlin there was not too much to do. At the beginning of 1963 Prague decided to call me home.

Meanwhile many changes had taken place in Prague. In 1961 Minister of the Interior Rudolf Barak was suspended and in January 1962 arrested by his former subordinates. He was accused of fraud, theft of state property, violation of security regulations, and of conspiracy against President Novotny. In the late fifties Barak's influence and power inside the Party and the government had grown to challenge even President Novotny. That may have been why Novotny allowed an investigation of Barak's activities. As

Minister of the Interior, Barak ruled the whole state security apparatus, including the intelligence service. Some of his public speeches mentioned the successes of the intelligence service, which was very unusual at that time since the existence of the service was officially denied. He characterized Radio Free Europe as an institution totally penetrated by Czechoslovak intelligence agents. He exaggerated, but there were indeed several highly productive agents among RFE employees. Barak's sympathy for the intelligence service was also personally motivated. The intelligence service had millions in Western currencies at its disposal, and thus Barak could, for example, send his two sons to the Olympic Games in Rome in 1960, accompanied by an intelligence officer as a guide and guard—all expenses paid from the intelligence service's funds.

When he was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment, the military court in Pribram declared that Barak had robbed the state of 143,268 Swiss francs, 20,000 Austrian schillings, 2 million Italian liras, 72,000 American dollars, 20,000 French francs, and about 765,000 Czechoslovak crowns. Not all the money came from the intelligence service. The counterintelligence division was another important source which in fact not only hunted Western spies but smuggled antiques from Czechoslavakia to Western European countries, mainly to Austria and West Germany. This business was supposed to bring back some important raw materials blocked by Western embargo provisions, but a considerable part of the profit found its way into the pockets of Barak and his helpers.

He was not the only one in trouble. Intelligence Deputy Chief Molnar was suspected of taking part in Barak's unofficial business or at least of knowing about it. Molnar quickly decided to change sides, willingly collaborated with the investigation commission, and became a witness for the prosecution. The maneuver paid off. He was awarded with the position of deputy chief of the regional counterintelligence service in Prague. Several other officers had to leave, among them intelligence service chief Colonel Jaroslav Miler, who was relieved by Colonel Josef Houska. Barak's position as minister of the interior was given to Lubomir Strougal, a former minister for agriculture and a reliable Novotny servant.

Several months after I returned from Berlin Colonel Houska asked me to his office. He offered me the position of his chief administrator and was surprised that I declined. In February of 1964 he flatly appointed me as deputy chief of a new department for special operations.

The new department, structured according to the Soviet pattern, offered much opportunity for imaginative work on a high level, rather than the stereotyped everyday actions of the operational departments which were involved in traditional activities of recruiting and directing agents. I was aware, however, of a few risks involved with special operations. Uncontrolled activity in the sphere of international relations, with the help of provocative psychological warfare operations, carried with it the danger that the intelligence service might go too far and establish its own foreign policy. Chapter 2 of this volume describes such operations. For the first time since entering the service I drew on my legal background and tried to explain the possible risks to the leading officers. I asked them to initiate a legal document justifying and clarifying our activities. They looked at me, unbelievingly, and refused. The department for special operations quickly became Colonel Houska's favorite department because he could present its successes as his own achievements to the Central Committee of the Communist Party and thus enjoy the Central Committee's respect. Even Soviet advisors could not conceal their admiration for the work of Czechoslovakia's new department. The Czechoslovak intelligence service successfully discredited West German politicians, attacked Americans, and fooled the inexperienced leaders of underdeveloped countries all over the world, as shown in Chapter 3.

My ambivalence on entering journalism reflected my state of mind. Torn between a feeling of responsibility to the intelligence service as an embodiment of the Party's principles and growing doubts about the usefulness and justifiability of the operations I participated in, I started to look for a way out. The romantic taste of the espionage world had disappeared, along—slowly—with my illusions about the Party's wisdom. I wanted to do something positive, constructive, and satisfying. After my first marriage ended, I married a young television reporter. Daily discussions

with an openminded partner who was not blinded by Party discipline and propaganda represented another step forward in my personal development. Following her example I enrolled in the School of Journalism at Charles University in 1964, studying in my spare time and planning to enter a new career after graduation.

In the fall of 1966 a slim volume called *Dirigent zakulisi* (Director Behind the Scenes) appeared in Czechoslovak bookstores and on newsstands. It discussed the postwar activities of the American intelligence service in Czechoslovakia and recounted the fate of several American agents who were exposed in the course of their activities in Czechoslovakia and punished. This part of the book was more or less factual, though the facts were understandably presented from the viewpoint of Communist Czechoslovakia. The intended consequence was for the domestic public to take warning. Parts of the book were carefully constructed, however, to present supposedly intimate knowledge of the CIA. The Czechoslovak intelligence service hoped that their American counterparts would analyze these sections and even consider the possibility of Communist subversion and leakages to the enemy within their own ranks. Two authors under the pseudonyms Müller and Guth wrote that book, and I was one of them. In the defense of my co-author Miroslav Hladky I must say that he knew nothing about my job as a disinformation and propaganda specialist and sincerely believed that all the data I gathered and parts of the book I wrote were inspired only by my journalistic ambition. After the Russian invasion we went our separate ways, and he became one of the few journalists to willingly offer his services to the new occupation regime.

The message made a successful impact on the domestic population. The book sold out in a few days. It was impossible to verify the effect on the American intelligence service however, though several unconfirmed sources suggested that the CIA was highly interested in the book's authors.

My first resignation as departmental deputy chief and intelligence officer had not been accepted in 1964. Houska instead tried to make the intelligence service palatable to me and decided to take me with him to France and Italy in 1965. The three-week inspection tour was in fact a vacation trip, but it was not the right

therapy. A chance to spend so many days and nights with him and to study the man was only another disappointment. Behind the façade of an energetic, clear-sighted, methodical man was the emptiness of a doctrinaire Stalinist who had neither a working knowledge of the problems of international relations nor the professional expertise of an intelligence officer.

Shortly after the trip to Italy the German operational department offered me a position at the intelligence station in Vienna, combined with a press attaché cover. Houska withheld his consent for more than a year but when he finally agreed I entered the last stage of a fourteen-year journey, in December 1966.

As an intelligence officer in the political sector my primary task was to develop a large circle of personal contacts with Austrians and West Germans to test their strengths and weaknesses, search for cracks in their political and moral stability, and look for candidates to become agents. At the same time I was a case officer, entrusted with directing several well-established agents.

One of them, an elderly man whose cover name was Maret, celebrated twenty years of successful undercover activities for the Czechoslovak intelligence service in 1968. He knew the espionage business better than many Czechoslovak intelligence officers, including me. He had developed the ability to give the intelligence service precisely what it wanted, regardless of whether or not his reports were true, and he knew how to deceive even experienced analysts. Not all of his activities were innocent and harmless—he had also been involved in a kidnapping. Capitalizing on the competition between East and the West and skillfully avoiding the dangers of the job, he was a typical figure in today's espionage world. He had no sincere faith in communism; for him spying meant making money and I had a feeling that the 10,000 Austrian schillings he received every month from us were doubled or tripled by his income from other intelligence services.

In 1968, under Dubcek's leadership of the Communist Party, Czechoslovakia awoke from her lethargy and began to move toward a goal considered in very bad taste by her closest Communist allies—democratic socialism. In February 1968 I visited intelligence headquarters in Prague and submitted a memorandum

outlining a new Czechoslovak intelligence service which would work for Czechoslovak interests only. The Czechoslovak intelligence service had been completely in Soviet hands and was incapable of performing any function that was not in the interest of the Soviet Union. A large group of Soviet advisors directed and influenced all its activities. The Soviet Union claimed satellite intelligence successes but failed to accept responsibility for failures. Under Soviet guidance, described in Chapter 4, the Czechoslovak intelligence service had grown to gigantic dimensions, operating in Europe, Africa, Asia, Latin America, and North America, gathering information and carrying out operations which were mostly of no use to Czechoslovakia, especially during its attempt to humanize socialism, but of definite value to the Soviet Union.

The big Soviet brother did not like the idea of democratic socialism, and Czechoslovak liberal Communists, myself included, became victims of our own deception in hoping that Soviet leadership would not be willing to pay any price for stopping the Czechoslovak experiment. Beginning in March the Soviets initiated a series of moves against Czechoslovakia, using diplomatic pressure, political, economic, and military threats, and intelligence operations. These activities are described in Chapter 5. Members of a pro-Soviet group in the Czechoslovak state security forces willingly offered their services and helped Russian informants to launch disinformation and black propaganda operations in order to undermine the new regime.

When the Soviet army together with token units of four other Warsaw Pact members crossed Czechoslovak borders and occupied her territory, I openly refused to follow any orders from Prague intelligence headquarters, thus drawing a clear dividing line between my past and future.

On September 3, 1968, at 11 P.M., two weeks after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, I turned off the lights in my apartment in Vienna and drew closer to a window. The car was still at the same place it had stopped when I had entered the apartment house. The Russian surveillance commando had been following me for several days after I told Mr. Prihoda, Vienna station chief of the Czechoslovak intelligence service, that I was not willing to

follow the orders of the invaders and their helpers. The period of discussions between liberals and Stalinists was over and the service had returned again completely to the motherly lap of the Russian intelligence service. It is true that Dubcek, arrested and transferred to the Soviet territory like a criminal, together with other leading liberals, was released and accepted as a partner in the negotiations, but he returned from Moscow with a treaty that was nothing more than a capitulation. Czechoslovak secret police, including the intelligence service, was to be the first target for political purges. I knew they would like to have me home as soon as possible. I would not be the first one kidnapped from Austria by a Communist intelligence service; there were only forty miles between Vienna and the Czechoslovak-Austrian border.

The idea that the Russian commando would stay there the whole night was not very heartening. Should I risk an escape now and hope to lose them in a hunt through the empty streets of Vienna or should I ask the Austrian police for protection? The Austrian police and counterintelligence service were largely penetrated by East European agents. Even at the highest level of the Austrian security forces was a Czech intelligence agent called Mr. Seven by my colleagues. I did not want to be captured by him. Should I ask a Western embassy for political asylum? The side effects, mainly the subsequent press coverage, also did not appeal to me. There was no other choice than to wait for the right moment and leave the country on my own. I had no idea where I would go, but I did know I had to leave.

In the darkness of the living room I helped my wife pack the few things we could take with us, checking my watchdogs below from time to time. Shortly before midnight the car began to move. I saw two faces look up at our windows. The car circled twice around the block of houses and then took off toward the center of the city. They believed we had gone to bed.

I gently opened the apartment door, went down without switching on the corridor lights, and checked my car standing in front of the house. The Russians apparently had not touched it. We quickly carried the few things to the car, having no time for sentimental reminiscences about the place where we had spent the last two years. I started the car, made several turns in the

Vienna suburbs to be sure once more that we were not being followed, and then headed the car toward the highway connecting Vienna with Salzburg.

Many chaotic thoughts came to my mind touching both past and future, fourteen wasted years of my life. I did not know for sure whether my decision had been right. There were other young officers in the service fighting futilely for the same liberal ideas and principles as I. If I returned home and joined them, we could perhaps still do something against the Russians. But was there anyone among the political leaders who would accept the services of an anti-Russian group within the Czechoslovak intelligence service? There was not. Their hands were bound by the Moscow capitulation treaty. Maybe I should go home, leave the intelligence service, forget the invasion, forget everything, and escape into my own private world. It would be another form of exile, yes, but in my own country without the frustrations of a world dominated by principles and rules I did not understand. I was torn by doubts. The Czechoslovak intelligence service will run again, slowly at the beginning; nevertheless, time is on the side of the Stalinists. Honest liberals will be purged and the remainder perhaps give up. Many people abroad and even at home will become victims again. The Czechoslovak intelligence service will have to deliver pseudo-facts for new political trials, and I am not willing to participate in such activities. For a long time I was a part of the machine, but then the moment came when life put a bill in front of me, and I had to pay it.

I lit a cigarette and watched as thick fog descended on the highway. I did not know what country would shelter us. I had a few friends among Czech journalists—writers and scholars in Western Europe waiting and hoping for the miracle of a Soviet retreat from Czechoslovakia. Some of them were ready to go back to Czechoslovakia, and my continuing relationship with those intending to stay could only harm their futures. I realized that I might be chased till the end of my life by the Czechoslovak intelligence service and its big Soviet brother as a defector who knows too much. This was certainly not a liberating feeling. I would have liked to have stopped the car, the time, and my life, to have remained in a vacuum between past and future.

When the sky grew lighter, I stopped the car at a small rest stop, opened the door, and left the car. I stepped to the front of the car and tore off the CD sign giving me diplomatic immunity. I no longer needed it. I had crossed my Rubicon. An hour later we arrived in West Germany.

Why have I written this book? I realize that the story of Czechoslovak and Soviet-bloc disinformation activities against the non-Communist world is of current interest and also that extremists at each end of the political spectrum of the non-Communist world could misuse it for their own political purposes. The left might see it as anti-Communist propaganda. On the other hand, the right might look at it as proof of an almighty Communist conspiracy and explanation for all the troubles of the non-Communist world. I think that both of these extremes are wrong, and hope this account will show why. I realize that recounting my experience itself without objective documentation could be misinterpreted or misunderstood by readers. Therefore I have carefully traced all available press coverage of special operations which I participated in or had known about or had registered as an observer of the international scene after my defection. Chapter 6 presents some observations of world events from which the reader may draw his own conclusions.

I can predict Prague's or Moscow's reaction to this book without hesitation. They will call it a fraud and literary espionage written at the direction of the CIA. I am sure that in the Czechoslovak intelligence service a group of experts is at work preparing measures to prevent my disclosure of Soviet-bloc special operation secrets. They have already begun to create a climate for their attack. Kim Philby, a Soviet agent and former official of the British intelligence service, who defected to the Soviet Union in 1963, in an interview published in the Czechoslovak Communist Party's daily *Rude Pravo* on August 18, 1971, meditated on contemporary CIA propaganda. He said that the manufacture of documents, pamphlets, and books is a major CIA industry, and despite many apparent mistakes, as in the so-called *Penkovsky Papers* and *Khrushchev Remembers*, the "CIA has by no means abandoned its incursion into the publishing trade. We must be prepared," Philby said, "for bigger and better fakes, the exposure of which

may call for a high degree of political sophistication." Philby's authority as an intelligence expert and his statement might be the start of Prague's and Moscow's public countermeasures against any revelation of their techniques of psychological warfare.

For several years I helped create cold war propaganda and I did not come to the United States only to continue in it from the opposite side. I defected because I concluded that cold war propaganda was a disservice, especially to my own country. It took me a long time to understand that the end does not necessarily justify the means. The final irony in my own experience was watching Soviet and Prague agents practice black propaganda on Czechoslovakia, herself one of the most successful producers of disinformation and propaganda operations against the non-Communist world. It is my hope that this book will contribute to, rather than impede, progress toward international understanding.

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Spring 1972 LADISLAV BITTMAN

1

Secret Games

The package arrived on May 17, 1957, addressed to André-Marie Tremeaud, prefect of the Lower Rhine Department in Strausbourg. His secretary hesitated to accept the package because the sender's address revealed little and the stamp indicated only that the package had been mailed from the eastern working-class section of Paris. The secretary unwrapped it and, finding a box of cigars, gave it to the prefect.

Tremeaud proposed to open it and offer a cigar to an associate with whom he was speaking, but the associate declined and Tremeaud put the box on the table. This certainly saved the lives of Tremeaud and his associate, but not that of Tremeaud's wife. Later in the day, as the New York *Times* reported on May 18, while preparing for a party, she picked it up and pried open the box with a knife blade. A huge explosion followed. The "box of cigars" was a bomb.

Because Tremeaud had served as a prefect in Algeria from 1952 to 1955, the first opinion expressed by French newspapers was that his wife's assassin should be sought among Algerian rebels, who were at that time prone to similar methods of terrorizing political opponents. But the French police discovered evidence leading to a neo-Nazi West German organization called *Kampfverband für Unabhängiges Deutschland* (Fighting Group for an Independent Germany). The *Kampfverband* had appeared on the German political stage in 1956, mailing vitriolic fascist proclamations to American, British, and French diplomatic and

military missions in the German Federal Republic (GFR) and sending threatening letters to officers and solders of allied units in the country and to relatives in America of GI's in Germany. The *Kampfverband* fought for a new unified Germany, against the dominant influence of the Western powers in West Germany, and for the return of all German territories, even the sensitive French nerve of Alsace-Lorraine, a French territory which had been seized by Germany in 1871 and returned to France by the Treaty of Versailles after World War I. The leaflets, statements, and letters written by the *Kamfverband* showed that the leaders and members of the organization were Nazis. But, though the *Kampfverband* documents revealed an anti-Communist streak, the main thrust of its attacks was not against the East but the West. The discovery of West German involvement in Mrs. Tremeaud's death stimulated much speculation in the French press and anti-German feelings among the French public. At that time the French and British ambassadors to West Germany received anonymous letters with which were enclosed copies of an American document signed by Mr. O'Shaughnessy, head of the political section of the United States Embassy in West Germany. The document was addressed to the State Department and revealed that the United States looked favorably on neo-Nazi organizations in West Germany.

Soviet-bloc mass media had new grounds on which to attack the German Federal Republic. Using Mrs. Tremeaud's death as an example of West German revanchist activities, the Soviet media raised a warning voice against West Germany's growing strength and defended France's rights on Alsace-Lorraine.

In June 1961, testifying before a United States Senate subcommittee, Richard Helms, then assistant director of the CIA, said that he thought the phantom originator of the poisonous campaign and Mrs. Tremeaud's assassin was the East German intelligence service. He was wrong. The action was in fact initiated and executed by the Czechoslovak intelligence service.

In its political maneuvering, Moscow needed a new opportunity to point to the growth of fascism in the German Federal Republic and, with the help of this specter, to intimidate West Germany's European and overseas allies. Under the direction of Soviet advisors, the Czechoslovak intelligence service carried out

an action entailing the fullest possible use of current methods of black propaganda as well as assassination. The intent was to prove to the world public that the German Federal Republic was a fascist seedbed; the *Kamfverband für Unabhängiges Deutschland* was created, at least on paper, to produce fascist propaganda on a large scale.

In the first phase of the operation, uninspired pronouncements were sent mainly to American institutions and soldiers in the GFR; in the second phase, the perpetrators turned their attention to the French public, where anti-German sentiment was greater. The climax of the operation was an assassination whose victim was to have been the French prefect.

In the course of the operation, several West German citizens were arrested and interrogated in connection with the activity of the *Kampfverband*. The perpetrators in Prague accounted for this incident with the theory that several *Kampfverband* leaflets had accidentally fallen into the hands of real Nazis, who further disseminated them on their own initiative. Public discussion of the *Kampfverband* as a possible instigator of Mrs. Tremeaud's murder was so widespread that the USSR could openly join the fray without fearing that the French public and investigatory agencies could deduce Soviet involvement in the matter.

There is no record of that operation in Czechoslovak intelligence archives. The Czechoslovak intelligence service is similar to its Soviet counterpart in its need to protect itself from the curiosity of its own employees. The files of the most sensitive operations are destroyed immediately after the mission is accomplished. In this way, the service tries to maintain an idealized self-image and to protect the officers involved. However, the desire to prove their importance and to show off in front of colleagues was for some of the officers involved in Operation *Kampfverband* stronger than the strict conspiratorial measures, and fragmentary information gradually spread among a wider circle of Czechoslovak intelligence officers, who nicknamed it Operation Booms.

Was Operation *Kampfverband* an isolated act of the Czechoslovak intelligence service or does it represent a common routine of Soviet-bloc intelligence services? The division of the world into two camps after the Russian Revolution in 1917 appeared at a

qualititatively new level after World War II. Under the threat of World War III both Communist and non-Communist parts of the world sought new ways, instruments, and possibilities for more effective defense against and weakening of the enemy.

The Soviet Union concluded that an element existed in international political communications systems whose potential had by no means been sufficiently exhausted. This element was the intelligence service which, in peacetime, was normally restricted to the one-way transmission of secret information about an enemy to the highest state agencies as a basis for the government's decision-making (a role described in intelligence circles as passive). Because in an open democratic society individuals and organizations have the right to transmit communications to both domestic and foreign audiences, the USSR and its satellites decided to utilize these opportunities for the large-scale dissemination of subversive messages, interpreted with the help of an intelligence apparatus on enemy territory. These activities, called special operations, constitute an active role for the intelligence service.

On the other hand, non-Communist countries attempting to employ the same methods and tools against the Communist bloc were handicapped by the totalitarian character of the Communist regimes, which impeded the free flow of information and sealed their societies against any direct Western ideological influence.

The massive development of science and technology in recent decades has also had a strong influence on the methods, orientation, and the role priorities of intelligence services. In the passive information-gathering function, the human element—a spy—is increasingly being replaced by electronic equipment such as spy planes, ships, and satellites. But intelligence services are no longer merely institutions which supply secret information to political or military decision-makers; they are active participants in foreign relations, trying to mislead opposition governments, to lead them to wrong conclusions, and to deceive the world public. From the viewpoint of Soviet-bloc intelligence services the United States is the primary enemy. Other NATO countries and West Germany are other important targets.

Soviet-bloc intelligence services distinguish three basic types of special operations through which they actively penetrate the

area of international relations: disinformation, which is false information leaked to an opponent in order to mislead him; black propaganda, including operations which conceal their Communist source or intelligence service as the initiator; and influence operations, which attempt to weaken the opponent's establishment from within.

Czechoslovakia's intelligence service, though formally subordinate to the government, is actually directed by the Communist Party and primarily by the Soviet intelligence service—the real center of the East European intelligence community. Directives from Moscow are transmitted to the Czechoslovak service indirectly through channels between the Soviet and the Czechoslovak Communist Parties and directly by Soviet advisors. Moscow is informed about every detail of Czechoslovakia's intelligence activities, including agent identities—the most protected secret of any intelligence service. The Soviet Union checks information gathered by Czechoslovak agents, selecting the most important for translation into Russian by Czech translators for transmittal to Moscow. The Russians influence the planning of operations and assess the results. No important decision is made without them.

The position of East European satellite intelligence services—primarily East German, Czechoslovak, Polish, and Hungarian—in the non-Communist countries is usually underestimated by the West. These services follow Soviet superpower interests and instructions and permit the Soviet Union to increase its intelligence activities substantially, especially in the Third World.

In order to understand Soviet-bloc intelligence activities as described in the following chapters, it is necessary to define a few basic terms and organizational principles. The headquarters of the service, called the "center," directs "*rezidenturas*"—intelligence stations abroad—which are headed by "*rezidents*"—station chiefs. While Western literature usually uses the term "agent" for any individual involved in the intelligence business, Communist intelligence services distinguish between an "agent" and an "organ." An agent is an individual who is recruited with the help of compromising material or money or who is willing to cooperate because of ideological or political sympathy. Even if he seems

to be very reliable, he is never trusted completely. He knows little about the internal structure, objectives, and methods of the intelligence service he works for because his connection with it is usually through only one man—another agent or an organ who is an intelligence professional. Headquarters and the *rezidenturas* are staffed only with organs. Because political intelligence services as well as the military in Communist countries use military ranks for their personnel and the majority hold the rank of officer, the term "officer" will be used here instead of "organ." When an officer is entrusted with directing one or several agents he is called a case officer.

In 1968 Czechoslovakia's political intelligence service consisted of two major sectors: operational and nonoperational. As the nonoperational sector plays no important role in the initiation and execution of special operations, we shall not be concerned with it. In the operational sector, four territorial departments—American, West German, European, and Afro-Asian—were responsible for intelligence activities on enemy territory. Their duties included searching for new candidates to become agents, recruiting and managing them, gathering secret political information, and carrying out special operations. Specialized tasks were assigned to the department for scientific-technical intelligence, which collected data on scientific and technological innovations abroad; the department of foreign counterintelligence, which tried to penetrate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence services; and the department for special operations, which is discussed in this book. Finally, several operational departments were entrusted with training and directing "illegals"—intelligence officers especially trained to live abroad on false documents as citizens of non-Communist countries.

Czechoslovak intelligence service guidelines defined the content and extent of "active measures" as special operations with the following goals: weakening the opponent by undermining his political, military, economic, or moral strength; creating new rifts or exacerbating existing rifts in his camp; discrediting his policies and representatives in the eyes of his own country and the entire world; influencing the formulation, content, and extent of his policies by feeding him disinformation and indulging in covert

action; and supporting the struggle against "imperialism" in developing countries.

Through special operations the Soviet-bloc intelligence services entered the sphere of foreign policy in three areas: the foreign policy of the Soviet-bloc countries with the non-Communist world; the relations between non-Communist countries; and the communications between a non-Communist government and a non-Communist public.

Special operations resemble a game in which the participants are divided into three basic categories: initiator, enemy, and victim. The initiator formulates and instigates operations. The enemy may include an entire foreign country or merely its government agencies or institutions. The enemy may also be an individual or group of individuals. From the viewpoint of Communist intelligence agencies, the role of enemy is most often played by the United States or West Germany. The victim is an innocent bystander exploited by the initiator in his attack on the enemy. The victim may then become the target for the enemy's counteroffensives, since the aim is for the enemy to mistake him for the initiator. The role of victim is most often played by the developing countries.

The range or scale of special operations is quite broad, but considered individually, their significance usually is not global. The typical disinformation or propaganda operation evokes a reaction having impact in only a few countries and of only a few weeks' or months' duration. The great value of a propaganda operation to the Soviet-bloc is in its long-term *cumulative* effect.

A Decade of Terror

One summer day in 1960, Major Michel, chief of the German department of the Czechoslovak intelligence service, called me into his office. "Have you heard anything about Bertelot?" he asked.

"No, Comrade Chief," I replied, protecting my colleagues who had told me much about Bertelot.

"Well, his case officer will be away for several weeks and I want you to take care of him during that time. He is a German living in Prague. He doesn't speak Czech, so you can have some practice in German."

"What am I supposed to do?"

"Nothing special. He is an agent we had to bring secretly from Germany to Czechoslovakia in 1955, and since then we have had to take care of him. Take 1,500 crowns from the finance department tomorrow and give it to him. It is a salary he gets from us regularly every month."

"What is he doing for us now?" I asked.

"Not too much," Michel replied. "From time to time some newspaper analyses and translations. Actually, not translations but German editing, whenever we need it."

"Is he the man who edits the forgeries?" I asked again.

"Yes," he said. "Don't forget to take some German newspapers with you. Reading newspapers is one of the few pleasures we can give him. And don't be too nice to him, I mean don't show any personal affection, it could be dangerous."

"Why?" I asked.

"Well, he could rape you," Michel said with a smile, "he is gay."

The following day when I went to Bertelot's apartment, I faced a man in his forties. I explained to him who I was, and he invited me in. He was soft-spoken with nonexpressive features, and he incessantly babbled about trivia and sex. Sex was his favorite topic, and his sex stories were just as tawdry as his appearance. Dust and dirt stuck to everything in his apartment, making his stories seem even dirtier. Although he was not a heroic type, he was a living bit of Czechoslovak intelligence history. The intelligence service had made him a murderer.

Because he was a homosexual it had not been too difficult for the intelligence service to recruit him. He once supplied the service with second-hand confidential information on West German politics, and from time to time, from West German territory, he mailed letters received from his case officer. He knew nothing about these letters, nor did he care. A few hundred marks

monthly for his work and a guarantee that he would not be exposed publicly as a homosexual were all he wanted and needed.

At the beginning of July 1955 his case officer gave him a small package with instructions on where and how to mail it. Bertelot followed the order without knowing what it was all about; he knew, however, that the addressee was Matus Cernak, former Slovak Fascist Minister who had lived since the end of World War II in Munich as an exile.

On July 5 Cernak came to a post office in Munich to pick up the package. He was opening it when it exploded, killing him as well as two West German citizens who happened to be nearby. When Bertelot realized what happened, he panicked. Although he was not directly responsible for Cernak's death he knew that his involvement in that operation could bring him many years in prison. He immediately left Germany for Austria and contacted his case officer who helped him to cross the Czechoslovak border.

It would seem that the reason for Cernak's assassination was not only in his fascist past but in his postwar political activity as well. He was one of the founders of the Slovak Separatist movement, which was nationalistic, strove for an independent Slovakia, and was influenced by the Roman Catholic clergy.

Bertelot helped to write this cruel chapter of Czechoslovak intelligence history in the 1950s; it was neither the first nor the last one. The Czechoslovak intelligence service could claim traditional precedents. Before and during World War II, Czechoslovakia had a relatively small but efficient military intelligence service, directed before 1938 mainly against neighboring countries with undemocratic regimes—Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Austria—and later primarily against Germany.

In 1938 a group of prominent military intelligence officers led by Colonel Moravec flew to London, taking with them important archives and documents concerning intelligence agents. The military intelligence service had at its disposal several key agents whose reports were a valuable source of allied information about the Nazis in the first half of the war.

After World War II, a small intelligence division emerged within the Ministry of the Interior, controlled by the Communists

and directed mainly against the Western great powers and West Germany, but its effectiveness was limited.

The cold war period and its side effects paved the way for what might be called the intelligence race. Intelligence services have grown to mammoth proportions, especially in the Soviet Union, the United States, and later in satellite East European nations. Leftist intellectual sympathy for the Soviet Union, intensified by the idea of anti-Soviet Nazi brutality during the war, was expressed in some instances by cooperating with Soviet intelligence agents. The Soviet Union won considerable successes in the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and France. When the Communists emerged victorious in Czechoslovakia, after February 1948, and when the rest of the countries in the Soviet sphere of influence set out on the newly open road to communism, satellite intelligence services modeled after the Soviet pattern and under Soviet supervision began sprouting up all over Central and Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union was thus able to increase the extent of its intelligence efforts substantially.

Czechoslovakia's political intelligence service, under the guidance of Soviet advisors, was reorganized and expanded to the dimensions of a large professional organization. The prewar and wartime intelligence archives afforded the new Communist service the opportunity to renew contact with several agents in Germany. The scope of activity, however, extended far beyond Germany.

The cold war proper and its aftereffects in the second half of the fifties were a productive time for Soviet-bloc services. They took advantage of the fast-fading sympathy communism had enjoyed and the direct threat of war that gave rise to a good deal of fence-sitting by citizens of non-Communist countries. Emigré organizations or institutions in which emigrés took prominent part—such as intelligence services and radio stations—were in general a common target for special operations during the fifties. Emigré centers were quite well saturated with Communist agents, and intelligence services did not stop at the most drastic methods of restricting emigré activity, thwarting their leaders, kidnapping, and even assassination.

Thus, in December 1953 Bohumil Lausman, a former vice-

premier of Czechoslovakia, who had fled his country in the winter of 1949, was kidnapped from Austria two years before Matus Cernak was assassinated. Special operations were not limited to these practices. Every group of political emigrés has its share of problems. It is invariably torn by inner conflicts, homesickness, insufficient contact with events and attitudes of the people at home, so all sorts of factors make it easy prey for the intelligence service. The Czechoslovak intelligence service disseminated disinformation, aroused mutual suspicion among emigré groups, and forged emigré organization documents. In the mid-fifties, the monthly journal *Ceske Slovo* (*Czech Word*) published in West Germany by J. Pejskar, was an important source of information for Czechoslovak emigrés about events in Czechoslovakia. As the published material was sharply anti-Communist, the Czechoslovak intelligence service decided to institute countermeasures. An agent was assigned to search the office of the journal's editor and appropriate all useful material, especially the addresses of subscribers and correspondents.

A false edition of *Ceske Slovo* was then prepared in Prague and distributed to Czechoslovak emigrant subscribers throughout the world. The Czechoslovak intelligence service knew that the forgery would be soon detected, but the action would serve to demonstrate the widespread nature of Communist espionage.

Several months after my experience with Bertelot another special operation of the Czechoslovak intelligence service attracted the attention of the world public. More or less a practical joke, it was investigated and classified as an attempt to poison the entire Radio Free Europe (RFE) staff in Munich.

The central offices of Radio Free Europe were frequently the object of special operations. Someone in Prague proposed putting a laxative powder into the RFE diningroom saltshakers. The idea was accepted and Jaroslav Nemec, an officer stationed in Salzburg and covered as a Czechoslovak consulate official there, was instructed to carry out the operation with the help of one of his well-established agents in RFE. Even though they did plan to use a strong laxative that might have threatened the health of some of the weaker staff members, the initiators only intended to create an atmosphere of fear among RFE employees and mainly to

amuse themselves. But nobody laughed. The agent who was to carry out the operation was actually a double-agent working for the Americans. The affair received wide publicity as a Communist murder plot because atropine, planned for use as the laxative, could in sufficient quantity cause delirium, convulsions, coma, or death. Jaroslav Nemec was publicly exposed as a poisoner, and intelligence headquarters immediately sent a coded telegram to Salzburg instructing the station chief there to bring Nemec home. Since Nemec had no diplomatic immunity, he could have been arrested and delivered to Germany. The trouble was that neither the station chief nor Nemec could be found. They were somewhere in Tyrol enjoying the beauty of the Austrian Alps. They had not heard the news on the radio, television, or newspapers and thus had no idea what had happened.

Leaders in Prague were very angry and anxious, but no one was able to locate the two. Finally, Deputy Chief of Intelligence Molnar decided to intervene personally. He drove to Austria, found Nemec, and brought him safely to Prague. The press coverage of the unsuccessful operation damaged Czechoslovakia's prestige despite the fact that the Munich public prosecutor said after completing his investigation that the amount of poison had not been sufficient to cause serious harm.

Officers of the intelligence service gained at least one positive effect. Since that time duty cars of officers stationed abroad have been equipped with radios and officers are instructed to listen regularly to the news.

In 1952 and 1953 the Soviet intelligence service took part in a massive anti-American propaganda campaign based on the claim that the American army in Korea was using bacteriological weapons. The campaign, run mainly by the World Peace Council, was quite successful although most of the arguments, documents, and testimonies were forged. The success of anti-emigré special operations encouraged officers of the Czechoslovak intelligence service staff to follow the Soviet pattern and to undertake special operations of falsification projects aimed at the United States and West Germany.

The rightist Sudeten German movement in West Germany be-

came a natural and easy target because the movement was a stronghold of anti-communism and many of its leaders had been devoted Nazis before and during World War II.

In 1956, Dr. Lodgman von Auen, spokesman for the Sudeten German organization, *Die Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft,* received insulting letters from abroad, the contents of which he could not grasp. The Czechoslovak intelligence service, in an effort to paralyze this organization's foreign activity and thwart the whole Sudeten German movement, had sent out a voluminous series of letters from Munich under Dr. Lodgman von Auen's name to important foreign persons known for their anti-German attitudes. In these falsified letters, Dr. Lodgman thanked the recipients for sending the Sudeten German movement messages of greeting conveying political support for its goals and promises of financial assistance. The recipients were surprised and exasperated by Dr. Lodgman's letter, since the political objectives of the Sudeten German movement were alien to them. They replied to Dr. Lodgman, demanding further explanation. Dr. Lodgman, who did not understand what was happening himself, had to answer these people and try to explain the whole affair in some natural manner. It was difficult because the content of the falsified letters in no way conflicted with the goals and purposes of the Sudeten German movement. In addition, it was known that the previous year Dr. Lodgman had taken advantage of a widely publicized but falsified greeting from the American Roman Catholic leader, Cardinal Spellman. The Czechoslovak intelligence service had sent this message to Dr. Lodgman from New York several days before Sudeten German Day, which is the annual culmination of mass action for the Sudeten Germans. Dr. Lodgman, enraptured by the unexpected personal letter from an American ecclesiastical dignitary, did not immediately verify its authenticity. As the Czechoslovak intelligence service had anticipated, Dr. Lodgman gave the letter to the press. Several weeks later, the message was exposed as a forgery—again by the Czechoslovak intelligence service. Thus Dr. Lodgman attained the unique distinction of being the initiator or co-perpetrator of the whole fraud. Each of these actions, publicly distorted, led simple readers and foreign victims

to the easy conclusion that the Sudeten German movement was headed by a group of imposters. That was the goal intended by the Czechoslovak intelligence service.

The East German intelligence service joined the Soviet and Czechoslovak projects and in 1958 developed a series of anti-American forgeries that included such items as "Dulles' Secret Report on Sabotaging the Summit Conference," reported in *Neues Deutschland*, June 7, 1958; "The Hoover Letter," in the January 22 issue; and "A Secret Order to All U.S. Pilots," in the October 2 issue. In each of these cases the initial channel was the East German Communist Party's official organ, *Neues Deutschland*, whose factual authenticity would, of course, be doubted by the Western media.

The wave of falsifications that inundated Europe during the fifties impelled the enemy's security apparatuses to a more thorough propaganda probe, and in several instances to the identification of the initiator. The use of assassination as a Soviet-bloc intelligence technique was discontinued at the end of the 1950s. The reason for ending this policy was practical, not humanitarian.

The details surrounding the assassinations of Ukrainian nationalists Lev Rebet on October 12, 1957, and Stefan Bandera on October 15, 1959, in Munich, became publicly known after the assassin Bogdan Stashynski fled from the Soviet Union to West Berlin in 1961. He gave himself up to the police and in October 1962 stood trial in Karlsruhe where he was sentenced to eight years in prison. For the first time the world learned from the perpetrator's mouth the details of behind-the-scenes politics, goals, and techniques involved in Soviet espionage murders. The risk that future operations of this sort might be exposed was too great. In addition, the growing liberal political atmosphere within the Communist bloc was not favorable. Khrushchev was most probably the man who stopped assassinations. At the same time even he, father of moderate Soviet liberalism, shared responsibility for Soviet assassinations in the fifties, just as Antonin Novotny, first secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, shared responsibility for the murder of Matus Cernak and Mrs. Tremeaud, as every operation of that kind must be approved by the highest party echelons. Mrs. Tremeaud's assassination went beyond the

pale of usual intelligence practice, since the most brutal methods were normally reserved for prominent political exiles from East Europe and defectors.

The eminently practical approach of Soviet-bloc intelligence services to political assassination as a technique does not rule out the possibility that it will be used again when interests require it.

The Birth of Department D

The beginning of the sixties brought, for many reasons, a decline in Soviet-bloc intelligence successes. The Soviet Union (the Soviet model for socialism) was morally compromised by the revelation of crimes dating back to the thirties. The growing deep-seated aversion to its security apparatus on the part of the Soviet population gradually made itself felt abroad. Even people who had sympathized with the Soviet Union began to realize that the problem of repression was not merely one of a misuse of power here and a minor shortcoming there; they began to see it as an integral part of the whole.

Despite the undeniable postwar progress of the Soviet economy, the difference between Western and Soviet-bloc standards of living has grown both in appearance and in fact to the detriment of the Soviet-bloc nations. Soviet propaganda has tried to explain away West Germany's astonishing postwar economic boom with completely irrational arguments. Khrushchev's deadlines for catching up with and overtaking the capitalist countries showed themselves to be utterly unrealistic. Czechoslovakia, a highly developed, heavily industrialized country before the war, adopted the Soviet economic system to the last detail to prove that the Soviet system could function successfully for well-developed countries. In consequence, the Czechoslovak economy sank into a deep and drawn-out depression.

In addition to the anti-Soviet feelings engendered by repression and economic problems, citizens of both East and West became weary of artificially instilled hate. They began to express an interest in establishing political, economic, scholarly, cultural, or simply human contact with their counterparts on the other side

of the Iron Curtain. Leading Soviet dogmatists interpreted such efforts as new imperialist attempts to interfere in Soviet-bloc domestic affairs. Dialogues were agreed to only when it seemed that they might somehow be turned to profit on the propaganda front.

Another reason for the sudden halt in Soviet-bloc intelligence successes was the improvement Western counterintelligence agencies had made since the war, especially in gathering information concerning the practices of Communist-bloc intelligence services and in exposing highly placed Communist agents.

The sixties saw the beginnings of a new stage in the development of special operations projects. The Soviet bloc challenged the new unfavorable conditions for its work by enlarging its intelligence services and by improving the inner organization and coordination of their activities. In 1959 a new department was established within the Soviet intelligence service—a department for disinformation. East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary (and most likely Poland and Bulgaria as well) followed suit in 1963 and 1964. Czechoslovakia's department for special operations was established in February 1964, officially designated as Department Eight. Unofficially it was called the department for active measures or disinformation department or simply Department D. "Department D" is used in this book as a common title for each Soviet-bloc disinformation department. In reality each intelligence service labels its disinformation department differently, mostly with numbers.

With the establishment of Department D's the special operations production curve took a sharp upward turn, especially in the developing nations. The over-all annual number of Soviet-bloc special operations is probably around three hundred to four hundred. The Czechoslovak intelligence service, for instance, carried out about 115 special operations during the fiscal year 1965. The increase in quantity was not, however, accompanied by an increase in quality. The desire for quick results had become too deeply ingrained.

When I returned to Prague from a two-week intelligence mission in Austria in February 1964, I was surprised to discover that during my absence I had been appointed deputy chief of the

new department. I cannot say that I was pleased. Ten years of intelligence work had left deep traces, and my original enthusiasm had faded. I belonged to an organization which was associated with the most Stalinistic elements in the Party and government. Harsh day-to-day repression of "class enemies" both at home and abroad involved a constant disregard for the law, even as prescribed by Communist legislatures. The Czechoslovak security apparatus—of which the intelligence service was a part—was hated by the people. The correct political stance required of every officer significantly limited the objectivity of the information turned out by the intelligence service because it entailed a juggling of the facts. I rationalized my continued work in the intelligence service on the grounds that I did nothing against the Czechoslovak people but only against "foreign enemies"; nevertheless, I was not quite satisfied with my own theory.

Several factors influenced the decision to create separate Department D's within Soviet-bloc intelligence services. It was felt that special operations could benefit from increased coordination. Each territorial department had handled its own special operations, and the potential resources of the entire intelligence machine lay untapped. The heads of the Soviet intelligence service concluded that not all the worthwhile materials gathered abroad were being put to effective use by the Party or government. The flood of information funneled through an intelligence service would occasionally yield materials that might have been suitable for putting high-power political pressure on the enemy had they not gone unnoticed. Following the lead of the Soviet intelligence service, the satellite services took over the role of initiator of foreign-policy operations.

It was decided that greater advantage should be taken of national liberation movements and the rise of new, nonaligned nations seeking their own forms of political development. Third World territory became an increasingly important field of operations; both the Communist and non-Communist worlds wanted to win over the political and economic systems of the developing nations. Since economic problems at home prevented Soviet-bloc nations from matching the West in terms of quantity or quality of economic and financial aid, they tried to compensate for this

handicap by intensifying their maneuverings behind the scenes by means of international games and intrigues.

A clear sign of the increasing interest Soviet-bloc intelligence services had begun to show in this area was the decision to send their own advisors into the field with the official assignment of helping to build up the security apparatuses of the developing nations. Unofficially these advisors used their knowledge and experience to influence conditions in the country in which they were stationed along lines that furthered the Soviet bloc's power politics. Czechoslovakia, for example, sent state security advisors to Guinea, Mali, and Cuba. The reason the Soviet Union agreed to allow certain non-Soviet Communist intelligence services to take on this assignment was that a number of developing nations were afraid of having a world power like the Soviet Union tamper with their internal affairs, quite naively considering Czechoslovaks, East Germans, or the like to be less dangerous.

It was deemed necessary to organize a counterbalance to the "ideological subversion" techniques of the West. The theory of ideological subversion, laid before the Soviet-bloc public during the waning period of the cold war, was meant to rekindle flickering vigilance and circumspection with respect to the foreign and domestic class enemy. Communist propaganda defined ideological subversion as the attempts by Western powers to impair the unity of the Socialist camp by *ideas* foreign and inimical to Marxism-Leninism. From force and violence, the propagandists claimed, the West had turned to ideological warfare, but their goal was still one and the same: to foster a gradual rift from within that would bring about a return to capitalism. The theory of ideological subversion countered the theory of peaceful coexistence between East and West. Any unsanctioned attempt by Western scholars, students, artists, or journalists to establish close contact with their Eastern counterparts was immediately condemned by the Party as proof of the Western-master-minded bridge-building syndrome and consequently as a part of a carefully planned and directed operation to undermine socialism in Eastern Europe.

Several weeks after Department D was established a Party meeting was held at the headquarters in Prague with a Party official from the Central Committee's Secretariat to indoctrinate

us on ideological subversion theory. His speech was long, very colorful, but empty. When he finished and asked for questions I decided to ask him one.

"I do not think that the very term 'ideological subversion' is correct. It implies that our opponent's ideology has a subversive, explosive power which we should stop with whatever means. But we as Marxists believe in the strength and superiority of our ideology, do we not? We consider it a scientific theory, so what are we afraid of? Why should we avoid direct confrontation with our opponents on a free democratic discussion basis? Could you comment on this, please?"

For several moments there was complete silence in the room. Some of my colleagues looked at me strangely, not sure that I was not crazy asking such a question. The speaker first drank a glass of water and then accused the imperialists of playing dirty tricks. He did not even touch on my question. When the meeting ended and I was leaving the room, our Party secretary stopped me. "I would not recommend that you ask provocative questions next time," he said.

The theory of ideological subversion provided one of the motives for establishing Department D, which was designed to produce ideological subverision against non-Communist countries. In retrospect, it seems that the early sixties saw a period of qualitative change in Soviet-bloc intelligence activities. Whereas in the preceding period the intelligence service's passive, information-gathering role had been paramount and special operations had been more or less coincidental projects, the early sixties marked a shift in priorities: the intelligence service's active role gained in stature, becoming equally as important as—in the developing countries even more important than—its formerly dominant passive role.

One of the direct results of this shift in priorities was the establishment of special Department D's that had the effect of institutionalizing the intelligence service's new active role. They turned special operations from chance occurrences into a regular part of everyday work.

With the establishment of an organized apparatus specializing in the systematic mass distribution of disinformation, black propa-

ganda, and influence operations, practical jokes, secret games, and intrigues among nations have entered a new era. A new element of distortion consciously and purposefully taints the natural flow of information throughout the world.

Disinformation

As noted earlier, Soviet-bloc intelligence agencies distinguish three basic types of special operations: disinformation, propaganda, and influence operations. A discussion of specific examples will help illustrate how these special operations work.

Disinformation is that branch of special operations that aims to deceive the enemy or victim by feeding him false information, the assumption being that he will then use it as a basis for reaching conclusions the initiator wishes him to reach. Depending on their content, disinformation operations may have a political, military, economic, or counterintelligence slant—and there have even been attempts at disinformation of a scientific nature.

In the sixties, the Czechoslovak intelligence service placed a number of agents high in the state hierarchies of such developing nations as the United Arab Republic and Algeria. These agents also served as disinformation channels for material produced in Moscow and Prague. Their prominent positions offered Moscow and Prague a chance to leak disinformational material directed mainly against the United States, and to a lesser degree against the German Federal Republic and Great Britain as well. The material consisted mostly of forged data on various anti-Arab plans and subversive activities by the United States. Information which Czechoslovak intelligence agents obtained in London, Paris, or Washington was brewed in the "disinformation kettle" in Prague and transferred to Cairo or Algeria in order to deepen Arab distrust of the Western world and draw the Arabs closer into the embrace of their Moscow friends.

Another example of a political disinformation operation was the action "Research," conducted in the mid-sixties and directed against North American influence in Latin America. The Czechoslovak intelligence service noted the unsuccessful American efforts

to survey public opinion in Latin America (called Project Camelot), and decided to continue it in the name of the United States. In the forged questionnaires, the respondents were asked to answer a battery of very personal and sensitive political questions and even to characterize the political orientation of their friends. The whole survey could be construed as American interference in the internal affairs of the countries involved. The completed questionnaires were to be sent to American embassies. Among the addressees were a significant number of people known to the Czechoslovak intelligence service for their anti-American opinions, who could be relied upon to create scandals and agitation over the methods of inquiry. That calculation proved correct.

For disinformation operations to be successful, they must at least partially correspond to reality or generally accepted views. A rational core is especially important when the recipient enemy or victim is a seasoned veteran in such matters, because without a considerable degree of plausible, verifiable information and facts it is impossible to gain his confidence. Not until this rational skeleton has been established is it fleshed with the relevant disinformation. In 1963, for example, the general staff of the Czechoslovak army, with the help of intelligence and counterintelligence services, developed a long-range military disinformation operation in order to deceive NATO countries about the military strength of the Czechoslovak army. It was in fact a part of the Warsaw Pact disinformation program, and it can be assumed that similar techniques have been used by other members of the pact as well.

The general staff supplied Czechoslovak media with purposely distorted information on the Czechoslovak military, assuming that NATO analysts would pick it up. At the same time hundreds of double agents on Czechoslovak territory working both for Czechoslovak counterintelligence and Western intelligence services were supplied with disinformation material on the Czechoslovak military that would fit with the published information. It was a very costly operation because the general staff had to finance the construction of deceptive missile ramps and organize a false transfer of army units in order to support the correct mixture of disinformation.

After 1964, the Czechoslovak disinformation service helped

to develop this long-range project further, without knowing, however, whether or not the desired effects had been achieved. The NATO military command had not reacted, but our department had at least one indication of success: the Russians insisted that we continue. It is quite possible that this operation is still being conducted.

In our efforts to find more and more effective means of weakening the enemy, we considered using disinformation of a scientific or technical nature. This idea posed a number of difficult problems. Scientific disinformation restricts the body of enemies or victims to the narrow group of highly developed nations with leading roles in East-West rivalry. The goal of scientific disinformation would be to delude a given circle of the opponent's top scientists. By leading them to believe, for example, that a problem on which they are working or planning to work is insoluble at the present stage of scientific development or that it requires an inordinate amount of funding or concentration of experts, the disinformation experts would hope to discourage certain projects or at least to saddle them with as many encumbrances and losses as possible. Effective application of the principle of scientific disinformation would require an extremely high level of expertise. The arguments advanced would have to satisfy more than political decision-makers; they would have to be acceptable to the opponent's scientific elite, the men actively involved in the matter at hand. A further difficulty the initiator would face would be in finding the appropriate channel. This channel could not be anonymous, but would need to be a recognized expert in the field. But no matter which side he came from, he would risk his reputation as a scientist by agreeing to act in such a capacity. For these reasons the attempt at scientific disinformation was dismissed by the Czechoslovak intelligence service. The use of scientific and technical data for propagandistic ends is another story altogether, but fits more into the category of propaganda-type special operations.

Propaganda

Propaganda-type special operations are among the most widely used by Soviet-bloc intelligence services if only because they are the least demanding. They are based on what might be called a "cult of the published word" in which the number of words used by the mass media of the enemy or victim is more important than a careful evaluation of the operation's results; less attention is paid to whether or not the words have had the desired effect or whether they signal a total lack of effect. The desire for speedy, easily visible, and audible success sometimes makes the intelligence service the victim of its own propaganda and disinformation.

It may seem strange that Soviet-bloc intelligence agencies spend so much time and effort on propaganda when every member country maintains an extensive official apparatus with sizeable staff and financial support for the same purpose. The fact is that intelligence agents assume the role of propagandists abroad whenever the official institution in charge is unable to identify itself openly with the type of propaganda desired for ideological, moral, or tactical reasons. Although the intelligence service will occasionally devise special operations requiring the use of its own media, such as its own press agency, newspapers, or radio and television stations, propaganda-type special operations can largely be defined as black propaganda. In the exceptional case that an intelligence agency does use its own media to channel an operation, it ensures as much as possible that its intentions and identity remain secret—even to the media themselves and its own public.

Anti-American propaganda campaigns are the easiest to carry out. A single press article containing sensational facts of a "new American conspiracy" may be sufficient. Other papers become interested, the public is shocked, and government authorities in developing countries have a fresh opportunity to clamor against the imperialists while demonstrators hasten to break American embassy windows. The initial article—the surfacing of the disinformation—is the key to detecting the perpetrators.

The influence of Communist intelligence activities on foreign

newspapers varies in intensity. Often it is only a member of the editorial board, a reliable friend, or agent of some Communist intelligence service who for sufficient remuneration is occasionally willing to publicize certain materials which reach him in the form of a report supplemented with graphic and factual data. The writer must work the data into his own manuscript. In such cases, the intelligence service tends to offer the agent-journalist precautionary instructions for substantiating the source of his material. For the leftist or pro-Communist newspaper, substantiating the source of information is relatively unimportant, since its very political orientation is sufficient cover, but documentation is crucial for the politically moderate or conservative periodicals. In the cases referred to, the perpetrator wanted only to publicize the basic disinformational "facts"; their political construction had to be consistent with the journal's orientation.

In some cases, the level of influence of the Communist intelligence service was qualitatively high enough to allow the service to deal directly with the editor-in-chief or the publisher of the newspaper and to assist its maintenance with financial grants. In return, disinformation material is published from time to time, and the paper's attitude is decisively influenced.

Periodicals owned by Communist intelligence services are also vehicles for releasing disinformation. Whether the intelligence service decides to buy an existing newspaper or to establish a new one, a reliable agent is required to take all legal responsibility. The type of long-term propaganda and disinformation tool carries several disadvantages. First, it is a very exacting operation from a financial standpoint, for such papers are not self-sufficient and must be supported with large financial subsidies. The second liability is the unstable political situation in developing countries. One Brazilian newspaper owned by the Czechoslovak intelligence service was banned after the right-wing coup in April 1964. The Czechoslovak intelligence service thus lost a financial holding as well as a disinformation channel. And finally, there is the risk that frequent usage of such channels will lead to their premature depreciation or exposure. Consequently, after the establishment of Department D in 1964, the Czechoslovak intelligence service

favored the alternative of developing broad contacts and agents in journalistic circles to that of buying additional papers.

The editorial boards which cannot be directly influenced by a Communist intelligence service (understandably the vast majority) are scrutinized with great attention where they enjoy public confidence and worldwide importance (such as the New York *Times*), display critical liberalism (*Der Spiegel*),* or exert mass influence on the politically unsophisticated reader (*Stern*). Communist intelligence services would send forged letters from readers or anonymous letters with photocopies of documents devised to discredit Western, primarily American, government authorities and political leaders.

As one of the most effective means of mass communication, television has understandably proved attractive for use by Communist intelligence services. Influencing Western television by manipulating programming or smuggling in documentary films with disinformational purposes is, however, too complicated a task. The most serious obstacle is the team character of television work. In contrast to the flexibility enjoyed by the newspaper journalist, the individual working in television has limited control over the content or distribution of filmed programs. A number of people could influence a given program's content in such a way as to efface or drastically alter the disinformational impact originally intended by changing the script, giving the television movie a new focus during the shooting, or by cutting its original length.

Communist intelligence services, therefore, usually limit their activity to their own television networks, influencing domestic public opinion or utilizing television as a disinformation channel. In 1965, the Czechoslovak intelligence service encouraged the filming of a documentary against the West German intelligence service. The intelligence service was aware that large numbers of Czechoslovak citizens were traveling in non-Communist countries,

* The Czechoslovak intelligence service has long been interested in the West German *Der Spiegel* not only from the disinformational standpoint but also because of its comprehensive documentary archives. The intelligence service has sought access to these archives in order to benefit from its compromising material on West German politicians in the recruitment of new agents.

especially in the German Federal Republic. Czechoslovak state security was apprehensive at this opportunity for West German intelligence agents to recruit Czechoslovak citizens. The film was to serve as a preventive measure and a warning. In filming, clips were used from a West German documentary on the Federal German intelligence service supplemented with documents, photographs, and statements from various Czechoslovak citizens who unwittingly had come in contact with it.

Very effective television propaganda was generated in two East German films which could be characterized as "black interviews" since in both cases the interviewee was under the impression that he was speaking to a *West* German television audience. The first was an interview by two German newsmen, Walter Heynowski and Gerhard Scheumann, of a German mercenary who had just returned from the Congo. As the interview progressed, this man, known in Western Europe as Congo Müller, became more and more voluble under the influence of alcohol; finally all his political and moral defenses fell, and he depicted his military adventures with undisguised cynicism. He was quite surprised to discover later that he had become the "hero" of a documentary film broadcast on East German television under the title "*Der lachende Mann*" ("The Laughing Man").

Some viewers felt this trick was possible only with a man of the intellectual and moral qualities of Congo Müller. They were surprised at the success of these same two television journalists in the case of Dr. Walter Becher, a leading figure in the West German rightist organization, *Die Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft.* In this film, which was made shortly after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and broadcast by East German television in 1969 under the title "*Der Präsident im Exil,*" Dr. Becher expressed displeasure with the outcome of World War II. Soviet-bloc intelligence services had had great difficulty in justifying the military occupation of Czechoslovakia. Dr. Becher, with his sympathy, even if limited, for the liberalization movement in Czechoslovakia, and the formulation of his long-term political goals, helped a great deal. He furnished East European Communist propaganda agents with new ammunition and offered an occasion to resurrect old slogans about the revanchist character of West

Germany. Although there is no concrete evidence that these two operations were initiated by the East German intelligence service, the technique and final result were so interesting and effective that *"Der lachende Mann"* was used as an example for professional training of the employees of Czechoslovakia's Department D.

Soviet-bloc intelligence services occasionally utilize domestic broadcasting media for intelligence work, not only as propaganda and disinformation channels, but in the search for budding espionage activists as well. Directors of radio stations periodically evaluate letters from foreign listeners all over the world. Copies are made and transmitted to the intelligence department along with all attainable concrete data on the listening correspondents. The aim is to discover whether friendly relations with foreign listeners can be transformed into cooperation with the intelligence service. Clubs of black African listeners to Moscow, Berlin, or Prague radio stations form a significant base for Communist intelligence operations.

Propagandists and disinformationists of the Soviet bloc focus on a vista much broader than black Africa. The Soviet action of January 1970 exemplifies a campaign directed through its own broadcasting media at the North American public. On January 19, 1970, Moscow radio announced that it would broadcast the transcript of tape-recorded messages from eleven American prisoners of war in Hanoi that evening. The announcement evoked indignant protests from American authorities in Washington, for it was evident that the American prisoners and their families in the United States were to become instruments of anti-American propaganda.

The Soviet method of misusing the voices of American war prisoners was in keeping with long-standing Communist intelligence techniques. Soviet, Czechoslovak, and probably other bloc intelligence services gathered information from the American press about fatalities in Vietnam and sent various appeals to their survivors—either anonymously, or under the name of a fictitious antiwar organization—inciting them to antiwar activity, calculating on their natural antiwar sentiments.

In the early autumn of 1964, huge bales of pamphlets and

leaflets printed in English and French arrived in the offices of Czechoslovakia's Department D. The operation in preparation was the newly established department's first large-scale effort to utilize such printed material. The thirty-one-page pamphlet, entitled "America Has Colonized 20 Million Negroes," together with a leaflet "Americans, Our Best Friends," were to serve as an anti-American propaganda infusion into the Third World, pointing to the United States as the enemy of nonwhite nations and the most racist country in the world. At the same time the operation was a "contribution" to the worldwide leftist campaign against conservative presidential candidate Barry Goldwater, whose name appeared several times in the material.

In October 1964, this material was sent to thousands of newspapers, periodicals, diplomatic missions, government organs, and political organizations in Africa, Asia, the Near and Middle East, and to Latin and North America. Some of it was mailed in United States Information Agency (USIA) envelopes to escape detection and possible confiscation by local police. The press response was minimal. On October 12, 1964, the *Ghanaian Times* published an attack on Barry Goldwater, together with a photograph reprinted from the pamphlet and a quote designating him "the world's most dangerous fascist." Four days later, the Ghanaian *Spark* published an excerpt from the text and photographs from the leaflet "Americans, Our Best Friends," as a piquant sidelight and added that the material had arrived in a USIA envelope. Quotations from the pamphlet and leaflets surfaced in a few insignificant contexts in the foreign press, and then the operation expired.

In view of the effort exerted in this operation, the results were not very encouraging. The individual Czechoslovak intelligence stations abroad lodged justifiable objections and complaints that headquarters should not in the future paralyze their work by requiring them to stamp, address, and deposit the letters in small quantities in mailboxes; the whole operation was deemed questionable in terms of time expended.

On the Communist domestic and foreign book market, works occasionally appear which are inspired not by an author's desire to communicate his moral or political message to the public, but by the very prosaic goals of Soviet-bloc disinformation services.

Some are directed primarily against foreign intelligence services, seeking to infuse uncertainty and confusion through publishing a composite of legitimate and invented data; some are produced with broader political objectives.

Even as late as the early sixties, Soviet-bloc intelligence services found their hands tied with regard to this form of disinformation and propaganda activity because books inspired by the intelligence service had to be imbued with the ideas of communism. Communist ritual and the outlook of the Party and intelligence *apparatchiki* did not permit the publication of material partially critical of Soviet policies or any phenomena of the Communist countries, even though the book as a whole might generate results favorable for the East European bloc. The situation changed when several manuscripts very critical of the contemporary Communist establishment were smuggled from Eastern to Western Europe and such prominent defectors as Svetlana Alliluyeva augmented the ranks of political emigrants.

The Soviet bloc could not prevent such harsh and damaging literature and memoirs from being published in the West, but it is possible that several ostensibly anti-socialist manuscripts have been "smuggled" to the West in recent years under the control and with the direct assistance of the Soviet intelligence service. They served to further political or operational objectives that were more important than the anti-Soviet character of the published matter. This type of disinformational literature is, however, still exceptional.

One illustration of the literary production of the Soviet disinformation department is Kim Philby's *My Silent War*. As is well known, Kim Philby occupied important positions in the British intelligence service during a thirty-year period in which he worked as a Soviet intelligence agent. In 1963, Philby, then under deep suspicion, fled to the USSR; in subsequent years the Soviet intelligence service supervised the writing of his memoirs, which were published in the West in 1968. The very fact that Philby was one of the Soviet intelligence service's most important, if not the most important, agent makes his book extremely interesting. His experiences in deceiving the British intelligence service—long considered the best in the world—the CIA, and the FBI

constitute the main message of the book from the standpoint of Soviet intentions. It is possible that the book conceals several disinformation perspectives, imperceptible to the average reader but designed for British and American intelligence personnel. Philby, a brilliant journalist gifted with an English sense of humor, well acquainted with the public mentality of the West, best knew how to convey his life story effectively, without burdening his work with the cheap political phrases and slogans which tend to lace Soviet prose, thus rendering the Soviet intelligence agency his last major service.

A special place in disinformation and propaganda operations must be reserved for forgeries, that is, written or printed disinformation. Most of the special operations aimed at the United States, West Germany, Great Britain, or France and carried out in the Third World consist of forgeries. Soviet-bloc intelligence sources devote much energy to collecting the raw materials necessary for their production—signatures of high-ranking public servants, diplomats, and officials of various political, religious, or special-interest organizations, official letterheads—anything that might be used as a model. The Czechoslovak intelligence service developed a very simple and efficient method of enlarging its collection. Intelligence officers abroad, authenticated as diplomats or representatives of various governmental organizations (such as trade consultants or journalists) send out a large number of Christmas greetings to their foreign counterparts and to important persons in general. As etiquette dictates, their greetings are duly answered, the answers signed, and the signatures sometimes written on letterhead stationery. These papers are carefully sorted, supplied with explanatory remarks, and sent along to the center as a special Christmas gift.

Forgeries of diplomatic or governmental communiqués and of the personal letters of highly placed Americans often serve as the basis for disinformation and propaganda operations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Their quality varies. The workshop turns out some that are credible both in text and signature, others that are wasted because of defective workmanship, incapable of passing even the most primitive tests of linguistic or criminal expertise. The initiator takes it for granted that the moment the

falsification is made public, the enemy will publicly repudiate it. The victim, if he is the first to have published the falsification, will by his very involvement have an interest in preserving the appearance of the document's authenticity, for as soon as it is proved a forgery, he must admit to indiscretion or just plain stupidity. Thus the issue of where the document came from is relatively unimportant, and the victim unwillingly does the initiator's dirty work for him, even to the point of bearing the brunt of the enemy's countermeasures. The enemy's disclaimer is generally lost in the daily flood of newspaper items; the victim's mass media are more likely to squeeze every possible bit of sensationalism out of the document's content than to provide space for the disclaimer.

For the intelligence service attempting to pass off the forged document, the choice of the channel to be utilized is very important. Department D must consider the enemy's later reaction when the falsification comes to light. Obviously, the enemy will know at a glance that he is dealing with a forgery, and may not only publish denials but also take other measures to prevent its dissemination, in order to expose the perpetrators and their assistants. This poses a threat to the security of the journalist agents involved in the operation and carries the risk of their detection. For this reason, the intelligence service often distributes forged documents anonymously.

Forgeries are not limited exclusively to official documents or personal letters. The Czechoslovak intelligence service even toyed with the idea of counterfeiting large amounts of the enemy's currency so as to upset his monetary system. However, because of technical difficulties and the possibility of analogous countermeasures on the part of the enemy the project was abandoned.

Influence Operations

The third and most demanding type of special operations is called influence operations. Even though the term fails to give a true picture of the basic nature of these operations, it is used in this book because it is a part of the basic phraseology of Com-

munist-bloc intelligence services. Disinformation and propaganda operations are obviously not meant to be goals in themselves; they are designed to influence the enemy as well.

Influence operations include the following activities: single or long-range attempts by highly placed agents to influence a given sector of the enemy's domestic or foreign policy; encouragement of the political parties and organizations of the leftist opposition; and demonstrations and support for insurgents. In contrast to disinformation and propaganda operations which attract or actively seek publicity, influence operations—with the exception of demonstrations—carefully avoid it. These operations are usually connected with political risks (public exposure of the perpetrator and possible retaliation by the target country) and operational risks (exposure of agents and their possible arrest) and therefore are used only exceptionally.

The initiator's agent who carries out such operations on enemy territory is called an influence agent. The ideal influence agent is very rarely realized. Since every intelligence service must make the most of its men in the field, influence agents are asked to participate in normal information-gathering activities as well as influence operations.

To the category of influence agents belong those who occupy important positions in the social hierarchy of an enemy country and by virtue of their position are capable of influencing public life there under the direction of a Communist intelligence service. Such individuals may be newsmen, officials of the national bureaucracy, Party or organizational functionaries, diplomats, parliamentary deputies, politicians, or employees of intelligence services.

Communist intelligence services have established contact with some Westerners who are neither purveyors of interesting and valuable information nor influence agents but who may be of value in the future. The intelligence service calculates that such a man's family and personal connections, intelligence, ability, or great ambition to succeed in his own country are striking enough to guarantee a promising political career. It has proved profitable to devote many years of individual attention, to reinforce a man's attachment with occasional gifts or friendly gestures, and even

to compromise him secretly to the point that it would be very difficult for him to refuse to assist the service when it so requested. The intelligence service, of course, requests aid from such a man only on worthwhile occasions. Whether he considers himself an agent or not is not important; a signed agreement or oral pact is not crucial. The key is his actual degree of dependence and previous compromise. Communist intelligence archives house sheaves of dossiers on individuals who are uniquely qualified as agents, even though they may have no suspicion of it themselves.

On October 24, 1967, the public was quite surprised to learn of the arrest of a forty-five-year-old millionaire, Hannsheinz Porst, in the German Federal Republic. It was revealed that Porst held simultaneous memberships in the West German liberal party FDP (*Freie Demokratische Partei*) and the East German ruling party SED (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*). Moreover, Porst had long been in contact with the chief of the East German intelligence service, Major General M. J. Wolf, and his subordinates. Public surprise grew when Porst not only failed to deny the allegations but proudly affirmed them, as reported in *Der Spiegel,* No. 6, 1968: "I am a millionaire and a Marxist. I belonged to both the FDP and the SED simultaneously. I gave money to the Free Democrats (FDP) for their campaign fund, and paid membership dues to the SED. I live in the German Federal Republic and hold political discussions with the other side [the German Democratic Republic]. Is that really contradictory? I don't feel that it is at all."

Porst defended himself by asserting that he had betrayed nothing and no one, but only corrected erroneous evaluations about West Germany by East German officials and wanted to prevent the military confrontation of the two systems, as *Der Spiegel* noted on April 24, 1969.

A West German court sentenced Porst to two years and nine months in 1969. His relationship with East Germany's Ministry of State Security was obvious and confirmed by his own testimony. The question concerned the nature of the information Porst was willing or able to convey. The court's ruling was further complicated because, according to a new statute which went into effect on August 1, 1968, it was necessary to prove that "an individual

must intend to engage in activity aimed at revealing state secrets."

Porst denied such an intention; it was even possible to accept his allegation that his name was not on the payroll of the East German Ministry of State Security, since several hundred or a thousand marks paid to the top agents would have been meaningless to a millionaire. Despite the fact that his contact with the highest FDP functionaries gave him occasional access to valuable information, the court could not prove that Porst had delivered the contents of secret documents to East Berlin.

Why was Porst valuable to East Germany? The intelligence service is by no stretch of the imagination a political debating club; General Wolf and his subordinates were assuredly not wasting time in ideological discussion with a West German Marxist millionaire and political visionary such as Porst, except to the extent that it brought profit or the promise of same.

Despite its small size, the FDP played a key role on the West German political scene. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democrats (SPD) contended for its favor. Several times in the history of the German Federal Republic, the FDP had been a crucial factor in establishing new governments or passing important legislation. Its liberalism and outspoken anti-communism were primarily attractive to businessmen and industrialists. It was exceptionally important for East Berlin to maintain people in the FDP who would be capable—possibly in the distant future, possibly much sooner—of influencing the Party on basic questions. It is not outside the realm of probability that the East German intelligence service had assigned such a role to Porst, despite his idealism, naivete, and repeated denials that he was an agent.

Another form of influence operations can be seen in financial support for political parties in opposition to the existing government. The West German parliamentary elections of 1961 were marked by the attempt of a new political party, the *Deutsche Friedens Union* (DFU) (German Peace Union) to establish itself as a new political force in the federal parliament. With its program, the DFU attracted a segment of the intellectual, left-oriented defectors from the Social Democrats and part of the

former following of the German Communist Party which was at that time prohibited in West Germany. The Czechoslovak intelligence service decided to support the DFU effort and to contribute fifty thousand marks to its campaign fund through one of its agents. According to reports circulating within the Czechoslovak intelligence apparatus, the DFU was kept alive through financial injections from East Berlin. The attempt to assist the DFU failed. The DFU did not poll the 5 percent of the vote required by the electoral laws and was not seated as a party.

Because organizing demonstrations is a complex task for an intelligence service, this mode of influence is rarely utilized. In itself, an isolated demonstration has a limited local effect unless it succeeds in arousing the interest of the mass media. The intelligence service can inspire and direct demonstrations only through capable agents experienced in preparing such outbursts—agents with sufficient authority and influence to engage a large circle of people (students or youth in general) and provoke them successfully.

Demonstrations entail a wide range of unforeseen circumstances and thus raise a risk factor much disliked by the intelligence service. The psychology of an enraged mob includes the danger that some of the participants will move in undesirable directions. A further risk is that the arrest and interrogation of the organizer could unveil the real perpetrators. Finally, no Communist intelligence organization has a sufficient number of agents at its disposal in the anti-establishment movements of non-Communist countries to permit frequent participation in organizing demonstrations. It is true that many Communist disinformation and propaganda actions are accompanied by outbursts, but these erupt spontaneously, inspired by disinformational messages rather than the direct initiative of a bloc intelligence service.

In 1965 and 1966, the Czechoslovak intelligence service attempted this type of special operation in Panama, instigated by student riots against the United States presence there. The riots occurred in January 1964 and led to dramatic, bloody clashes between students and American military forces stationed in the Canal Zone. The Czechoslovak intelligence service not only had no agents in Panama at that time, but Czechoslovakia was not

even officially represented in that country. The intelligence service therefore decided to rely on the assistance of several agents established in Mexico. With their help, the anniversary of the Panamanian events was to become an international day of struggle of Latin American youth against American imperialism, offering a permanent stimulus to anti-American activity. At the beginning of 1965, several demonstrations were initiated in Panama and other countries. The next year a follow-up attempt to incite leftist demonstrations and lend an air of tradition to the occasion fizzled out, and the operation died.

In concluding this description of the characteristics of the three basic types of special operations, it must be said that there are very few pure types of operations. Special operations—or at least several of their phases—usually bring together elements of all the basic types.

Special operations are only a part of the total effort which experts variously designate as manipulative persuasion, informal penetration, subversion, or informal attack. Soviet-bloc intelligence services are neither the only nor most important center of secret operations against foreign enemies. The secretariat and the presidium of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee is the primary nerve center.

In Prague, the first day of May 1964 was supposed to be celebrated in a traditional way with flags, Party slogans, and the usual parade demonstrating the devotion of the masses to their Communist leadership. Waving flags and shouting slogans had no appeal for me, so I decided to spend the day with a group of scuba divers. For several years I had been an enthusiastic scuba diver, spending my free time under the surface of Czechoslovak rivers and lakes and my vacations in the waters of the Mediterranean or the Baltic.

The group of Czech divers I belonged to was offered the interesting job of investigating the bottom of Black Lake and Devil's Lake, making underwater films for Czechoslovak tele-

vision. Television editor Vladimir Branislav and director Milan Tomsa from the television group, Curious Camera, were fascinated by the legends and folktales concerning these two lakes set in a romantic nook of the Bohemian Forest near the Czechoslovak–West German border.

The lakes had a special magic past. The depths were rumored to have swallowed a driver and a team of horses when the ice broke under the weight of a load of timber. On the bottom of one of the lakes supposedly lay a coach, and also the bodies of a countess, soldiers of Napoleon's army, and German soldiers taking flight through the region toward Bavaria and western Austria during the last weeks of World War II.

On April 30 and May 1, 1964, the staff of Czechoslovak television together with our diving group arrived at the lakes for an initial survey of the underwater terrain. On the bottom of Devil's Lake we discovered some objects which could not be identified. For this they would need to be pulled up to the surface. But the television workers gave orders for an underwater inspection only, because they wanted to leave the real booty on the bottom for live filming. The period proposed for shooting was May 13–25, 1964. We returned to Prague excited about our accomplishments and looking forward to the next visit, this time with underwater movie cameras and all other necessary equipment.

The following day I returned to my office and official duties. Department D was only two months old at that time, still not well organized and still lacking any significant operational accomplishments. I spent nearly the whole day with Major Jiri Stejskal, Department D's chief, trying to devise an action that would help us successfully execute a large project.

In the late afternoon all members of the department gathered in the office of one of our employees to celebrate his birthday with a glass of wine. There was a relaxed atmosphere; anti-Communist jokes were accompanied by outbursts of laughter, and everyone enjoyed himself.

I sat with Stejskal in a corner drinking and talking about our private problems.

"What did you find in the lakes?" he asked, referring to my latest scuba-diving trip.

"Nothing significant yet. There are some objects on the bottom, maybe explosives. We couldn't pull them out and identify them. The television team wants to film the identification and make it a part of the movie. Maybe we should throw a few corpses in and help them make the film a great success," I said.

He stared at me for a while and then said, "That's not a bad idea. Yes, that's precisely what we're looking for."

"What do you mean? Do you think that a few dead bodies on the bottom of a lake can solve our problems?" I asked him.

"I'm not speaking about dead bodies. Documents, genuine documents. We can make this summer very hot for the Germans," he said.

"You mean—Nazi documents?" I asked.

"Yes, that's what I mean."

In the spring of 1964 the question of war crimes was again brought to the fore by the approaching lapse in the statute of limitations on war crimes which was to expire in May of 1965. It was an excellent opportunity for further propaganda against the German Federal Republic. Earlier propaganda campaigns had shown a tendency to gradualism, and the institutions and citizens of Western Europe were becoming indifferent to materials presented by the East. We had found a form dramatic enough to draw the attention not only of the responsible institutions but the uninformed public as well.

Inspired by a glass of wine an idea was born that later made headlines.

2

Operation Neptune

In the last days of May 1964, members of the Czechoslovak intelligence service lowered four large, asphalt-coated cases into the Bohemian Black Lake. Several weeks later the cases were discovered by a Czechoslovak television crew shooting a documentary film on the lakes of this forest region. The find was presented abroad and to the Czechoslovak public as an important set of Nazi archives.

This was the start of an extensive disinformation and propaganda action against West Germany, inspired by the Czechoslovak intelligence service and carried out jointly by the Czechoslovak and Soviet disinformation departments. The action, which received the cover name "Neptune," was evaluated in Moscow and Prague as one of the most successful operations of the first half of the sixties. To understand the circumstances surrounding Operation Neptune one must consider several events that took place in Germany in 1944.

Nazi Caches

At the "Maison Rouge" in Strasbourg on August 10, 1944, Nazi leaders held a conference to discuss the future of Germany. The situation on various fronts indicated that the end of the war was near, and with it the end of the Third Reich. The Strasbourg conference had as its explicit aim the laying of foundations for a

Fourth Reich. The participants dealt with the problem of how to prevent important German inventions, plans for rebuilding German science, technology, and the German economy, and also, of course, documents of the Nazi security apparatus from falling into enemy hands.

The Nazi apparatus worked out a broad directive which classified not only written material but currency and items of technical and material value which were to be destroyed or, if need be, concealed. The Deputy Reichs Protector for Bohemia and Moravia, SS *Gruppenführer* Karl Hermann Frank, issued an order on February 22, 1945, to the various institutions operating on Bohemian and Moravian territories. He directed that transport to places of safety be booked for all important or irreplaceable documents and valuables. By Frank's order, each of the institutions was to work out its own plan for the transfer of the materials to previously assigned places in the districts of Klatovy and Domazlice in southwestern Bohemia, near the German border.

In the last months of the war southwestern Bohemia had grown more important to the Nazis. The territory of Germany itself had become a theater of military operations, and from Berlin, which was under Allied air bombardment, columns of German soldiers streamed across Bohemia carrying not only weapons and ammunition but also secret Nazi archives. They headed for the so-called Alpine Fortress, which was to be the final refuge of the Nazis.

After the war, Czech lands became a significant site of Nazi documents, as the Nazis had not succeeded in destroying or carrying away all of them. Large parts of the central archive of the SS, located in a castle in the village of Zasmuky, not far from Prague, fell into the hands of Czechoslovak units. On the route leading from middle Bohemia to Austria, other units succeeded in finding volumes of Nazi written material which was gathered up and later handed over to Soviet authorities at their request. The documents were neither evaluated nor sorted by Czechoslovak authorities but were loaded into several railroad cars and carried away to the USSR.

Not all the documents found their way so easily into the hands

of Czechs and Russians. When the Nazis had time, they concealed their archives quite ingeniously. One proof of German meticulousness in this regard was the so-called Stechovice archive.

In middle Bohemia between Benesov and Stechovice, on the left bank of the river Sazava about forty kilometers from Prague, a large area had been evacuated during the war and used by German units for military exercises. Not far from the small town of Stechovice, an extensive Nazi archive had been buried by a select unit of sapper specialists. A participant in that action, SS-member Günther Achenbach, fell prisoner to the French army in Germany and gave an extensive account of the Stechovice archive. The French Embassy in Prague sent the following note to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry on October 13, 1945:

> The Embassy of the French Republic has the honor of informing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic that according to a report received from General Koenig, commanding officer of the French Occupation Zone in Germany, a man named Günther Achenbach, born on 27 August 1921 in Essen Borbek, a volunteer assigned to SS, who is now in a prisoner-of-war camp at Mulhouse, intends to reveal a place near Prague where the German authorities have buried extremely important documents. These documents are in sealed boxes and the access to them is protected by mines.
>
> The Embassy of the French Republic hereby informs the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic that the French authorities are willing to bring Achenbach under escort to Czechoslovakia in order to verify that the statements made by this prisoner are true.
>
> The Embassy of the French Republic asks the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic kindly to inform it about the results of the steps which will be taken.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave the contents of the note to the Ministry of the Interior, which, strangely, took no action, and the French request remained unanswered. A later investigation, conducted by Communist officers of the Czechoslovak state security service, concluded that the guilt for this was borne by Dr. Karel Zavadil, one of the officers of the Ministry of the Interior who had charge of the matter. Dr. Zavadil was con-

sidered loyal to the Czechoslovak People's Party (oriented toward Roman Catholicism), and Communists in the Interior Ministry believed that he wished to guard against the archives' falling into the hands of Czech Communists.

In the meantime American occupation authorities in Germany learned of Günther Achenbach's testimony. They proposed to their French partners that a joint Franco-American action be carried out on Czechoslovak territory without official Czechoslovak permission. On February 10, 1946, four months after the delivery of the French note, a column of American military vehicles set out for Prague from Nuremberg, under the command of First Lieutenant William J. Owens, an intelligence officer. Included in the thirty-member group were one of the American army's best sappers, Captain Stephen M. Richards, Günther Achenbach, two members of the French army, and an American newspaperman, Lionel S. B. Shapiro, whose vivid and colorful coverage of the story appeared in American newspapers.

Two days of tense and dangerous work by the American sappers were crowned with success. With Achenbach's help they located the cache, and, despite the treacherous arrangement of booby-traps, they loaded more than thirty large, heavy cases onto the trucks and shipped them to West Germany.

The Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of the Interior were informed sometime on February 12 that a group of American soldiers were involved in a suspicious operation in the vicinity of Stechovice. But investigators who were sent to the scene the next day found only an empty gallery, disarmed Nazi mines, and remains of the inevitable C-rations. Trucks and documents were already well outside Czechoslovak territory. But a three-member group of sappers had remained in Prague, led by Captain Richards, who wanted to rest and spent a few pleasant days there. On February 13 they were arrested and held as hostages because the Czechoslovak government wanted the documents returned.

Several weeks of diplomatic activity followed between the Czechoslovak Republic and the United States. The American ambassador in Prague, L. A. Steinhardt, visited the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 23, 1946, and expressed

the American government's regret over the incident. The same day, the State Department issued this announcement:

> On 11 February 1946 a police unit of the American occupation forces in Germany entered Czechoslovakia. It managed to remove to the American zone a certain number of documents which were hidden in the hills south of Prague. These documents were taken in possession because the detachment of the American occupation forces in Germany was informed that the documents could cast some light on Hitler's prewar plans and on the method of warfare used by the Nazi army. Although the American unit entered the territory of Czechoslovakia with passports issued by the Czechoslovak liaison officer, the expedition was not approved by the Czechoslovak government, which protested against the act. The American government expressed its deep regrets to President Benes for the incident and ordered that the documents be returned immediately to the Czechoslovak government.

On March 2, 1946, an American military convoy brought the cases back to Prague, where they were transferred to members of the staff of the president of the republic. The American hostages were released the following day. It remained unclear whether all the papers found in Stechovice had been returned. The American newspaperman Lionel Shapiro wrote an article for the *Pittsburgh Press*, February 26, 1946, in which, among other things, he took up the matter of the contents of the cases:

> The enclosed lists of documents have shown that in addition to written material of the Czech government [documents of the prewar Czechoslovak government, which had fallen into Nazi hands] which was of the greatest importance, the hiding place contained the following:
>
> Complete volumes of records of the Reich Protector in the years 1940–1945, which were designated as top secret, including long lists of Czech collaborators, a list of the so-called honorary associates of the Nazi intelligence service, basic material concerning German research projects, personal volumes of notes of top Gestapo leaders, including the hangman Heydrich, and a list of treasures including coronation jewelry which were stolen from Prague Castle. [Retranslation from the 1946 Czechoslovak investigation commission's report to the president.]

A commission of representatives of the Ministries of National Defense and the Interior and the staff of the president of the republic, which concerned itself with the study of the Stechovice archive, concluded that the returned materials did not fully correspond to what Lionel Shapiro had described. The following discrepancies had been found:

1. Lists of documents had been removed from the cases.
2. The transcripts of the order of business were dated from 27 September 1941 to 30 August 1943. The other transcripts before and after those dates were missing.
3. The transcripts of the order of business of the state secretary from 8 January 1942 to the end of the war were missing.
4. Secret transcripts of the order of business were missing entirely.
5. Records of telephone conversations of the state secretary were missing for the period from 15 May 1944 to 12 October 1944.
6. The material which had been returned included only six or seven volumes of written documents of the Reich Protector.
7. Daily reports of the Gestapo were missing from July 1944.
8. Lists of Czech collaborators were all missing.

Czechoslovak officials presumed that in the period between February 13 and March 3 all the documents had been photographed by American specialists in Germany and that the most important documents, chiefly the list of Czech collaborators, had been removed.

The Stechovice affair was gradually forgotten by the public, but the Czechoslovak security department continued to search for further caches. Counterintelligence officials assumed that a discovery of documents on the cooperation of certain Czech citizens with the Nazis could provide clues for the detection of secret agents of the West German intelligence service (BND) in postwar Czechoslovakia. During the next fifteen years, written and photographic material on the Stechovice archive was studied several times by groups of specialists who attempted to find the key to the detection of further archives.

The Stechovice archive had been concealed deep underground on land that would not undergo any changes due to construction or agriculture. Mines had been laid under some of the

cases and over the cache which was covered by a heavy layer of earth. Full-grown trees had been planted on the surface to deceive any chance observer. Although analysis of the methods used to conceal the Stechovice archive provided several basic possibilities for seeking further caches, it was likewise evident that without the cooperation of several of those Nazi who helped to hide them in 1945 this would be a nearly insoluble task.

One of the high SS officials who had been sentenced as a war criminal in Czechoslovakia after the war was the commander of the military training grounds for SS groups, the terrain on which the Stechovice archive had been concealed. Czechoslovak security officials believed that this man would know the place of further caches. In 1964 Deputy Minister of the Interior Colonel Jaroslav Klima spoke with him several times personally, vainly trying to convince him—before his sentence lapsed and he was released to the German Federal Republic—to make a statement. And so the Stechovice archive remained as one isolated find.

A further event was the discovery of Nazi cases on the bottom of Toplitz Lake in Austria in 1959. Because of tales about cases hidden in the lake and the death of a young West German diver in an attempt to fish out the "Nazi treasure," Austrian authorities decided to conduct a probe of the lake. The tales were supported by the fact that during the war there had been a German naval research station on the shore of Toplitz Lake. Together with the body of the diver and remains of the station's technical equipment, a large number of counterfeit English banknotes had been fished out. The currency had been manufactured on orders of the Nazi intelligence service and was to have been used in an extensive operation which was to disrupt the English monetary system during the war. But this plan had never been carried out, and many millions of pounds of forged banknotes had fallen to the bottom of Toplitz Lake.

One last subject should be mentioned before describing the details of Operation Neptune—the political climate between Czechoslovakia and Germany after the war.

Czechoslovak and West German relations after World War II were entirely influenced by the politics of the great powers. Postwar Czechoslovakia, headed by President Benes until 1948,

was still disillusioned by the action of the Western powers at Munich and saw in an alliance with the Soviet Union a guarantee of national independence and protection in the face of a possible future German menace. The transfer of three million Sudeten Germans in 1945–47 from Czechoslovakia, of whom two-thirds found a new home in West Germany, strengthened Czechoslovakia's affiliation with the Soviet Union even further. The strong anti-Czech and anti-Communist orientation of the rightist Sudeten German leaders supported by West German governmental authorities, and their demand for adhering to the provisions of the Munich pact, aroused the public about the new German danger.

After 1948 the government and Party leadership of Czechoslovakia, operating according to the dogmatic viewpoint of so-called class consciousness, was unable to evaluate realistically the internal or international political situation of West Germany and to admit that positive changes had been made in West Germany since the end of the war. And as a tacit agreement evolved between the Czechoslovak and West German forces of conservatism that the *status quo* was the most acceptable situation for both countries, Czechoslovak–West German relations reached the stage where practical solutions of the points at issue were threatened by mutual accusations, and political relations were reduced to attacks and propaganda maneuvers.

A simplistic view of the German question was easy to maintain when the border between Czechoslovakia and the German Federal Republic was closed to Czechoslovak citizens. But from the beginning of the sixties more and more Czechoslovak citizens traveled to the GFR, established personal and friendly relations, and altered the views and prejudices which had been stimulated by Czechoslovak domestic propaganda. They no longer called all those Germans living in the German Democratic Republic good and those settled in German Federal Republic bad.

In this political climate Operation Neptune was born and developed.

The Secret of the Black Lake

One evening in the last week of May 1964 a military GAZ, the Soviet-built version of the jeep, set out from Prague loaded with four cases, diving equipment, and a military-issue inflatable rubber raft; it was accompanied by a civilian car.

I sat in the second car with the chief of the Czechoslovak intelligence service, Colonel Houska, a Soviet advisor, and Major Stejskal, chief of the disinformation department. Colonel Houska had decided to take part in the first stage of Operation Neptune because he liked its basic idea but worried at the same time about the risks involved and wanted to be at the scene in order to check everything personally.

Operation Neptune had the following goals: first, to develop a campaign against the lapse of the statute of limitations for war crimes in West Germany which was to expire a year later in May 1965; second, to exploit the question of war crimes in an anti-German political campaign in order to revive anti-German feelings and resentments in Western Europe; and third, by disinformation to limit the supposedly extensive activities of the West German intelligence service on Czechoslovak territory. It was to be made known after the "discovery" of the documents that they contained lists of Czechs who had collaborated with the German secret police during the war.

We presumed that some members of West Germany's intelligence service active in postwar Czechoslovakia were being recruited from Czech collaborators. If disinformation activities were well executed, the West German intelligence service would have to break contact with those agents, at least temporarily, to appraise the situation and determine whether their network of agents was indeed threatened. The initial proposal followed these three main aims. But in the course of executing the plans, yet another aim was added—that of exploiting the action to help uncover real Nazi archives on Czech territory.

Operation Neptune was planned in several stages. The first stage included a chemical probe of the waters of Black Lake (located on the Czechoslovak–West German border about 120 miles from Prague) and, depending on the result, preparing a

number of old German military cases. This task was entrusted to a group led by Lieutenant Colonel Vratislav Podzemsky under the Ninth Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior. Preparation of the cases was not a technically challenging task. In a military depot, workers of the Ninth Directorate found some old German military cases. Nazi efficiency was simulated by placing the papers in sealed metal boxes that were enclosed in wooden cases which were then dipped in asphalt. This method was adequate for the few weeks that the cases were immersed in water, but for an underwater stay of several months, let alone several years, it would not have been sufficient. During the short period that the cases were under water, large bubbles formed in the asphalt coating and, as they burst, water started seeping gradually into the cases.

I decided to use Black Lake for the site because it would be the most logical spot for the fleeing Nazis to have dumped the cases. During the war a good access road had been built to the lake, and several kilometers away one of the main roads linked Berlin with the Alpine Fortress.

A group of Department D's employees was assigned the task of selecting from the Czechoslovak archives a great number of Nazi documents which were to be deposited on the bottom of Black Lake. The documents had to be of possible propaganda value, unknown either to the public or historians, and removed secretly from the Czechoslovak archives without their loss causing alarm among the archive workers.

The schedule initially set by Czechoslovak television for underwater filming, May 13–25, 1964, was postponed by the Ministry of the Interior. Czechoslovak television was notified that troop movements and exercises of the border guard would be taking place in May in the area of the lakes. Actually, we needed time to find suitable documents, place them in the cases, and sink them in the lake. It became clear after only a cursory inspection of Czechoslovak archives that this task would be quite difficult and, in the short space of a mere several days, impossible. So we decided to throw the cases into the lake filled only with blank paper, simply to provide the necessary weight. Colonel Houska relied on me to direct the action so that the discovery of the

cases would be made known immediately to the security authorities in attendance, but that they would remain unopened.

The discovery of the cases was to open the second stage of Operation Neptune. We planned to close off the whole area of the lake the moment the cases were discovered and to summon a team of helmeted divers from the Ministry of the Interior, on the basis that the cases might contain explosives and their handling should be entrusted to specialists. The cases were to be transported to Interior Ministry headquarters in Prague and "expert" information on their opening and contents released shortly after that. The comedy should serve one purpose: to make the discovery a sensation and with the help of Czechoslovak press, radio, and television create a dramatic scene for the final stage of the operation, an anti-West German propaganda and disinformation campaign.

Czechoslovakia and the world public were to be acquainted with the contents of the documents at a press conference by Interior Minister Lubomir Strougal. A subsequent series of propaganda actions was planned for Western Europe, organized according to the character of the available documents.

I looked at Houska's face, which betrayed his worries. He accepted the risks of the operation but had been cautious from the very beginning. He recommended the proposal for Operation Neptune and presented it to Strougal, who first consulted Antonin Novotny, the First Secretary of the Communisty Party, and approved it only after Novotny's oral concurrence. Houska knew that if the operation failed his own career could be ruined.

In Susice, a town about forty miles northeast of the lake region, our group was joined by the commander of the local border guards, Lieutenant Colonel Pokorny, and the chief of the intelligence department for that brigade, Major Klika. Both officials assured us that the area around Black Lake was not then being patrolled.

Around two in the morning our group reached the lake. Lieutenant Pokorny and Major Klika went off to the nearby barracks, and after their report that all was in order, the raft was let down into the water. I put on my scuba-diving suit and aqualung and slipped into the water. Equipped with a lamp I

found the area previously selected for placing the cases, where the layer of mud was not too deep. If the cases had been thrown from the surface into the middle of the lake, no one would have been likely to find them, since the middle of the lake, nearly 120 feet deep, is covered with a layer of mud several yards thick, into which the cases would have vanished irretrievably.

I placed the cases at a depth of eighteen to thirty feet and covered them lightly with mud so that they would be easy to find but would still give the impression that they had lain on the bottom for years. The project lasted about an hour, after which we returned to Prague.

A staff from Czechoslovak television, together with a five-member group of divers including me and led by Petr Karhan, arrived on June 25 in the Bohemian Forest region called Sumava in Czech and set up camp at Devil's Lake, which was to be examined first. We found a large number of explosives that shortly after World War II had been dumped into this lake by Czechoslovak military experts. This discovery made the first headlines and induced a welcome dramatic effect which had not been originally foreseen. Finally on July 3 our diving group set out for Black Lake. Shortly after we descended under the surface we discovered the cases. Major Klika, the border guard intelligence officer who had participated in sinking the cases, was waiting at the bank. While being informed of the discovery he gave orders not to pull the cases from the water, lest they contain explosives. From that instant the propaganda merry-go-round was off at full speed.

On Saturday, July 4, the Czechoslovak Press Agency released a report—which had been prepared earlier by Department D—from the Ministry of the Interior:

> Last week a group of *Svazarm** divers began shooting a film with a crew from Curious Camera on the surroundings and in the waters of Devil's Lake and Black Lake in the Bohemian Forest. One of the formations of border guards was advised that in a probe of the waters of Black Lake the *Svazarm* divers discovered large objects

* Acronym for "Union for Cooperation with the Army," which organizes amateur sports of importance to the army, such as parachute jumping and scuba diving.

> at a depth of about ten meters. The Ministry of the Interior advises that the district heretofore open around Black Lake will be closed to the public from 4 July of this year until further notice.

The Interior Ministry's declaration was intended to bar the public from the immediate vicinity of the cases, which still lay in the water waiting to be fished out by a diving group from the Ministry of the Interior. There was one illogical point in the text, however. The public was denied access to Black Lake, where the cases were hidden, but not to Devil's Lake, where explosives had been found. I had written the text of the statement, leaving only the dates blank, before my departure to Sumava. Major Stejskal did not correct the statement after we discovered the explosives, and he released the report in its original form.

Journalists, for whom the discoveries in Devil's and Black Lakes were a welcome subject to liven up the summer dead season, began to come to the nearby small town of Zelezna Ruda. Divers from the Ministry of the Interior arrived, as well as a sapper unit from the Czechoslovak army with several pontoons. First, the explosives were removed from Devil's Lake, then the chests from Black Lake, which were transported to Prague according to plan. On July 16, 1964, the Ministry of the Interior made a further report formulated by Department D:

> Prague, 16 July (CTK). Czechoslovak television has been shooting a documentary film from 25 June to 10 July 1964 in the area of Zelezna Ruda in the Bohemian Forest on the legends of Devil's Lake and Black Lake. Divers of the Prague *Svazarm* were conducting a partial probe of the bottom of both lakes in this connection and came upon a significant number of explosives and cases of unknown contents. After the border guards were notified of the discoveries, divers from the Ministry of the Interior arrived on the scene and in cooperation with a sapper unit of the Czechoslovak army hoisted the objects out. The explosive finds from Devil's Lake were rendered harmless near Zelezna Ruda. The cases from Black Lake were carried away to Prague.
>
> After a detailed technical examination it was determined that the cases contained no explosives, whereupon they were opened. Within the cases were sealed metal boxes containing Nazi papers from the

time of the Second World War. The papers were given over to a group of experts.

The Ministry of the Interior advises that the heretofore restricted area of Black Lake will again be accessible to the public, beginning Saturday, 18 July at 6 P.M. Swimming in Black Lake, unlike Devil's Lake, is prohibited.

The Ministry of the Interior takes this opportunity to thank those of our citizens who in recent weeks have offered to its organs valuable information on the possibility of various caches of Nazi material. It is turning to the public with a request for information which could be of aid in uncovering further Nazi hiding places from the last months of the war on our territory. Any information may be sent to the Secretariat of the Ministry of the Interior.

The find in the lakes of the Bohemian Forest excited the Czechoslovak public, and a first-class sensation was created. The Czechoslovak press daily referred to each of the most minute details connected with the find, and after the announcement that the chests contained Nazi papers, interest increased even more. By means of the Czechoslovak Press Agency the report was spread and published in much of the European and overseas press.

In the course of implementing the first and second stages of Operation Neptune, Department D encountered two serious problems. First, rumors had begun to circulate among the workers of Czechoslovak television, even before the discovery of the cases, that unidentified persons—most likely, employees of the Interior Ministry—had thrown some sort of cases into the lake. Colonel Houska first suspected that I was responsible for the leak because my wife worked for Czechoslovak television. He was completely wrong. Not until four years later, after we had come to the United States, did I tell her the truth about Black Lake. The intelligence service finally discovered the source of the information leak. An operative of the Ninth Directorate who had helped prepare the cases had confided in one of his co-workers, and from there it had come to the ears of Czechoslovak television's staff. The intelligence service tightened all security procedures but decided not to take any action against the guilty individuals, since that would probably arouse still more attention. An operative

from Prague's intelligence headquarters was sent to the area, posing as a West German citizen; it turned out that the people living there truly believed that there had been a significant find in Black Lake. After several weeks even the television employees considered the rumors unsubstantiated, and Minister Strougal's press conference and the success of the television film dispersed the rumors completely.

In order to prevent new possible leakages from the intelligence officers, Colonel Houska decided to spread disinformation among them which was supposed to confirm the plausibility of the find. From the Berlin intelligence station a fictitious report was sent out in code, confirming that in the spring of 1945 an unnamed group of German soldiers had thrown several cases into Black Lake. The report made the normal rounds of individual intelligence departments so that the greatest possible number of ordinary employees would inconspicuously familiarize themselves with it. And it was even worked up as a piece of special information for the Minister of the Interior. Of course, it was not sent out as such, but came to the desk of Colonel Houska, who thereupon destroyed it.

A second problem, much more grave, was selection of the documents which were to be used in the action. The Department D workers who were examining the Czechoslovak archives concluded that a large number of suitable documents were not available because most of them were already known to a specialized public (historians) and their existence recorded. Although the group continued its examinations, after consulting with Soviet advisors, we accepted an offer from Moscow to add a sufficient amount of original Nazi documents to meet the requirements of the action. This decision, reached even before we dumped the cases into Black Lake, put the intelligence service leadership and Minister Strougal at ease, but weeks and months went by and the documents from Moscow had not yet arrived. Time was growing short and Colonel Houska even considered canceling the Interior Minister's press conference, announced long before, on the pretext that the documents discovered made no new contribution.

The documents selected from Czechoslovak archives amounted to only several hundred pages, and their subject matter could

not fulfill the requirements of Operation Neptune. We had a volume of materials on the activity of Otto Abetz, a Nazi subversion specialist, containing financial records of the trips abroad of his agents. These were all German citizens of high social standing who had used their scientific, artistic, or trade activities as a cover for their intelligence work. Also included were daily reports of certain components of the RSHA (the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt,* headquarters of the Nazi security service) during the war; documents on the so-called final solution of the Jewish question in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia; documents of German courts-martial; and partial materials on the brutal treatment of Allied prisoners of war.

Only less than a week before the scheduled press conference on September 15 did a special courier arrive from Moscow with several sacks of Nazi documents. A group of carefully selected officers studied them day and night. The documents had obviously been pulled from original German volumes and they represented quite a heterogeneous assortment. They contained the following:

1. Materials of the SS Historical Commission set up after the *Anschluss* of Austria to probe the reasons for the failure of the 1934 Nazi *Putsch* in Austria.

2. Materials on the activity of the Sixth Bureau of the RSHA in Italy during World War II. These documents bore witness to extensive intelligence activity in Italy by the *Sicherheitsdienst,** which meant the Nazis were consciously breaking a pact by which the two as allies had agreed not to conduct espionage activities against each other.

3. Some of the Italian documents concerned the technique employed for sending German agents through Italy to Latin America on board freighters.

4. Materials on the activities of the German aristocrat Max von Hohenlohe. According to the documents, von Hohenlohe had worked for the Nazi intelligence service.

5. A *Sicherheitsdienst* report on the preparation and execution of a Nazi special operation "Anzio" in Italy.

6. Documents of a local character on the activity of German military intelligence in France after the opening of a second front.

* *Sicherheitsdienst* (SD) was one of the Nazi intelligence services, known as the Sixth Bureau of the RSHA.

7. Incomplete minutes from sessions of the staff of the Sixth Bureau of the RSHA.

8. Official reports of certain SS units on the extermination of populations in occupied territories of the Soviet Union and several diaries of Nazis operating in military units in the USSR.

9. Diverse partial materials on the intelligence activities of the SD in Hungary and Yugoslavia.

The group entrusted with the study of the documents and the preparation of Strougal's report were hindered in their work by the fact that there were pencil notations in Cyrillic—the Russian alphabet—on many of the documents. One objective of Operation Neptune was to make documents accessible to the public, and so those with Russian notations had to be excluded. The experts of the Ninth Directorate revealed that although the Russian notations could be removed, Western experts could reveal the irregularity during a check of the documents' authenticity.

Strougal's Press Conference

Minister Strougal was very nervous. At the last moment he lost confidence not only in the success of Operation Neptune but in his own ability to field unpleasant and aggressive questions posed by foreign journalists. Major Stejskal and I spent the entire night before the conference in Strougal's office to prepare him for trick questions the Western correspondents might ask.

After the session ended in the small hours of the morning and we were leaving Strougal's office, he looked at us and said, "If anything goes wrong you will be arrested." One small irony was that the press conference was held in Studio D of the television station in Prague.

The press conference opened with Strougal's hour-long statement. He had to sail around several dangerous cliffs. One was a heterogeneous mixture of materials—documents on activities of the SS, RSHA, individual offices of the SD, Wehrmacht, German occupation units in Bohemia, and personal records of prominent Germans—that could not be fully accounted for. Strougal tried

to face up to this by admitting that some of the documents in the find could possibly be already known. As *Mlada Fronta* reported on September 16, 1964, Strougal said:

> This matter is a part of the materials of individual offices of the Reich security headquarters in Berlin, from their operations in various areas. The materials contain documents on events which have already been explained and reported by historians; but besides this there are also documents from the find relating to events which have been insufficiently reported. It is furthermore a matter of original documents whose existence was assumed, but which had up to the present time never been brought to light.

Disinformation on the Nazi trunks had to be supported by credible expert testimony from the bomb-disposal specialists of the Ministry of the Interior. "Expert information" available for reporters present at the conference described in detail how the cases had been opened. This document, which ran to several pages and included documentary photographs, explained that

> the first of the cases was x-rayed with a radioactive isotope of cobalt while at the same time a number of deflectoscopic photographs were taken to see whether the lid of the box had been secured by explosives against opening. After negative results were confirmed, the experts scrutinized the hinges and the wires around the chest. After deflectoscopy, the coating of sealant was removed from the lid of the case and around the lock, mechanically and with the aid of solvents. There was nothing suspicious even here. That being so, the specialists were then able carefully to cut out an opening in the lid of the chest and with the help of light beams and a small mirror to scrutinize the space under the lid. They found that the contents proper of the case were covered in an independent layer of asphalt. Only after this point could the lid and back wall of the chest be freed. After this the coating of sealant was partially removed and a steel wire winding around a steel box placed within was taken off. It was necessary to again submit the box from the chest to deflectoscopy, and photographs were taken with the help of cobalt 60. Because they were not altogether conclusive, the box was opened from a distance by means of a relay mechanism. Only then could all the papers under cover in the box be carefully removed.*

* Josef Glückselig, "Svedectvi z jezernich hlubin," *Zapisnik*, 1964.

Mlada Fronta stated that on carrying out the first propaganda attack against the German Federal Republic, Strougal had said:

> World opinion is acquainted with various revanchist manifestations on the part of certain persons, particularly in the German Federal Republic, of whom a number participated actively in war crimes at the time of the Second World War. And there are those who are still in hiding and eluding just punishment. This being in our country as in a number of others, we cannot keep silent on such a matter. A proposed legal measure has been presented to the National Assembly, which would forbid the lapse of criminal prosecution of the most serious criminal acts against peace, war crimes, and criminal acts against humanity perpetrated in the interest of the service of the occupying forces.

Strougal continued in his report with examples of the activity of Dr. Max von Hohenlohe, who was an agent of the SD according to the Moscow documents:

> The documents acquired throw new light too on the mission led by Lord Runciman in Czechoslovakia before the Second World War. From the documents it is unmistakable that the German intelligence service likewise participated in the action of the mission, but in a quite opposite sense, through their secret service in London. It was they who decided that, at the time of his stay in Czechoslovakia, Lord Runciman would be the guest of Dr. Max Egon von Hohenlohe-Langenburg on his estate in Cerveny Hradek at Chomutov. They decided thus, because even at this time Hohenlohe was an agent of the Berlin offices of the SD. Max Hohenlohe not only kept up contacts with the American Embassy in Prague, but was also meeting with Ribbentrop and other important personages of the Third Reich. The importance of this agent may be judged from the fact that from 15 to 21 July 1939, he was sent on assignment with the RSHA to London. It ensues from his seven-page report that by means of Runciman [with Runciman as an intermediary] he entered into contacts with leading personalities in British life. The pretext for this activity was an effort to enlist the British politicians in a solution of the German-Polish problem analogous to that of the Sudeten problem.

Strougal went on to suggest that there could be people living in Britain who, in their connection with Max von Hohenlohe,

constituted a reserve or even direct source for the West German intelligence service. The spicy anecdote which was to enliven the dry speech about the documents was Strougal's mention of the diary of Max von Hohenlohe's daughter, the Princess von Hohenlohe. With reference to the diary, he revealed that the princess had all along noted down carefully—in addition to her own experiences—the nature of her father's political activities. "I believe that publication of this diary in the West would cause anxiety to certain leading people, at the mention of the slightest personal unpleasantness," said Strougal. It was in fact not overly interesting reading, either personally or politically. Strougal was alluding to an upsurge of emotion on the part of Max von Hohenlohe's daughter for the present-day Prince of Monaco, Rainier III.

Strougal's report primarily contained events which, supported by the language of the documents, followed the original political goal of Operation Neptune. He referred to the activity of Hitler's intelligence service in Italy, which conducted total espionage against its Italian ally and attentively followed, among other things, the activity of leading Italian fascist personalities. He cited one of the SD reports from December 1940, according to which "Mussolini has lost a great deal of popularity in the last six months. As a result of this, the *Duce* is deceived by many of the state organs. For example, on his summer inspection tours of the aviation squadrons, he was several times shown the same military contingents, without suspecting anything." Strougal went on to speak about the documents of the so-called SS Historical Commission, connected with the unsuccessful Nazi *Putsch* in Austria in 1934, the Nazi effort to smooth over tracks which could uncover part of their espionage activities, and efforts to rehabilitate the chief offenders and overtake those who had come out against the National Socialists in court trials. He spoke of Nazi intelligence activity in France, on the period after the Anglo-American invasion, on the contents of several periodic bulletins of the Fourth Bureau of the RSHA evaluating the internal situation in Germany and occupied lands, and of the barbarities of SS units on the occupied territories of the Soviet Union.

Finally, Strougal said that events had been cited that touched on agents and confidants of the *Sicherheitsdienst* and the Gestapo.

"Please understand clearly," said Strougal, "that this is a question of material which, in the interest of the security of our republic, cannot be divulged at the present time. . . . The written documents which have been found will unmistakably aid in the explanation of certain historical events in the time of Nazism. But it is not only a case here of the importance of the acquired documents in the explanation of particular events in the area of history. The documents acquired have meaning as well for the assurance of the security of our socialist republic."

After returning to his office, Strougal was congratulated by Colonel Houska. Strougal's threats were forgotten. The press conference had been a success.

One problem remained to be solved. Strougal had mentioned in his speech that "evidence exists indicating that more, as yet uncovered, secret materials were placed in our lands at the time of the occupation, and the search for them is continuing." This statement obliged Strougal to see that the probe of Black Lake itself be brought to a close. After the "discovery" and removal of the cases from Black Lake, it was logical that the Ministry of the Interior should conduct a thorough probe of Black Lake and all nearby lakes of the Bohemian Forest. The cases were discovered several minutes after the amateur divers had gone beneath the surface, so some speculated that Black Lake concealed more than just the four chests which had been pulled out. The diving group of the Ministry of the Interior had conducted no probe, but only hoisted those four chests.* Technically speaking it would have been very difficult for helmeted divers to have done the job. Major Stejskal sent the same group of amateur divers, myself included, to the Bohemian Forest again in May 1965. One man, Petr Karhan, was excluded because a security check on him had revealed that his father had emigrated from Czechoslovakia and was probably cooperating with a West European intelligence service. A probe lasting two weeks, again prominently reported by the press, was intended to indicate the Interior Ministry's

* Newspapers differed in recording the number of cases found, some reporting five, six, or even tens of cases. Only four cases were placed in Black Lake, but the divers also found a metal cash box and a large wooden chest, both of which were empty.

diligent pursuit of its duties. There were, of course, no new "historical discoveries" because no other chests had been placed or thrown in the lakes.

The remains of an unidentified man on the bottom of Black Lake, at a depth of about twenty-seven meters, was the only result of the probe. The pathology staff of the hospital in Pilsen, where the body had been taken, determined that he had lain on the bottom for more than twenty years. Further investigation failed to identify him.

Public Response

The documents from Black Lake provoked a response in Eastern as well as Western Europe. Several weeks after Strougal's press conference Austria expressed interest in the documents of the SS Historical Commission, concerning the Nazi *Putsch* in Austria in 1934. We were delighted. Through the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences photocopies of the material were presented in full academic ceremonies to two Austrian historians—Professor Dr. Ludwig Jedlicka and Dr. Rudolf Steiner—in Prague in the autumn of 1964. The Austrian publishing house Europa Verlag published them in 1965 in book form under the title *SS Historical Commission.*

Europa Verlag's interest stimulated us to select another set of documents, the records of SS units who had massacred the civil population in some regions of the Soviet Union. The documents were supplied to Europa Verlag by way of the Czechoslovak Press Agency, which anticipated financial profit from the publication. The documents were also published as a book.

The Soviet disinformation department, impressed by the publicity which Operation Neptune had received in Austria, sent Czechoslovakia's Department D a document concerning former (1934–38) Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg, who had been imprisoned by the Gestapo shortly after the Austrian *Anschluss* and later held in a concentration camp until the end of the war. The document was designed to appear as a declaration

in which Schuschnigg addressed Nazi authorities, requested mercy for his co-workers, apologized for his activities during his tenure as chancellor, expressed readiness to work for the *Führer* —should the opportunity be granted him—and promised absolute loyalty to the *Führer*, the Reich, and the German people. The declaration was dated June 11, 1938, during his imprisonment of a few weeks in a provisional cell arranged in the former Hotel Metropol in Vienna.

Moscow sent the "Schuschnigg declaration" to Prague and requested that the Czechoslovak intelligence service attempt to exploit it in advance of the Austrian parliamentary elections, to be held in March of 1966. Prague was to discredit the Austrian People's Party (*Oesterreichische Volkspartei*) and its historical traditions by attacking Kurt von Schuschnigg, a former champion of the party, as a weakling who had relinquished Austria to Hitler, and who had even been willing to collaborate with the Nazis.

The plan was unsuccessful because the Czechoslovak intelligence service failed to reveal the document before the elections. The Austrian People's Party won convincingly and even pushed the Socialist Party of Austria (*Sozialistische Partei Oesterreichs*), its coalition partner in previous years, out of the government. In evaluating the reasons for its defeat, the Socialist Party concluded that the officially announced support of the Communists for the socialist candidates had contributed to its downfall.

It was not until March of 1968 that the French, West German, and Austrian press discussed the nature of the "Schuschnigg declaration." The Austrian socialist, Otto Leichter, wrote a book entitled *Zwischen zwei Diktaturen* (Between Two Dictatorships), published in March of 1968 by Europa Verlag. The author made public the full text of the "Schuschnigg declaration" and the content of his private correspondence with Schuschnigg from 1967. According to *Der Spiegel*, No. 12, 1968, Schuschnigg admitted the existence of the "declaration," but held that this document had acquired its final form without his voluntary cooperation. In fact, his signature is not on the document. Gestapo officials could have given it another form by careful editing.

The Austrian media were divided in their opinion on Schuschnigg's declaration. The *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, on March 12, 1968,

publicized Georg Scheuer's conclusion that no one doubted the authenticity of the "Schuschnigg declaration" found in the Gestapo archive. On the other hand the *Wochenpresse,* on March 13, 1968, defended Schuschnigg, inquired about the document's source, and quoted the Austrian historian, Professor Dr. Jedlicka, as saying: "For years some such ghostly paper as this has been floating around in the Eastern bloc. Years ago Czech historians indicated to us in a conference in Prague that there were such letters to Hitler, not only from Schuschnigg but also from Otto von Hapsburg. They were not published, either in expectation of some appropriate moment or because they were not held to be authentic."

Thus, this part of Operation Neptune utilizing the "Schuschnigg declaration" did not achieve the success anticipated for it. It turned out to be very difficult to exploit a thirty-year-old Nazi document of dubious value for current political ends. Although the polemical discussion which developed around the document exposed the weaknesses of Schuschnigg's defense, it did not influence Austrian public opinion to any great degree.

Since uncovering a "Nazi archive" in Black Lake had met with favorable publicity in the West German press, we decided to exploit the documents directly in the German Federal Republic. We established contact with the leaders of the Union of Fighters Against Fascism* in Prague and worked out the details of further action. On November 20, 1964, the West German federal government appealed to governments, private organizations, and individuals throughout the world for any information which might bring to light hitherto uninvestigated war crimes, so that proceedings could be taken against the persons concerned before the statute of limitations expired in May of 1965. Any government, organization, or individual possessing such information was requested to communicate it to the Center for the Prosecution of Nazi War Crimes, in Ludwigsburg, or to any federal diplomatic or consular mission abroad.† The secretary of the Union of

* The Union of Fighters Against Fascism, *Svaz protifasistickych bojovniku* in Czech, is an organization of former political prisoners in concentration camps, members of an anti-fascist partisan movement, and World War II veterans.

† As reported by *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Weekly Diary of Contemporary Events, Bristol, January 1–9, 1965, p. 20,511.

Fighters Against Fascism, Dr. Volejnik, was dispatched to the German Federal Republic in December 1964 to establish contact with the West German partner organization called *die Naziverfolgten* in West Germany and to give them a collection of legally verified photocopies of Nazi documents on the massacring of the civilian population in the USSR. In cooperation with this West German organization, he was to arrange a press conference in the German Federal Republic, to call on a representative of the Center for the Prosecution of Nazi War Crimes, and to hand over to him another set of the photocopies mentioned above.

Volejnik's visit to the German Federal Republic was a complete success. It was stated in Bonn on January 6, 1965, that Poland and Czechoslovakia had agreed to collaborate with the Center for the Prosecution of Nazi War Crimes in making available previously unknown material which would help to track down Nazi criminals. The Polish and Czechoslovak attitude in response to the German appeal for further information on Nazi crimes was officially welcomed in Bonn, where the hope was expressed that other countries would follow the example of Poland and Czechoslovakia.* The Czechoslovak intelligence service convinced West German units that Czechoslovakia had a great number of original and important Nazi documents at its disposal—documents that would require a long time to evaluate. West German authorities under the pressure of world opinion began to consider altering their original negative position on extending the statute of limitations.

On February 24, 1965, the Federal Cabinet considered a provisional report prepared by Dr. Bucher, the Minister of Justice, who stated that a total of seventy thousand Germans had already been convicted of war and Nazi crimes (six thousand by West German courts, thirteen thousand by East German courts, and the remainder in other countries) and that proceedings had been instituted or would be taken before May 8 in Western Germany against thirteen thousand others suspected of participation in Nazi crimes. The report added that the material handed over by East European countries in response to the federal government's

* As documented in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives,* January 16–25, 1965, p. 20,532.

appeal had brought evidence of previously unknown "crime complexes."*

After a dramatic discussion in parliament and in the government in March of 1965, the West German government extended the time limit for the prosecution of war crimes until December 31, 1969. Operation Neptune was clearly one of the factors which influenced the decision, in addition to public opinion in Western Europe, the official protest of Israel and the USSR, the statements of the Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, and the U.N. Commission on Human Rights with its seat in Geneva.

After Strougal's press conference, the French press devoted attention to the Black Lake find mainly in connection with the problem of the prosecution of war crimes. Yet French journalists were not overly impressed with those parts of the documents connected with French territory. Strougal had stated that "the documents on the activity of German intelligence in France chiefly concern the period after the Anglo-American invasion and in particular diversionary actions in the rear of the invasion armies." Some French journalists, to whom this material was made available through the Czechoslovak Press Agency, retreated from their original plan to publish them since they contained only a report on the number of agents at the disposal of the German army intelligence service, *Abwehr*, at certain places in the enemy rear. The documents, which were only a few pages in length, did not provide either the content of individual German intelligence operations or the identity of the pro-German agents within the ranks of the French population.

While we had more attractive documents at our disposal, we hesitated to use them immediately for propaganda purposes. These included financial records of foreign trips by Nazi agents of the so-called Otto Abetz group. In the early 1930s Otto Abetz was a member of the French section of Joachim von Ribbentrop's intelligence bureau; from 1935 until 1939 he acted as a propagandist for the Nazis in France, and during the Nazi occupation of France he served in Paris as the German Foreign Office's minister plenipotentiary to the Army of Occupation. He was in

* As stated in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, January 1–9, 1965, p. 20,951.

fact deeply involved in intelligence activities. The documents revealed that Abetz had exploited, for intelligence purposes, German scientists, businessmen, writers, and aristocrats—people who maintained contacts at the highest level with foreign partners both in and outside Nazi-occupied countries. Although the Abetz group's primary activities were in France, the documents showed that Abetz had also directed his agents toward Scandinavia and had developed a great interest in South Africa. Otto Abetz had occasionally made financial donations to pro-German newspapers in South Africa, in the sum of tens of thousands of reichsmarks. After briefly considering the immediate propaganda value of these documents, Colonel Houska decided to wait and first determine the current status of all persons mentioned in the Abetz materials as agents. Confirmation that some of them were living in Western Europe provided the Czechoslovak intelligence service with the possibility of blackmailing and recruiting them as Czechoslovak agents. For this reason these documents were not exploited in the 1964–65 anti-German campaign.

We had some success with those documents found in Czechoslovak archives which concerned the tracking down and legal prosecution of members of the French underground. Voluminous material from German courts-martial was evaluated and the contents used in several programs in French for Czechoslovak radio's foreign broadcasts. These programs had a very positive reception in France, judging by the great number of letters which Czechoslovak radio received from French listeners.

The Italian press provided wide publicity to the find of Nazi cases in Black Lake. *La Nazione*, for example, on September 16, 1964, informed Italian readers that the Nazi intelligence service had relied heavily on its ally, Fascist Italy, and, furthermore, that the German intelligence service had investigated even the highest government functionaries, including Mussolini.

An Italian publishing house showed an interest in publishing a book on those Black Lake documents concerned with Italy. Two representatives of the firm were sent to Prague, where, at the Czechoslovak Press Agency, they studied originals of the documents and made their selections. After several days of activity, they returned to Italy with an extensive collection of photo-

copies intended for publication. The Czechoslovak Press Agency was to share in the financial gains, while the intelligence service contented itself with the anticipated propaganda effect.

Many of the documents concerned with Italy described activities of the Nazi intelligence service among Italian notables, including the Italian aristocracy which was considered to be anti-Nazi. We expected an increase in anti-German feeling to follow the documents' publication, since many prominent Italian persons were to learn officially for the first time that they had been targets of the German intelligence service during the war. In addition, we considered the fact that the Italian counterintelligence service would have to answer the question of whether or not certain former Nazi intelligence agents were now working for the West German intelligence service.

Through the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague, the embassies of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Holland in Prague were given selected groups of documents concerning the persecution of citizens of their countries by the Nazis during World War II. These were primarily Allied prisoners who had been treated very brutally by the Nazi machinery. In the accompanying letters to the foreign embassies Czechoslovak authorities did not mention that the documents had come from Black Lake, since they were already known to Czechoslovak historians. We anticipated a heightening of official pressure from the Allied countries against the lapse of the statute of limitations on war crimes.

In order to spread disinformation and develop propaganda campaigns within the framework of Operation Neptune, we used the following channels:

A documentary film in two parts on the mysteries of the two lakes was prepared by Czechoslovak television and broadcast in Czechoslovakia as well as in several Western countries. The film was singled out at the Leipzig Film Festival in the category of film documentaries having extraordinary journalistic effectiveness.

During the course of Operation Neptune all the individual reports of the Ministry of the Interior (prepared by Department D) were disseminated by means of the Czechoslovak Press Agency. A special correspondent covered the Black Lake dis-

covery, without, of course, being taken into the confidence of the intelligence service. After Strougal's press conference the Czechoslovak Press Agency partially assumed the role of foreign distributor of the "discovered" documents—but under the control and direction of the intelligence service. Certain documents were made accessible or sold to Western editors or publishing houses, particularly in West Germany, Austria, and Italy. In this way the intelligence service solved the potentially unpleasant problem of transferring the materials to interested parties abroad without direct official intervention of the Ministry of the Interior. The Czechoslovak press in fact played only an ancillary, supporting role.

Czechoslovak radio in its foreign broadcasts transmitted several feature programs on the heroism of the anti-Nazi underground in Western Europe. The feature on France was very successful.

The Union of Fighters Against Fascism was used as a channel for transmitting parts of the material to the Center for the Prosecution of War Crimes and to the Organization of Nazi victims in West Germany.

Documents which directly or indirectly touched on the massacre of Jewish populations during the Second World War were given to the Jewish Religious Community, a religious and cultural organization in Prague, with the expectation that they would find their way into the hands of various Jewish groups abroad and through them be used for propaganda purposes.

The reactivation of the government's Commission for the Prosecution of War Crimes* was stimulated directly by Operation Neptune. Uninitiated government representatives believed that the great number of Nazi papers had actually been discovered in Black Lake. But the commission unconsciously hindered the intelligence service's work, since it requested at the beginning of 1965 that all the documents be submitted to it before being given

* A commission of similar character was in existence previous to Operation Neptune but was not functioning. A new commission was put together from representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, the Office of the General Prosecutor, the Union of Fighters Against Fascism, and the Ministry of Justice, with Minister of Justice Alois Neumann as chairman.

out abroad, published, or otherwise utilized, claiming its own priority in using them. The intelligence service circumvented this regulation, accepting the risk that publication abroad without the commission's knowledge would evoke protests, which did indeed occur in several cases.

By means of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, documents on the "SS Historical Commission" were given to Austrian scholars who initiated their publication in Austria.

Through the agency of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs documents concerning the persecution of citizens of several Western countries were given to the appropriate embassies.

Reports in the foreign mass media on the Black Lake documents were inspired by the sensation of the find itself. The intelligence service did not use its agents in foreign mass media as tools for extending the campaign because agents aware of the true circumstances could have been a security risk.

Thus the Czechoslovak intelligence service used only official dissemination channels in Operation Neptune, and no agents abroad were involved. With the exception of the initial group of officers in the Ministry of the Interior who took a direct part in the action, no one outside the framework of the Interior Ministry was informed as to the substance of the disinformation except President Novotny and, of course, the Russians. All Czechoslovak institutions and individuals who came into contact with the documents, or even shared in their propaganda use, became the victims of this disinformation just as were the West European public and the West German government authorities against whom it was in fact directed.

Accomplishments

"Congratulations, comrades," said Colonel Houska to Stejskal and me after reading the Minister of the Interior's announcement judging Operation Neptune one of the most successful actions of the new disinformation branch and recognizing our personal roles. "It was a very good job. It is a model of the informal, creative

approach to the problem of special operations without the usual clichés."

Both of us were singled out for exceptional financial reward. The Soviet intelligence service conveyed its congratulations through its advisors in Prague and cited the operation as a good illustration of "cooperation between the Czechoslovak and Soviet intelligence services."

Was it really such a success? Had we not deceived ourselves more than the opponent? To a limited extent, the action revived Western Europe's anti-German predilections, but the Czechoslovak and Soviet intelligence services were not successful in convincing the West European public that the present-day West German regime was the practical and ideological outgrowth of Nazi Germany. In the area of political relations between the German Federal Republic and its West European partners, the Czechoslovak intelligence service achieved nothing that could be evaluated as the direct consequence of Operation Neptune, in either a positive or negative sense.

The dramatic plot of Operation Neptune was carried out on Czechoslovak territory, and there it consequently found a wide response. A two-part television film, a whole series of broadcast programs, and articles in the Czechoslovak press contributed to bringing the find in Black Lake into the consciousness of the broad population.* A classical example of how intelligence disinformation can mislead one's own state apparatus was the reestablishment of a government Commission for the Prosecution of War Crimes, as a consequence of the uncovering of a "Nazi archive" in Black Lake. The commission did not suspect that the documents were brought from the Soviet Union or found in Czechoslovak archives and that this was an intelligence service action. So, not only was the Czechoslovak public disinformed, but the top governmental bodies as well, who thus unknowingly played a role in the intelligence game.

* The sensationalism of the find stimulated the publishing house "Nase Vojsko" to publish *On the Bottom Was Death* (1964), and the house of the Union of Fighters Against Fascism to issue *The Mystery of the Black Lake* (1965). The weekly *Svet v obrazech* (The World in Pictures) published a series of articles written on the Black Lake documents.

The Ministry of the Interior expected that Operation Neptune would spur the discovery of real Nazi archives. A call to the population brought a few hundred letters from Czechoslovak citizens containing fragmentary facts or suspicions of further caches, but no new archives were found. In one case the Ministry of the Interior located a possible Nazi cache in a former stone quarry, but its recovery would have been so costly that it was decided to abandon the search.

The documents which the special courier brought from Moscow revealed that the Soviet Union had at its disposal a great number of important German documents, part of which concerned the Nazi policy of extermination in the western part of the Soviet Union. These documents, containing the names and signatures of Nazi war criminals, had not been used since World War II in any effective punitive action nor had the Soviet security agency that held the documents exploited them in the pursuit of those responsible for the extermination of citizens of the USSR. The narrow interest of Soviet security to use these documents for its own purposes was decisive. If the Soviet intelligence service had succeeded in identifying in the GFR anyone who had been compromised by his activity during World War II, it was possible to blackmail him and force him into collaboration with the Soviet intelligence apparatus. The interests of the Soviet state security service predominated over the real interests of the entire Soviet public.

The Soviet intelligence service claimed that the documents sent to the Czechoslovak intelligence service were genuine. The Soviet choice of documents made allowance for the use to which they would be put but on the other hand showed evidence of having been selected in haste. Many were given over in original and facsimile form, although that was not necessary, and on some there were notations in Cyrillic, as mentioned before. Czechoslovak intelligence employees who studied and sorted them were convinced of their authenticity. Yet the theoretical possibility exists that some of the materials had been falsified by Soviet experts. The forgery of documents more than twenty years old is a technically challenging operation. If Soviet intelligence

agents had decided to carry out such disinformation against the Czechoslovak intelligence service as well, the content of the counterfeit documents should have justified the labors involved. But, though in the aggregate the documents were interesting material, none of them individually would have been a great sensation. Even the "Schuschnigg declaration" was not of primary importance, for, at the time when the intelligence service set out to publish the document, Schuschnigg was a private person, freed of any direct influence whatever on Austrian political events.

After evaluating the results of Operation Neptune the question arises whether it was necessary to choose so complicated a method of execution—sinking and hauling out the chests. An official admission that the USSR or Czechoslovakia had held the documents since 1945 would have entitled the West Germans to ask why the documents had not been used earlier for the prosecution of war criminals. Ultimately, the Black Lake find permitted the Czechoslovak intelligence service to announce through Czechoslovak authorities, even before the statute of limitations for war crimes had lapsed, that the documents in question were so numerous and so significant that neither Czechoslovak nor West German experts would be able before May 1965 to evaluate them. Thus an extension of the term of the statute was justified. In this sense, Operation Neptune fulfilled its purpose.

The operation did not accomplish all the objectives which had been stated at the time of its conception. On the other hand, it did give Department D's personnel greater self-confidence and courage to take on additional challenging disinformation assignments.

Because a list of Czech collaborators was supposed to have been found among the Black Lake documents, we anticipated suspension of the activities of those West German intelligence agents in Czechoslovakia who had been recruited as a consequence of their pro-Nazi orientation during the war. Prague did not acquire any direct information about the reaction of the West German intelligence service, but assumed that the disinformation had fulfilled its purpose. This conclusion was based on the hy-

pothesis that if the Czechoslovak intelligence service had been in the same position as the West German opponent, it would have stopped its agents' activities, at least for a certain period.

For one disinformation specialist in Prague this hypothesis was not enough. He detailed a plan to alert the West German intelligence service, especially its counterintelligence branch, to send them in a completely wrong direction.

Espionage Offensive

"Is anything wrong?" a West German repatriation official in a Friedland camp asked a man who had requested a private discussion with no witnesses.

"No sir. I am quite content with the accommodations here in Friedland, and I know it's the maximum that I, a newcomer, can get," the man answered.

"What's the matter, then? Why the secrecy?"

The man hesitated a moment and then said: "You know, I'm innocent, I have not done anything against the German Federal Republic, but I have to confess that I am a Communist agent."

Strangely, the confession did not surprise the repatriation official. "Continue, please," he said, encouraging the man to tell the whole story.

"When the Czechoslovak government announced that all Germans living in Czechoslovakia would be permitted to leave the country for Germany, I submitted my request, as did many of my friends. Several months later I was invited by local authorities in Liberec who wanted to discuss the request with me personally. They asked me a lot of questions but they didn't say whether my request would be approved or not. Instead, they invited me again and only then did I realize that those men were from the police. They threatened that if I wasn't willing to work for them as a spy in West Germany I couldn't count on their permission to leave Czechoslovakia. So, I agreed and signed a commitment, but believe me, it was only because I wanted to get out. I have no intention of working for Czechoslovak espionage."

"Well," the official said, "I think you were right to report this incident immediately after coming here. If you had kept it secret for any reason, it would have caused you a lot of trouble because we would find out anyhow. Go back to the barracks now and write a full report on your experience wtih the Czechoslovak intelligence people."

Three million Germans were deported from Czechoslovakia with the consent of the four Great Powers shortly after World War II. The majority of them settled in West Germany, and the remainder in the Soviet Occupied Zone. Only those Germans who could demonstrate anti-fascist sentiments were permitted to remain. This precaution, which the postwar Czechoslovak government expected to help calm the situation within the country and to enhance security in the face of traditional German rivalry, did, however, represent a considerable loss for the national economy. The border regions of Czechoslovakia, where Germans had long concentrated, became largely depopulated. Czechs, despite continued government appeals, preferred to live in the interior.

The approximately 170,000 Germans remaining in Czechoslovakia became second-class citizens; their national rights were not respected. A second phase in the German migration to the German Federal Republic began in 1950—but of course emigration was allowed only for those Germans who had official permission from Czechoslovak authorities. At first these cases were exceptional, but in 1965, the Czechoslovak government magnanimously decided to permit the resettlement of all Germans who so requested. Petitions for resettlement were refused, however, in cases where the petitioners were irreplaceable at their posts or were considered party to production and state secrets. In these cases, existing directives did not permit the request for transfer to be denied outright, but approval was deferred for one to three years. About seventy thousand requests piled up at the Ministry of the Interior. They were carefully studied not only from the standpoint of defensive security but also for potential use by Department D.

Some West German politicians considered the new Czechoslovak move a gesture of good will, but counterintelligence officials, learning from more and more Germans coming from

Czechoslovakia that they had been recruited by the Czechoslovak intelligence service, thought that the Czechs had decided to open an immense intelligence offensive against Germany. It was indeed an offensive, but its main character was that of disinformation.

Several months before West German counterintelligence officials started to register growing numbers of Czechoslovak agents, I entered Lieutenant Colonel Michel's office to discuss with him the passivity of his subordinates in developing disinformation actions against foreign intelligence services.

Lieutenant Colonel Michel had not changed very much. His hair had grown grayer, but his face was as boyish as in 1955 when I had first met him. He had introduced me to the finer points of the intelligence profession when in 1958 I became a junior officer of the German operational department headed by him. For a long time I had respected and admired this man for his brilliant, cool mind. In the late fifties he had had a good chance to reach one of the highest positions in the service, but after Interior Minister Barak was arrested Michel became a non-person for political reasons.

Now we stood face-to-face again, no more as teacher and student but as partners occupying the same position in the service's hierarchy. Michel was deputy chief of the Sixth Department specializing in offensive counterintelligence activities on enemy territory. In terms of disinformation operations, the Sixth Department had a very poor record. For unknown reasons this department was staffed mostly with incompetent people who had failed in other operational departments, and it was therefore nicknamed a "dump."

Michel was still one of the most capable officers in the service, an outstanding card player who could plan a ruthless political assassination with equal imparitality. Communism was not a moral imperative or a goal for him; he had chosen sides in the duel of intelligence services only because of the accident of his birth in Czechoslovakia.

"Congratulations," he said.

"What for?" I asked him, not understanding the unusual welcome.

"For Operation Neptune," he said. "It was quite a good piece; nevertheless, there is one little blemish marring the beauty of the whole: too many people know about it." His cool green eyes appraised me in contrast to the smile on his lips.

I did not want to take part in one of the typical cat and mouse games he liked to play, so I changed the subject with no comment. "I came here to discuss disinformation possibilities against the West German intelligence service. You undoubtedly know that your department has been sleeping for a long time."

"Really?" he asked. "Spare yourself the effort of agitating me. We know each other very well, don't we?" He opened a drawer in his desk, took out a thin file, and threw it on the conference table in front of me.

When I finished reading that material, entitled Operation Transfer, I could not resist expressing my amazement. "It's an excellent idea," I said. Lieutenant Colonel Michel had recognized the great opportunity for Czechoslovakia's intelligence service in the government's decision to permit resettlement of Germans from Czechoslovakia to West Germany. It was possible to utilize this mass migration for a large disinformation action which could drive the West German state security agencies crazy. New arrivals in the German Federal Republic were screened by a procedure understandably necessary in such cases. Michel proposed to recruit several hundred pseudo-agents from among Czechoslovak Germans before their departure. These people would be expected to inform the West German police of their recruitment.

The main objective of the plan was to engage the West German counterintelligence service to the maximum degree in screening the alleged Czechoslovak agents, thus clearing West German territory for genuine intelligence activity. Pseudo-agents, recruited only for disinformation purposes, were to profess missions and goals designed to seem credible to the enemy, thus distracting attention from the actual targets and aims of the Czechoslovak intelligence service.

Michel did not intend merely to improve his department's image in the sphere of disinformation activities. He proposed to intersperse several capable, tested, and reliable agents with thousands of migrants in Operation Transfer, thus enhancing their

chances of escaping detection by the West German counterintelligence service.

Shortly after the operation was approved and under way, those Department D officers involved in its execution became aware of its distressing complexity because the recruitment of several hundred agents demanded considerable time and effort. They felt relieved when the burden was alleviated by the counterintelligence service and subsidiary state security apparatus of the eleven existing regions to which the task of selecting suitable candidates was entrusted. All of the candidates had strong anti-Communist or anti-Czech backgrounds so Department D could be sure they would inform West German police immediately after crossing the border.

One serious problem was the pseudo-communication plan they were to be given. The Czechoslovak intelligence service could not risk contacting disinformation agents through its officers stationed abroad. Such action would have given the operation more credence, but at the same time it would have exposed those officers to the danger of being arrested or publicly uncovered and expelled. The solution was found in primitive communication methods avoiding any personal contact with pseudo-agents abroad. Agents were instructed, for example, how to prepare invisible ink from chemicals available at any drug store and to send their reports covered as friendly letters to addresses in Czechoslovakia or to visit Czechoslovakia once or twice a year and bring the reports with them.

The West German counterintelligence service, and to some extent the intelligence service as well, understandably had to devote individual attention to each of the new arrivals who claimed to have been recruited in Czechoslovakia. Their testimony could be sincere or merely simulated in an attempt to gain confidence and later begin genuine intelligence operations. The West German intelligence service even felt compelled to screen all remaining emigrants, for the real danger existed that there were those among them who had not confessed their obligation to the Czechoslovak intelligence service and were willing to fulfill it. The thousands of German settlers from Czechoslovakia therefore represented a millstone around the necks of the German counter-

intelligence service, necessitating protracted, complicated, and unproductive examinations. The West German government eventually proclaimed immunity for all who voluntarily admitted to having worked for a foreign intelligence service.

For Prague it was a pleasure to confuse the West German counterintelligence service, called the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, as well as the West German Federal Intelligence Agency, sometimes called the *Gehlen organization,* after its founder and long-time chief, General Reinhard Gehlen, both of which had once enjoyed reputations of professional excellence. *Gehlen*'s glory disappeared when Mr. Felfe, chief of the Russian operational department in Pullach, was arrested and confessed to having worked for the Russians since the beginning of the fifties. The credibility of the West German counterintelligence service suffered a series of smaller but nonetheless painful failures. Now it was Czechoslovakia's turn to prolong West Germany's blunders, even if without publicity.

For several years West German authorities had tried to stop the Czechoslovak intelligence offensive. In 1968, the West German criminal code was reformed to allow immunity to foreign agents who voluntarily admitted to having worked for a foreign intelligence service. It was to little avail, so Interior Minister Genscher, after consulting with Minister of Justice Jahn, made a public appeal in April of 1970, asking spies to surrender. On April 4, 1970, the West German magazine *Der Spiegel* sarcastically reported the only response to Genscher's appeal was that of an old woman who went to the Ministry of the Interior to complain about pension payments.

Operation Transfer was a success. It confused the West German counterintelligence service, keeping it busy with unproductive investigations and thus reducing its effectiveness. The operation was based on logical premises, the fundamental principles, and working methods valid for all counterintelligence services whether Communist or not. The West German counterintelligence service was forced to submit to the procedures imposed by the Czechoslovak service. Its only option was one which victimized it.

The "bad" Germans were neither the only nor the most im-

portant target of Czechoslovak special operations. As a member of the Soviet intelligence empire the Czechoslovak service had to look far beyond West German borders and to attack the main Soviet opponent—the United States. It seems strange but true that on many occasions the Czechoslovak dwarf was able to challenge the American giant.

3

Scapegoat for the World's Troubles

The United States of America has often been criticized by her allies and friends as well as her enemies for what many countries have considered her errors in foreign policy. Some mistakes —American military involvement in Southeast Asia, for example— have been reevaluated and are in the process of being corrected, though many critics say that the process has been too slow. However, not all accusations are justified that United States foreign policy consists of being "policeman to the world." Soviet-bloc intelligence services have constructed several plots, eagerly believed in many quarters, to indicate American conspiracy in the Third World. The United States—called "Enemy No. One"—was and most probably still is the most important target of Soviet-bloc special operations.

Several case studies of anti-American operations carried out by Czechoslovakia's disinformation department during 1964–66 and an analysis of a long-range disinformation plan which served as a guide for activities will help to clarify the objectives of this aspect of Soviet-bloc intelligence work.

Foreign "Aid"

In the summer of 1964 an international seminar on the economic and political problems of underdeveloped countries was

held in Sweden. At the registration desk a thin, tall man introduced himself as a Czechoslovak diplomat, and seminar leaders saw no reason to question his identity or doubt the authenticity of his personal documents. During discussion sessions he was attentive but quiet, taking no part in the talks but otherwise friendly and polite.

None of the organizers and participants could know the real reason Major Vaclav Louda had come to the conference. He was not delegated to contribute to the solution of the urgent problems of underdeveloped countries because he was a specialist for Afro-Asian disinformation operations of the Czechoslovak intelligence service. His mission was primarily to listen, analyze, and note those facts, trends of discussion, and conclusions which indicated the possibility of misusing them later in disinformation campaigns against the United States.

Major Louda was no theoretician. After finishing elementary school he had worked as a bricklayer for several years before the Czechoslovak intelligence service offered him a different career. He served as an intelligence officer in Great Britain and as a station chief in Canada, and had headed the most important American operational department. A short assignment as deputy chief in the Afro-Asian department was followed by the position of senior officer in Department D. His career started to decline in the 1960s. Alcohol was the main reason for his fall; it drove him from one Prague tavern to another, sapping his physical and intellectual strength. But his innate cleverness still made him Prague's most successful disinformation expert.

His trip to Sweden was fruitful. After his return he came to my office nearly every other week with a new plan for attacking American positions in Africa or Asia. Despite the primitive qualities and similarities of his various operations, they very often succeeded, as, for example, the operation he introduced in Tanzania.

On November 10, 1964, Oscar Kambona, Tanzanian Foreign Minister and Secretary General of the Tanzanian African National Union (TANU), held a press conference at which he disclosed a Western plan to overthrow the Tanzanian government, as reported in the Dar es Salaam *Nationalist*, November 11, 1964:

> We have information that certain big Western powers are engaged

> in deliberate, calculated moves to render ineffective the force of the nationalist movements. Some of these Western powers, in collusion with the government of Portugal, are preparing to bring subversion and threat to the United Republic of Tanzania. They are preparing the Government of Portugal to attack this country. . . . We also have some information that certain powers want to use the South African mercenaries to carry on subversion in this country. . . . I . . . take this opportunity to warn those powers and their duped brother African states.

Kambona denied that Tanzania had become a center of subversion or that daily ammunition from the People's Republic of China, Algeria, and the United Arab Republic was pouring into his country. According to Kambona, these charges had been made by Western countries to justify to their people at home "an unwarranted attack on the people" of Tanzania. He said that he would report "this intended aggression" to the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

TANU's press organ, the English-language newspaper the *Nationalist*, published a "proof" of the conspiracy the following day—actually facsimiles of three documents. The first was a letter from the American embassy in Leopoldville to the Congolese foreign ministry, in which the American embassy expressed its determination to incapacitate further Chinese subversion conducted in Tanzania against the Congo by encouraging Portugal to bombard strategic Chinese sites in Tanzania and to overthrow the Nyerere government. The second was a letter from a Congolese officer to the American embassy, purporting to document American technical preparations for overthrowing the Tanzanian government. The third letter, written again in the name of the American embassy, spoke of Dar es Salaam as a channel for military supplies used by the "Afro-Asian coalitions, principally Red China, the United Arab Republic, and Algeria," to support subversion in the Congo and Mozambique.

Several days later, on November 15, 1964, TANU conducted a protest demonstration at which President Nyerere spoke. Compared with Kambona at his press conference, Nyerere was more restrained. He announced that he was referring the incriminating documents to the American government and would welcome the

proof that they were forgeries. The State Department analyzed them and presented such evidence to the Tanzanian government. At a mass meeting in Dar es Salaam on December 9, President Nyerere said that the American government had assured him that the documents were false and had expressed the hope that the whole incident could be closed. It was not.

The Czechoslovak intelligence service was at that time well established in Tanzania and had access to high government circles. The time for leaking the documents was chosen at random. Their contents, however, made the purpose clear: to reveal the United States as the major conspirator against and enemy of the leftist African regimes. The forged documents were transmitted to Foreign Minister Kambona, who validated their authenticity, regarding them as confirmation of his own political line. Through him not only the Tanzanian government but the whole African public saw the falsified material. Unwittingly, Kambona lent his political authority to Prague's intrigue, thus providing welcome publicity. The plot formulated in the forged letter dealt with American intentions to squelch Chinese rather than Soviet subversion. This measure was a safeguard against possible Soviet objections. The main actors were the United States, China, and Tanzania; in the event that inquiry and public discussion of the documents' validity took a bad turn, the Soviet Union would be officially uninvolved.

The forgery was full of technical defects. The initiator had made a number of linguistic and administrative errors. Nonetheless, the material was accepted and published as reliable evidence. Reports of the American "plot" against Tanzania were circulated even in Eastern Europe, where the response of the press was spontaneous, not manipulated by bloc intelligence services.

Just before the Tanzanian public was informed of the American "conspiracy," Foreign Minister Kambona notified the Organization for African Unity of the incident in the following telegram as quoted in the *Nationalist,* Dar es Salaam, November 12, 1964, to the Secretary General of the organization, Diallo Telli:

> The United Republic has gathered sufficient documentary and factual evidence to reveal the existence of a plot by certain Western powers to overthrow the Tanzanian Government and subvert na-

> tionalist and liberation movements based in the United Republic. The plot would use Portuguese and South African mercenaries to attack points of strategic importance to the security of both the United Republic and the nationalist and liberation movements. Obviously, Africa's commitment to liquidate colonialism is at stake, and since African Liberation Committee headquarters are in Dar es Salaam, I have found it necessary to inform you of this development. Grateful if you would inform other member states.

The Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization gave credence and publicity to the forgery. The secretary general of that organization, Youssel El Sebai, made a speech at a Cairo press conference on November 17, in the name of the secretariat of the AAPSO. He judged the plot to be "not only against the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, but against the national liberation struggle of all African peoples who found the United Republic of Tanzania to be the main base of Freedom Fighters as it is clearly exposed in the captured letter." Sebai and Tanzanian representative Amanas Swai blamed the United States for this conspiracy.

The press conference was widely reported in the African press —*Al-Akhbar*, Cairo; *Al-Jumhurriyah*, Cairo; *Vigilance Africa*, Dar es Salaam; *Evening News*, Accra; all on November 18, 1964— which accused the Americans of conspiratorial and diabolical plans.

The next day, a meeting of the African Association, representing a number of political groups which maintain close ties with AAPSO, convened in Cairo. The Tanzanian ambassador to Egypt made a speech condemning the imperialist plot against Tanzania.

The Tanzanian press gave broad coverage to the Czechoslovak provocation. The *Nationalist*, on November 11, 1964, weighed the accusation and decided that the published letter was only "the surface of the iceberg. The greater portion of the evidence inevitably remains subject to the strictest state security." The next day the paper published Kambona's message to the Organization for African Unity, seeing the plot as an extension of NATO activities into Africa.

A socialist fortnightly review called *Vigilance Africa* published a front-page editorial on November 18 entitled "The Big Con-

spiracy," saying that "neo-colonialism, particularly the Anglo-American clique, is employing new techniques to stem the advance towards continental union and to ensure continued economic exploitation of the wealth of Africa." In its December 1 edition *Vigilance Africa* commented: "The plot has revealed something very important: that it is the Americans who are the insidious killers lurking at our doors. . . . The State Department, the Pentagon, and above all, the Central Intelligence Agency are carrying out permanent underground activities in Africa."

On November 19, the Tanzanian representative to the United Nations, John Malecela, spoke to UN correspondents and accused the United States of a plot to overthrow his government. On November 24, Algerian President Ben Bella, in a speech broadcast by Algerian radio, condemned imperialist maneuvers and intrigues in the Congo. That same day, the Algerian ambassador to Tanzania, Noureddine Djoudi, asserted in a press conference in Dar es Salaam that Ben Bella and other members of the Algerian government had reacted strongly to this conspiracy, considering it of primary importance not only for Tanzania but for all of Africa. "We also feel," said Djoudi, "that this plot is a continuation of a plot on a much larger scale."

Some newspapers in Ghana, India, and Egypt characterized the American conspiracy in similar terms. The anti-American campaign did not subside even after Nyerere's speech on December 9 revealed American assurances that the plans were falsified. Several days later, on December 15, 1965, *Vigilance Africa* wrote: "A few weeks ago, Mr. Kambona, speaking as the Minister of External Affairs, disclosed on behalf of the Government the imperialist plan to overthrow the Government of Tanzania." The possibility of forgery was not mentioned.

The successful course of the Tanzanian operation gave Major Louda an opportunity for celebration, and for two days he did not come to work, leaving no word as to his whereabouts. In a similar case involving any other officer, headquarters would have been alarmed about a kidnapping, assassination, or defection. But we were all quite sure that Major Louda was drunk.

He returned to his office having decided to prolong and intensify the anti-American hysteria. The second stage of the opera-

tion was based on a forged letter from G. McMurtrie Godley, United States ambassador in Leopoldville, addressed to Congolese President Moise Tshombe, who was at that time fighting with rival governments in Brazzaville and Kinshasa. Its contents were similar to those of the other forgeries. Through Godley, American desire was expressed "to take measures against the neighboring regimes under Communist influence where the subversion against your Government [Congo Leopoldville] is organized." The forged letter was transported from Prague by diplomatic mail, falling into the hands of several "reliable sources" before it appeared on the desk of the Congolese rebel Foreign Minister Thomas Kanza. Not until that moment did I recognize two major errors in the production process. The letter was erroneously dated July 3, 1964, several days before Tshombe took over the premiership, and furthermore Tshombe was incorrectly addressed as "President," not "Prime Minister." The document could not be retracted, however, and the outcome was left to fate.

The forgery appeared in the African press on December 28, 1964, after Thomas Kanza had granted an interview to a reporter from Nairobi's *East African Standard*. On that occasion, Kanza related that the Congolese revolutionaries had documents showing that the United States, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, South Africa, and Rhodesia were preparing to return Moise Tshombe to the Congo. As proof of this assertion, Kanza presented the Godley letter:

Leopoldville, July 3rd, 1964

Excellency,
Instructed by Mr. G. Mennen Williams, Under-Secretary of State for African Affairs, I have the honor to inform you by personal letter that the Government of the United States, on the basis of previous meetings, is agreed

1. that the expenses involved by the organization, the recruitment and the creation of special units are to be compensated through a fund designated for the purpose;
2. that the organization of special units is to be handed over to our services at your request. The necessary measures have already been taken in this direction in collaboration with the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium;

3. with your point of view on the deliveries of the modern military and mobile equipment necessitated by the undertaking of operations in distant regions. For this purpose, it will place at your disposal the required equipment, including the technical cadres needed to direct the operations against sedition-mongers;

4. with your opinion that it is necessary to take measures against the neighbouring regimes under Communist influence: where the subversion against your Government is organized.

The negotiation of particulars will be taken up with Your Excellency by Mr. Williams personally whose visit I am led to expect in mid-August.

I pray you to accept, Excellency, the assurance of the deep friendship of the Under-Secretary of State and of my high personal consideration.

G. McMurtrie Godley
Ambassador of the United States

His Excellency
Mr. Moise Tshombe
Head of the Government of
the Republic of Congo Leopoldville*

The wheels of anti-American propaganda began to turn again. Seasoned with various additions, the document appeared in *L'Essor*, December 30, 1964; *The Spark*, December 31, 1964; *Evening News* (Accra), January 1, 1965; *Advance* (Khartoum), January 28, 1965; and *L'Etincelle* (Accra), January 1965. *The Spark* not only accused the United States of systematic intervention in the internal affairs of the Congo, but also vehemently praised the actual perpetrators: "Neither the USSR nor any socialist country has ever opposed the unity of the Congo. . . . Russian action in the Congo has been strictly humanitarian." In Prague and Moscow, these statements were enthusiastically applauded.

At the OAU meetings of the Council of Ministers in Nairobi, *Agence France Presse*, March 7, 1965, reported that the Algerian

* *The Spark* (Accra), December 31, 1964. The editor reproduced a facsimile of the document and published a translation in which Tshombe's title had been corrected from "President" to "Head of the Government."

Foreign Minister, Abdelazis Bouteflika, had announced that he possessed compromising documents, particularly a letter from the United States ambassador in Leopoldville dated July 3, 1964, which promised Tshombe American financial support and agreed that steps should be taken against neighboring countries reportedly organizing subversion against the Congo. Bouteflika's statement was reported in *Alger Republicain* on March 8 under the bombastic headline "Washington's Complicity Established in Plot against Congo." Bouteflika's extemporaneous remarks, which were directed neither by Prague nor by Moscow, had an interesting consequence of which he remained unaware. He had been considered by the Czech intelligence service to be an American agent and therefore a suitable target for special operations. Soviet advisors agreed that it was necessary to remove him from the Algerian political scene as quickly as possible. The Czechoslovak intelligence service was foiled in its designs by Bouteflika's attack on the United States, which pleased African politicians and protected him against Soviet intrigues.

At the OAU meeting in Nairobi, the Congo Brazzaville delegation also charged, as reported by the *Ghana News Agency*, March 7, 1965, that "The United States is responsible for all troubles facing Africa generally," and presented a letter indicating that the United States was collaborating with Congo Leopoldville with the intention of capturing Congo Brazzaville.

Two weeks later, on March 22, Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah claimed in a speech to the national parliament, as presented by the Ghanaian press a day later, that his government had "unmistakable evidence that plans are in an advanced state for the overthrow of the progressive government of Congo Brazzaville and other states by certain powers."

Political utterances such as these were welcomed in the African press but it is impossible to record here all the irrationality which the campaign evoked.

The Czechoslovak intelligence service concentrated on preparing and distributing the forged documents to selected African politicians. The victims themselves helped to disseminate the disinformation, to spur the extensive press campaign accompanied by anti-American demonstrations, and even to affect the behavior

of the international African organizations toward the American conspiracy. Convincing American evidence of forgery was indeed accepted by President Nyerere, but the campaign continued and the defective forgery went unchallenged. The operation overstepped the boundaries of a single country to become an affair concerning all of Africa. The purposes of the perpetrators were fully realized.

The campaign's most interesting sidelight was the chain reaction in certain leftist African media. Individual African papers printed various speculations and "newly discovered circumstances," enlarging the original deception to still greater proportions and thus contributing to their own confusion.

The fact that the forgeries were accepted, despite obvious linguistic, administrative, and logical errors, implied that the victims—in this case the young leftist government—would be willing to go beyond rational boundaries if the deception conformed to their own political beliefs. The Soviet bloc not only escaped identification as the initiator, but reaped acclaim as an ideological partner and friend of developing Africa.

Enemy No. One

Czechoslovakia's Department D, like any other satellite disinformation department, was not left to its own devices in determining its operational goals. Long-term plans, covering a period of five to seven years, are worked out by individual intelligence services, but the Soviet Union influences the development and implementation of these basic guidelines in order to assure that specific plans are in harmony with its own objectives. I had many discussions with Soviet advisors on plans for special operations; they mentioned the existence of their long-range disinformation plan, but I had no opportunity to become acquainted with its text. It is probably doubtful that any satellite intelligence officer had access to the material. The Soviets are too cautious to reveal their secrets completely, even to trusted allies. Thus conclusions about Soviet intelligence operations presented here are deduced primarily from Czechoslovak activities as they were guided by Soviet

advisors. Before describing details of the Czechoslovak disinformation plan, I wish to offer some generalizations which I consider valid for the whole Soviet bloc.

The plans for satellite intelligence services include both national and international interests and responsibilities; in order to convey the impression of compactness and mutual consistency, however, the two are not explicitly divided. International responsibilities—the superpower interests of the Soviet Union—are dominant. As a consequence, satellite intelligence organizations, paradoxically, expend significant financial and human resources on activities in countries where their own national interests are difficult to discern: Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Nigeria, Ghana, the Congo, Tanzania, or Indonesia. Since Soviet-bloc countries with the exception of Romania do not exercise foreign policies independent of the Soviet Union, information collected on these or other countries by satellite intelligence services is useless to their own governments and of value only to the Soviet leaders.

Operations which have relevance to the national interests of individual bloc countries might be campaigns to paralyze defections, operations against prominent exiles, actions helping a particular country's foreign trade with its non-Communist partners, or operations which could resolve some special problem, as for example the controversy over Czechoslovak gold in the United States. Return of this gold has been blocked by the United States government until compensation is made for nationalized United States property in Czechoslovakia.

East European disinformation specialists realize that a single operation, however competently conceived and executed, cannot significantly tip the existing power balance between East and West to Soviet advantage. The planners therefore concentrate on the mass production of disinformation operations, hoping that over a period of several years there will be cumulative benefit to the Soviets.

Although the scope of special operations is relatively broad quantitatively, it is restricted by the capacity of the intelligence apparatus itself. All Communist intelligence organizations are aware that it would be absolutely unrealistic even with the whole

arsenal of instruments at the disposal of the Soviet power system to set a five to seven-year timetable for revolutionizing the West German or American political systems.

One other point must be mentioned. A deception game is also played by Communist intelligence services against ruling Party and government authorities. Long-term goals are set which do not require the participation of the intelligence service but enable the intelligence service to claim unearned successes later.

Since 1965 Czechoslovakia's plan has focused on misleading the non-Communist public rather than enemy decision-makers. The international political scene has been observed systematically, and cracks or conflicts between public opinion and governmental policies of non-Communist countries have been analyzed in order to exploit them in manipulating the dissatisfied public as a pressure group. For this reason, a major portion of Czechoslovakia's special operations might be called a diversionary public relations program aimed at negating and destroying relationships between enemy governments and their populations, intensifying existing disputes, and fomenting new ones.

The introductory section of Czechoslovakia's long-term plan, which was supposed to be a general evaluation of the balance of forces between East and West, consisted of *a priori* conclusions and ideological theses. The growing military, political, economic, scientific, and cultural superiority of the socialist camp, in peace and war, was the constantly repeated theme of the entire Preface. The opening section took on a propagandistic rather than objective character, despite the fact that the plan as a whole fell into the hands of a relatively narrow group of people. An ordinary intelligence employee might have knowledge only of those sections of the plan on which he worked. The introductory part served merely a ritualistic purpose, as emotionally slanted "socialist realism" intended to arouse enthusiasm for the march to the great tomorrow.

The Czechoslovak disinformation plan designated the United States as the chief enemy, and set these primary goals:

1. *USA.* The United States was to be divested of its allies in Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa; it was to be isolated

morally and politically; the withdrawal of American military strength from Europe was to be promoted.

2. *Western Europe and NATO.* The partnership of NATO countries was to be weakened to the extent that the Atlantic alliance would not be renewed in 1969.

3. *German Federal Republic.* Its alliance ties both with its main ally, the United States, and with Western European partners were to be weakened; Western European political and economic integration was to be retarded by raising security arguments over the dominant position of the German Federal Republic in Western Europe and by breaking through the political and diplomatic blockade of the German Democratic Republic.

A number of subsidiary tasks were to accompany these primary missions, to be carried out in conjunction with the broader goals.

Moscow envisages the moral and political isolation of the United States as preliminary to its military isolation which would insure the withdrawal of American units from Europe. Soviet planners calculate that individual West European states, even if highly developed economically, would not, singly or collectively, be capable of resisting Soviet armed forces without direct American assistance. The Soviet bloc studies American foreign policy carefully, pinpointing its weakness which, after processing in the Soviet laboratory of political intrigue, return to the world scene in new form.

Which characteristics of American foreign policy seem to provide the most fertile soil for Soviet-bloc special operations? Foremost is the American attempt to resolve complex political problems by military means. The inception and development of the Vietnamese conflict, and the military situation in which the United States found itself after the French defeat, afforded the Soviet Union a welcome opportunity for extensive propaganda against the Americans. Moscow judged that the Americans could not win the war in Vietnam and their military involvement there would harm their prestige throughout the world. The USSR could thus profit from the situation by appearing in the guise of peacemaker and identifying with the Western peace movement. Although Soviet military and economic aid to North Vietnam

could sustain balance on the battlefield, it was not so extensive as to influence the course of the war radically to the benefit of North Vietnam. Special operations were never aimed directly at altering the conduct of the war; the primary objective was propaganda and disinformation abuse of the United States. The American tendency to give priority to military means made it easier for the apprehensive public and the political leaders of several developing countries to believe the Soviet falsifications.

The New York *Times*, November 10, 1969, quoted Governor Rockefeller's report to President Nixon after the governor's visit to twenty-six Latin American countries in 1969: "In its relations, the United States has all too often demonstrated, at least subconsciously, a paternalistic attitude toward the other nations of the hemisphere. It has tried to direct the internal affairs of other nations to an unseemly degree, thinking, perhaps arrogantly, that it knew what was best for them. . . . The United States has talked about partnership, but it has not truly practiced it." This assertion also has validity in American relations outside the western hemisphere. Insensitivity to the specific internal and international problems of her foreign partners and a failure to try to understand their mentality and nationalism bred further suspicion of and alienation from the United States. An additional factor was the American attitude toward socialist thought. By automatically equating Soviet communism with the socialist experiments in non-Communist countries (especially conspicuous in the fifties), the United States assumed a Manichean view of world events, paraphrasing the Soviet slogan: he who is not with us is against us. In its misunderstanding of or disregard for the special problems of smaller nations, America's foreign policy created additional maneuvering room both for Soviet decision-makers and the disinformation services.

In search of defenses against communism and its propagators, the United States sought alliances with nondemocratic regimes whose vocal anti-communism gave the optimistic impression of the viability of such alignments. This enabled Soviet-bloc propaganda forces to equate all American policy with dictatorial regimes. The most momentous concomitant phenomenon was the gradual alienation and distrust of American politics along with

growing anti-Americanism and the tendency to hold the United States responsible for any problem. "If the current anti-American trend continues, one can foresee a time when the United States would be politically and morally isolated from part of the Western hemisphere," stated Rockefeller, unaware that he was enunciating Moscow's objective.

The Czechoslovak disinformation plan paid relatively little heed to American domestic conditions, although the circumstances arising from unresolved racial problems, growing student radicalism, and public discontent with the Vietnam war were vulnerable to foreign exploitation. Although official Soviet-bloc propaganda supported the black militant movement in the United States, the opportunity for direct influence was small. The American Negro's distrust of whites was stronger than the ideological fissures dividing this world, and American Negroes thus tended to turn to Africa rather than to the USSR. Soviet-bloc disinformation services do abuse the issue of black status in anti-American propaganda for the developing countries, but in cases where Communist intelligence departments have attempted propaganda actions in the name of the black movement directly on American territory, the consequences are probably negligible by comparison with the legal activity of black organizations themselves.

The second major focus of Communist intelligence activity was NATO. The existence of NATO, American participation in the alliance, and the presence of American troops in Western Europe were impediments to the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence. The withdrawal of United States troops from Europe and the replacement of the West European defense system with a series of bilateral agreements with the USSR were plans for creating favorable conditions for Soviet dominance in Europe.

The systematic erosion of America's prestige and position in Europe and the reinforcement of disintegrative tendencies within NATO were among the continuing tasks of Soviet-bloc disinformation services. With the exception of West Germany, to which the Czechoslovak intelligence service gave individual attention, actions in West European countries (including France, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark) were subordinated to the overriding goal of NATO's dissolution.

In 1965, Moscow instructed individual satellite intelligence organizations to exert maximum effort to block the renewal of the Atlantic alliance in 1969. In the four intervening years, the Soviet bloc began long-term operations focused on several elements favorable to its interests. Foremost were the policies of de Gaulle's France, openly critical of United States foreign policy; Communist disinformation saw an opportunity to feed on and broaden the rift. The second factor deemed significant was the problem of the so-called second-class partners in NATO. Special operations in Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy were aimed at underlining the impression that their voices were not sufficiently heard, and that the Atlantic alliance was an aged and ineffectual institution. While France was considered the key disintegrative element among first-rank Atlantic states (the others being the United States, Great Britain and the German Federal Republic), Denmark, the most reluctant NATO adherent, seemed to be the first link in the chain reaction of internal schism among second-rank states. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, however, silenced Danish neutralist tendencies. In 1969, Denmark consented to military maneuvers on her territory for the first time in NATO's history.

The West European public was to be systematically exposed to anti-American sentiment, to the idea that Europe should be able to resolve Continental problems independent of American military participation. Additional black propaganda was designed to shed unfavorable light on American troops—by emphasizing, for example, the sexual offenses and homicides committed by American soldiers. The dominant position of the United States was used to prove that NATO strategy was developed by American military experts concerned only with United States defense capabilities, who would be willing, in the event of war with the Soviet Union, to transform Europe into a vast nuclear battleground. Finally, in working for NATO's dissolution, Soviet disinformation agencies exploit all existing West European disputes and points of friction. Thus, for example, there was an attempt to reanimate the Italo-Austrian dispute over the South Tyrol and to transfer the resultant hostilities to Italo-German relations.

According to the Czechoslovak disinformation plan, West Ger-

many was the third most important target. The experience of Nazi Germany left deep and enduring scars on the European consciousness. After the war, European nations, recalling the Nazi extermination policy, sought effective guarantees that such a tragedy would not recur. The smaller countries of Eastern Europe were forced to find that assurance in alliance with the Soviet Union. West European nations looked to European political and economic integration with the participation of West Germany as a possible solution.

The Soviet Union was soon aware that the German Federal Republic posed no military threat to its security, but West Germany became an easy target for propaganda attacks, the focus for intimidating, influencing, and manipulating European public opinion.

Soviet-bloc special operations against West Germany linked politicians with the tainted Nazi past. Some leading West German politicians had indeed been Nazis, and the pasts of many others permitted such speculation. While anti-American campaigns were conducted primarily outside United States territory, anti-German special operations were carried out both in West Germany and abroad. Bonds between the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic permitted Soviet and East German intelligence services to infiltrate West Germany's government institutions, political parties and movements, and interest groups on a large scale.

Although France was considered an important arena of Soviet political and intelligence maneuvering in the 1960s, the German Federal Republic remained the key European state for many reasons: the Soviet wartime experience, which provoked a hatred of Germans that made no distinction between the citizens of the two Germanies; fear of the country's growing economic strength; concealed admiration for German resilience; and the possibility of using the German Federal Republic as a straw man for both East and West.

A united Germany would represent a threat to the Soviet Union regardless of whether it became socialist, capitalist, totalitarian, or democratic. Several times in the past two decades, the Soviet Union has received indications that not even a Communist

regime would be a sufficient guarantee of loyalty to the USSR. The attempt to break down the diplomatic and political blockade of the German Democratic Republic and to establish East Germany as a permanent separate state is essentially an effort to postpone the moment when a united, economically powerful Germany will confront the USSR as a rival.

Soviet-bloc disinformation activities in the 1960s continued to reinforce West Germany's image of being heir to Nazi Germany, a persisting potential threat to the European people. Intelligence agents worked to retard West European political and economic integration; to prevent the GFR from filling the role in relation to developing nations vacated by France, Great Britain, or the United States; and to intensify rifts between the GFR and its Western neighbors wherever the opportunity presented itself. The most important and demanding task was, of course, the corrosion of the German-American alliance.

According to the long-range plan, special operations in the developing countries were subordinated to the major objective of isolating the United States and depriving her of allies and support. Prague rarely concerned itself with special operations against the former colonial powers, France and Great Britain, regarding their departure from the Third World as assured. There was apprehension, however, that the United States, and to a more limited extent West Germany, unencumbered by the sins of the colonial past, would fill the vacuum. Conditions in the countries of the Third World favor their utilization as the most frequent victims of special operations. Complicated social problems, prolonged unemployment, low levels of education, acute nationalism, extensive military influence on politics, inexperience, and sometimes even naive leadership increase their likehood of exploitation by a continuous series of propaganda and disinformation campaigns. Public opinion is influenced by massive falsification operations.

Special operations in developing nations are not, of course, the most effective weapon of Soviet power politics. Arms contracts, military training, the presence of advisors, economic aid, or, in some cases, influence through Communist Party channels are by and large more effective than risky intelligence activities. Each area requires and responds to different treatment.

Latin American anti-United States sentiment is not solely the product of Communist subversion. The postwar eruption of the world's social revolution found the United States unprepared to reevaluate its traditional South American policies. In an effort to insure America's military security against growing Soviet political and military power, the United States emphasized the strategic and military defense of the American continents, disregarding even more dangerous economic and social problems in Latin America.

The Cuban revolution, accepted at first by the American public with sympathy and by the USSR with restrained distrust, and the gradual Communist evolution of that revolution, convinced the Soviet Union that new outlets existed for Communist politics and penetration in Latin America. Castro's ideological sympathy with Moscow led to close collaboration between Cuban and Soviet intelligence services. The Cuban intelligence service was established with the help of Soviet and Czechoslovak advisors. The crisis in Soviet-Cuban relations, which followed the Soviet missile installation attempt, cut short this cooperation and incited Cuban leaders to independent subversive activities in Latin America. While Soviet-bloc intelligence services concentrated on disinformation and black propaganda, the Cuban apparatus preferred direct armed engagement, as shown by Ché Guevara's operations in Bolivia in 1966–67.

The Czechoslovak intelligence service's primary attention in Latin America in the mid-sixties was directed at Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile; Mexico and Uruguay were important operational bases for the rest of the continent.

Black Africa is flooded with false evidence of American counterrevolutionary conspiracies to overthrow leftist governments. In the mid-sixties, the Czechoslovak intelligence service was well established in a group of states with marked socialist tendencies: Guinea, Congo Brazzaville, Tanzania, Mali, and, before 1966, Ghana. Congo Kinshasa, Nigeria, and Kenya were among those countries where Czechoslovak influence was potentially lower.

Documents leaked to the African press confirming American subversion were reprinted and disseminated not only by African but also by East European mass media, both of which were un-

aware that the documents had originated in Communist intelligence laboratories.

In the East-West rivalry over Africa's political future, satellite intelligence services have from time to time taken on the role of intermediary between Moscow and the African insurgents. For example, in 1961 the Czechoslovak intelligence service, under Moscow's direction, sent an undercover group to Stanleyville to make contact with Congolese rebels. The group smuggled in a radio transmitter, contacted several Congolese leaders, and established regular radio linkage through Prague to Moscow. This intelligence station conducted no military operations, concentrating, according to instructions, on an intermediary role.

Disinformation activity in the Middle East and North African Arab countries was directed in the sixties predominantly at the United Arab Republic, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and Morocco. Special operations were carried out in part against the United States as the main adversary; to a lesser extent against Great Britain, still influential in the area; and against the German Federal Republic, whose potential impact Moscow feared as a result of traditional Arab-German sympathy. Long-term plans for special operations in this region essentially recapitulated the practices of the 1950s—the transfer of traditional Arab enmity from West European colonial powers to the United States.

As in other parts of the Third World, Soviet-bloc disinformation services utilized black propaganda and frequent falsification, and systematically foisted reports of American anti-Arab (UAR and Syria) activities on Arab diplomatic, political, and intelligence media.

Activities in southern Asia and the Far East were dominated by the Soviet Union itself. The Czechoslovak political intelligence service worked actively only in India and Indonesia, leaving the rest of Asia to its Soviet tutors. The Vietnamese conflict was regarded only from the standpoint of abusing American policy all over the world.

Latin American Intermezzo

On a hot, humid day in February 1965, after landing in Buenos Aires, I left the airplane with an edgy feeling. There were several photographers in front of the ramp taking pictures of each passenger, and the same procedure occurred once more at customs in the terminal.

People involved in intelligence work do not like being photographed. I thought that perhaps this unusual welcome ceremony was because of me, and the Argentinian security service was planning to watch me closely during my visit. My suspicions remained after a discussion with our station chief in Buenos Aires, who said that such photographs were not normally taken.

But nothing happened in Argentina, Uruguay, or Brazil, where I had been sent to look for new ideas and to make a personal appraisal of the political climate.

The Czechoslovak intelligence service had qualified journalistic channels at its disposal in Latin America. It influenced several papers ideologically and financially in Uruguay and Mexico, and even owned one Brazilian political journal until April 1964. But traditionally, disinformation was linked in large measure to falsification techniques. From 1960 to 1963, the Czechoslovak intelligence service's Latin American territorial department attempted to escape that tradition by establishing a legal continent-wide organization which would shoulder the burden of anti-American political and propaganda activities. The operation, under the cover name *Druzba* (companionship), was accorded special significance by both Czechoslovak and Soviet intelligence services, since its success would mean the substantial upgrading of Soviet propaganda and disinformation activities in Latin America and, consequently, the further restriction of American influence. Propaganda produced by existing legal organizations was to supercede the previous stereotyped anonymous letters and forged documents. Moscow was to provide only basic political directives and necessary financial aid, while individual anti-American political and propaganda actions were the province of the organizations themselves.

A division of labor was made between Czechoslovak and

Soviet intelligence services. The Czechoslovaks were to utilize their good contacts with several prominent Latin American personalities who were to lend their names as a façade of respectability. The Soviets were to ensure political coordination. The primary objective was to evoke the sympathy and support (even if unpublicized) of the Latin American Communist Parties, without which practical action would be difficult. The project's initiators actually succeeded in locating individuals willing to collaborate on such an undertaking, and in the period between 1961 and 1963 several preliminary organizational meetings were held. However, the operation failed. The Soviet intelligence service was unsuccessful in negotiating the plan with the continental Communist Parties; negotiations dragged on without visible progress, and the operation died. According to existing regulations, Soviet intelligence officials could not conduct direct negotiations; all contacts had to be mediated through the Soviet Party apparatus, the only vehicle authorized to deal with other Communist Parties. Use of this tedious bureaucratic channel probably precipitated the failure. Although the setback could be traced directly to the Soviets, Czechoslovak participants in this international maneuver could not openly criticize Moscow's direction.

After this abortive experience, which originally promised new horizons in disinformation techniques, the Czechoslovak intelligence service returned to orthodox methods in Latin America. I arrived there when Operation Thomas Mann was just approaching its finale. The basic disinformational objective of Operation Thomas Mann was to prove that American foreign policy in Latin America had undergone a fundamental reevaluation and transformation after President John F. Kennedy's death, directed at more severe economic exploitation and even more open interference in the internal conditions of the countries of Latin America. According to the fabricated theory, the author of the new policy, approved by President Lyndon B. Johnson, was Assistant Secretary of State Thomas A. Mann. The impression was to be given that the United States was placing economic pressure on those South American countries with policies unfavorable to the investment of United States private capital; the organization of American States (OAS) was to be awakened from its lethargy to

a more active anti-Communist stance, and new CIA offensives were to include plans for coups against the regimes of Uruguay, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, and Mexico. The operation was designed to warn the Latin American public against the new hardline American policy, to incite greater anti-American outbursts, and to brand the CIA as the notorious perpetrator of anti-democratic intrigues.

The operation, which began in February 1964, was to utilize only anonymous channels, disseminating a series of forgeries. The first forgery was a counterfeit USIA press release in Rio de Janeiro, containing the fundamental principles of the "new American foreign policy." The second disinformational product was a series of circulars published in the name of a mythical organization entitled "Committee for the Struggle Against Yankee Imperialism." Through this medium, the Latin American public was to be alerted to the hundreds of CIA, Pentagon, and FBI agents masquerading as diplomats. The final element of the sequence was a forged letter allegedly written by J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Thomas A. Brady. The letter accorded credit to the FBI and the CIA for successfully executing the Brazilian *Putsch* in April 1964.

The forged USIA press release in Rio de Janeiro was mimeographed and distributed in mid-February 1964 in a simulated USIA envelope to the Brazilian press and select Brazilian political circles. To the press release was appended a cover letter purportedly written by a local USIA employee who asserted that the American chief of the mission had suppressed the document because it was too frank. He revealed that he had managed to retain several copies which he turned over to the Brazilian press because he was convinced that the Brazilian public should know the truth about the whole situation. In conclusion, the anonymous writer apologized for not revealing his name; to do so would be to risk losing his job.

On February 27, 1964, the forgery appeared in the Brazilian *O Semanario* under banner headlines: "MANN FIXES HARD LINE FOR USA: WE ARE NOT PEDDLERS TO BE BARGAINED WITH" and the subtitle "YANKEES WILL HELP BRAZIL ONLY IN EXCHANGE FOR CONCESSIONS." An

anti-American attack accompanied the text of the forged press release.

Several days later, on March 2, 1964, Guerreiro Ramos, a member of the Brazilian Labor Party, delivered a speech in which he commented on the new policy attributed to Thomas Mann. He said that after President Kennedy's death, the United States had returned to the hard line of John Foster Dulles. The American Ambassador in Rio de Janeiro published a statement on March 3, an assurance that Mann had never made the statements attributed to him and that the embassy had never issued such a release. Two days later, Mr. Ramos acknowledged his mistake and said that the statements attributed to Mann were based on a forged document.

In the following months, the press and public response to the first phases of Operation Thomas Mann merged with the press response to the subsequent forgeries produced by the Czechoslovak intelligence service within the framework of the operation. After a time, the name Thomas A. Mann became a living symbol of American imperialism for the leftist Latin American press.

On April 29, the pro-Communist Mexican weekly *Siempre* printed an article referring to the so-called Thomas Mann Plan against Latin America, and added that in the course of 1964 the plan called for the overthrow of the government of Uruguay, Brazil, Chile, and Cuba, and the isolation of Mexico. The Uruguayan journal *Epoca* addressed itself to this question on May 20. Less than two weeks later, the First Secretary of the Uruguayan Communist Party spoke in parliament in the context of a discussion of American export problems, accusing Thomas Mann of "cynically favoring coups d'etat." When the American embassy in Montevideo published a statement the following day, a reminder that the so-called Thomas Mann Plan was a forgery, the Communist organ *El Popular* responded on June 5, 1964, with an article eloquently titled "Mister Mann: Guerrilla Plan for All Latin America." Even as late as June 16, 1965, this question recurred in the leftist Mexican journal *El Dia*, which printed a quarter-page paid announcement of the "National Coordinating Committee for Support of the Cuban Revolution," in which it was asserted that in 1964 Mann had guided Operation Isolation

which was designed to undermine Cuba's position as the leader in the anti-imperialist struggle in Latin America.

To grasp the logic of Operation Thomas Mann, one must go back several months to the moment when its initiators manufactured a series of circulars in the name of the fictitious organization "Committee for the Struggle Against Yankee Imperialism," which were distributed to the editors of Latin American newspapers, politicians, public officials, and members of diplomatic missions. The Czechoslovak intelligence service delivered the first of them shortly after the coup in Brazil, identifying "some of the American agents who took part in the recent coup d'etat in Brazil." Additional circulars disseminated at irregular intervals gave "the names of several American agents who are involved in the preparation of a coup in Chile." A continuous series of circulars on the preparation of an American conspiracy against Uruguay appeared at the end of 1964, again purportedly specifying culpable American agents.

The selection of candidates which the Czechoslovak intelligence service presented to the public as alleged United States agents was a comparatively simple matter. The American publishing industry teemed with books and periodicals containing valuable biographical data on American diplomats and employees of various official and private American institutions operating abroad. Even without utilizing secret intelligence material culled by agents, simply on the basis of studying legally accessible material published in America, it was possible to select candidates whose biographical backgrounds were in keeping with the purpose of the deception. Despite some obvious flaws in the circulars, leftist Latin American editors and public figures accepted them as a source of reliable information.

In July 1964, the Latin American public received additional new "proof" of American subversive activities in the form of two forged letters from J. Edgar Hoover. Both were addressed to Thomas Brady, an FBI employee. The first, a congratulatory message on the occasion of Brady's twentieth year of service with the FBI, was dated January 2, 1961. Its only purpose was to authenticate the second letter, dated April 15, 1964, to the same person. The letter read:

Washington, D.C.
April 15, 1964

PERSONAL

Dear Mr. Brady:

I want to take this means to express my personal appreciation to each agent stationed in Brazil for the services rendered in the accomplishment of "Overhaul."

Admiration for the dynamic and efficient manner in which this large scale operation was carried out, in a foreign land and under difficult conditions, has prompted me to express my gratitude. The CIA people did their part well and accomplished a great deal. However, the efforts of our agents were especially valuable. I am particularly pleased that our participation in the affair was kept secret and that the Administration did not have to make any public denials. We can all be proud of the vital part the FBI is playing in protecting the security of the Nation, even beyond its borders.

I am quite aware that our agents often make personal sacrifices while fulfilling their duties. Living conditions in Brazil may not be of the best, but it is encouraging indeed to know that because of loyalty and the realization that you are contributing a vital if not glamorous service to your country you stick to the job. It is this spirit which today is enabling our Bureau to successfully discharge its very grave responsibilities.

Sincerely yours,

J. E. Hoover

As the text implies, the intention of the forgery was to indicate direct American participation in the overthrow of Joao Goulart's Brazilian government. The Czechoslovak intelligence service would have preferred to place all blame on the CIA. The reason for the inclusion of the FBI in the American conspiracy was quite prosaic. The Czechoslovak intelligence service had no sample of CIA stationery.

Department D depended on its own resources to produce the falsification: an archive of documents, official letterheads, seals, and signatures from various Western government organs, political parties, organizations, and officials. The archives are constantly supplemented but are by no means the only source of basic materials. Many specimens have long been obsolete, or there may

be no material at all on some institutions. It would have been possible to manufacture false CIA documents without a sample and without knowing the CIA's internal administrative procedures, but the initiators of the action decided that such a forgery would seem suspect to the recipient at first glance. The forged Hoover letter presented another danger, however. The tasks of the FBI as the United States counterintelligence service are essentially defensive rather than offensive in character; it was not plausible that the FBI would have taken part in the Brazilian *Putsch.* This counterargument was finally disregarded on the ground that such details would not be widely known; the Hoover letter was therefore approved.

The falsification first surfaced on July 23 in the Argentine journal *Propositos* (Buenos Aires) along with one of the circulars produced earlier. A chain reaction ensued in the Latin American press, with individual journals publishing the "facts" and commentary about the new wave of American subversive activity on the continent: *Ultima Hora,* Santiago, July 24, 1964; *Vistazo,* Santiago, July 27, 1964; *El Siglo,* Santiago, July 28, 1964; *El Popular,* Montevideo, July 28, 1964; *Prensa Latina,* Montevideo, July 28, 1964; *Marcha,* Montevideo, July 31, 1964; *Epoca,* Montevideo, August 1, 1964; *Combate,* Santiago, August 1, 1964; *El Siglo,* Santiago, August 2, 4–6, 1964; *El Dia,* Mexico City, January 17, and 20, 1965; *La Gacota,* Bogota, March–April, 1965; and probably many others.

On my return from Latin America I found in the West European press an explanation for the security procedure at the Buenos Aires airport. Alfred Cucurts, a former SS officer responsible for the death of many thousands of East European Jews during World War II, had been mysteriously murdered in Montevideo. Latin American police were searching for suspects. The body had been discovered in an abandoned villa after a death-sentence statement, which listed the victim's war crimes and mentioned the hiding place, had been mailed to many journalists in West Germany. The press speculated that Cucurts had been assassinated either by the Nazi colony in Latin America on suspicion that he had been traded his personal security for delivering other prominent hiding Nazis into hands of Israeli hunters of war

criminals or by Israeli intelligence agents to punish Cucurts for his war crimes.

Thinking about my own mission I realized that the situation in Latin America was not ripe for any qualitative changes in our disinformation activities there. A return to Operation *Druzba* was impossible. Whenever I mentioned *Druzba* to my colleagues their reaction was accompanied by such comments as "Russian bastards." Operation Thomas Mann, representative of the so-called paper operations which consisted of the production of falsifications and their anonymous distribution through post delivery rather than live agents, set the pattern for further activities. Paper operations had certain advantages. They were not linked with operational risks, the financial outlay was minimal, and the Latin American public was willing to believe information conveyed even through such extremely dubious channels.

Repeated refutation of the Mann and Hoover forgeries by American authorities went unheeded by the leftist press; on the contrary, the denials were considered to be evasive maneuvers and further evidence of the validity of the information received.

Reports of the "new American policy in Latin America" and of "CIA conspirators" also penetrated the East European, Chinese, and Cuban Communist media. Czechoslovak and Soviet intelligence departments did not interfere in this process but allowed the same free rein accorded the Latin American Communist Parties. It is interesting, however, that the Communists and the leftist Latin American press became primary victims since the conservative media did not trust and were not deceived by the disinformation message of Operation Thomas Mann.

Indonesian Boomerang

On the night of September 30, 1965, the Indonesian Communists launched an attack on their political opponents with the tacit consent of President Sukarno. The coup, to which six Indonesian generals hostile to the Communist revolutionaries fell victim in the first stages, did not succeed. With a few exceptions, the armed forces opposed and crushed not only the *Putschists* but

also the Communist sympathizers. The new anti-Communist government demanded the heads of the offenders and got them. About a half million suspected Communists and fellow travelers were slaughtered, including Communist Party Chairman D. N. Aidit. The Indonesian Communist Party, proportionately the largest in a non-Communist country, was physically decimated and driven underground. The intoxicating illusion of power dissolved, leaving the imperative of physical survival.

Until now, the reasons which led the Indonesian Communists to this suicidal position have not been entirely clear. The Indonesian Communist Party and members of the international movement still discuss the causes of this catastrophic setback. The Communists of the Moscow camp pointed the finger of guilt at Peking. Unquestionably, Peking had encouraged the abortive offensive, since its influence was more significant that Moscow's. For a short time after the Sino-Soviet split, the Indonesian Communist Party had attempted to find a middle ground between the two main centers of international communism, but soon leaned toward Peking.

In its anti-Chinese tirades, Moscow and Prague were tactfully silent about the measure of blame borne by the Soviet bloc in the defeat. Special Operation Palmer, inspired by the Czechoslovak intelligence service in 1964, was originally one of many anti-American provocations. After the successful first phase, the Soviet disinformation department joined the effort; together, we cultivated the seeds of anti-American hatred on fertile Indonesian soil, nurturing them to a level of hysteria which threatened to destroy American-Indonesian diplomatic relations. We ourselves were surprised by the monstrous proportions to which the provocation grew. The Indonesian Communist Party, abetted by Peking, sought to harvest the fruit on September 30, 1965.

"By the way, Mr. Ambassador, I brought something that might interest you," said Major Louda, as he took several papers out of his briefcase. "We came across this document by accident and are

of the opinion that Prime Minister Dr. Subandrio or President Sukarno should be informed. You know that we feel more than sympathy toward your country. We have the same goal and the same enemy and we think it's time to cut off all his sources of information and means of influence in Indonesia. Please don't misunderstand me; we don't intend to intervene in any way in your country's internal problems. What you do with the information is entirely your business, but you should know what the enemy does."

"Yes, I understand," said the Ambassador.

"Can I be of any other help, Mr. Ambassador?" asked Louda.

"Well, you can," said the Ambassador. "I need a bigger apartment for my private parties; the one I have is too small. And the people living in that apartment house are becoming too much interested in me."

"Oh yes," said Louda, "but you must be patient. As I'm sure you know, it will not be easy to find something suitable. We'll do our best, but you'll have to be patient."

"And one more thing," the Ambassador said. "Can you introduce me to a new girl? The last one was too demanding, financially I mean."

"Yes, Mr. Ambassador, that will not be difficult. What about three weeks from today?" asked Louda.

"That's fine with me," the Ambassador replied.

They said goodbye to each other and Louda left the Ambassador's house. "The old sinner knows no limits," was the reaction of Prague headquarters when Major Louda reported his latest discussion with Mr. Arit, the Indonesian ambassador to Holland.*

For a long time the Afro-Asian operational department of the Czechoslovak intelligence service did not know how to proceed in Arit's case. As a protégé of Indonesian Prime Minister Subandrio he served abroad in a diplomatic as well as intelligence capacity and naturally attracted the attention of the Czechoslovak intelligence service. Prague succeeded in establishing personal contact with him and had no objection to his admiration for young girls. He was supplied with a small, nicely furnished apartment where

* The ambassador's name and the country of his diplomatic mission have been changed by the author.

he could play out his sexual fantasies. Attractive and willing young ladies were instructed to build up his ego.

It was not clear if Arit considered these attentions as friendly political gestures of the Czechoslovak government toward Indonesia or as intelligence service intrigues. Although he had compromised himself with the Czechoslovak intelligence service, he did not consider himself an agent. Strongly nationalistic and politically sympathetic to the Chinese model of communism, he nevertheless knowingly participated as a channel in delivering various anti-American messages to the Indonesian government when the Czechoslovak and Russian perpetrators decided to use him. The reports and documents which he received from the Czechoslovak intelligence service were never designated as disinformation. On the contrary, their validity and significance were affirmed. It is not improbable that Subandrio unofficially knew of his envoy's dealings with the Czechoslovak intelligence department; he may have tolerated it in the interest of obtaining "significant material" by whatever means.

Department D had no responsibility for directing agents abroad; this activity was handled by the operational departments, and the fact that Major Louda, Department D's senior officer, was at the same time Arit's case officer was an exception to the rule. This was a useful arrangement because it was Louda's idea to use Arit as a disinformation channel in a game which was supposed to make life less pleasant for the Americans in Indonesia.

Louda's operation was inspired in 1964 by a newly emerging movement in Indonesia which demanded an embargo on American films. The organization, entitled the Action Committee for the Boycott of United States Films, was convinced that American films were demoralizing the Indonesian people and their revolution.

It would have been inefficient for Department D to have constructed new proof of the "moral decadence of American culture" and the pernicious influence of American films, and to present this additional propaganda to the Indonesian public. A more effective approach was to produce live victims personifying "American imperialism and its brain trust, the CIA."

William Palmer, director of the Association of American Film

Importers in Indonesia, was chosen as victim. To be sure, we had no direct and persuasive evidence that Palmer was a CIA employee and could only suspect him to be one. However, his broad dealings with the highest Indonesian political circles, wide social contacts, and inexhaustible financial resources predestined him to serve as the incarnation of American influence in Indonesia, the symbol of all evil. From trivial and fragmentary reports, we compiled a file presenting Palmer as the CIA's most important agent in Indonesia. According to its original purpose, Operation Palmer was to be one of the customary backstairs skirmishes between Eastern and Western intelligence services, in which both sides tried to harass the opponent and restrict his room for maneuvering. The operation outgrew this initial intention, however, and became an explosive factor in American-Indonesian relations as well as in the internal politics of Indonesia.

Arit was not the only channel in Operation Palmer. Several Indonesian journalists who were also Czechoslovak agents were even more important in intensifying the anti-American campaign in their own country. Several times in the course of the operation they received outlines for articles to be embellished with their own journalistic style and Indonesian political phraseology which, during the latter part of Sukarno's reign, was even more irrational than Moscow's political jargon.

We also used anonymous channels successfully, mailing forged documents and distorted information to Indonesian politicians, organizations, and editors.

A channel outside Indonesia opened the operation. Material accusing Palmer of subversive activities against Indonesia appeared in the *Ceylon Tribune* on September 12, 1964. The article introduced the name William Palmer. According to the *Tribune*, he was to sneak into Malaysia to continue his subversive activities against Indonesia. The article, also reprinted on September 30 in a Singapore bulletin published by Barisan Sosialsis, stated:

> This espionage ring is using an organization, the Association of American Film Importers, as its cover. It is reported that this organization represents nine American film companies. Its monthly income amounts to not less than two millions. The money is used to finance reactionary political parties and organizations as well as to

> bribe political leaders, important executive officials, and other secret activities. . . . William Palmer is the manager of the association. He is an active United States chief agent in Indonesia. He has been associated with the Indonesian rebels, the Masjumi Party [a Moslem organization], all anti-government, anti-Sukarno, and reactionary influences. . . . William Palmer has also set up his cells in political parties, government departments, and armed forces to help him gather information and intelligence. . . . Despite his long-term activities, William Palmer has now been uncovered, and his base for further subversion cannot remain. He has to leave Indonesia. What puzzles the British authorities in Singapore is that London allowed him to operate in Malaysia. Apparently, this has something to do with the whole process of United States control and influence over Malaysia.

The Palmer article attracted attention in Indonesia as well as Malaysia, and gave new impetus to the Action Committee for the Boycott of United States Films. The organization called a five-day conference at the end of October 1964, where it was resolved to continue the boycott of American films. One of the resolutions categorically insisted on an immediate halt to all activities of the American motion picture association in Indonesia. The Indonesian press, which widely publicized the incident, inveighed against the United States not only with regard to the boycott of American films, but also on the American military mission to Malaysia which arrived in Kuala Lumpur on November 11, 1964. The Indonesian newspaper *Warta Bhakti*, November 12, 1964, asserted that the arrival of the American mission in Malaysia was "a clear indication that the United States has been siding with the puppet state which was hatched by British imperialism." *Warta Bhakti*, pointing to United States Ambassador Jones's efforts to improve Indonesian-American relations, warned that Jones's endeavors would be futile if United States planners did not "heed the warnings in President Sukarno's August 17 address and in the actions of the U.S. imperialist films boycott committee."

Sukarno's Indonesia, heavily indebted to the USSR and Western countries, torn by economic chaos, inflation, internal tension, and hatred for Malaysia, was a ready victim for Communist intelligence activities. It was possible to claim that all past, present,

and future difficulties, real or imagined, were the results of American imperialism. Brother Karno, a master of demagoguery, obligingly nodded his approval. At the beginning of December, student demonstrators against the presence and activities of the United States Information Agency in Indonesia demolished USIA libraries in Djakarta and Surabaya, East Java. On December 10, postal and telecommunications personnel in Djakarta and other cities confiscated USIA publications. In several provinces, USIA local information organs were banned. The Indonesian journal *Harian Rakjat*, December 11, 1964, wrote: "The decision is indeed an exciting and patriotic one. This is a great victory of the progressive people of Indonesia," and demanded an all-out prohibition of USIA activities in the country and the expulsion of all members of the United States Peace Corps. Utami Suryadarma, deputy general chairman of the Indonesian Action Committee for the Boycott of United States Films, again urgently demanded that the American Motion Picture Association be dissolved because it was a "hotbed of infiltration in the country," as reported by *Antara*, December 11, 1964.

On February 28, 1965, students attacked the residence of American Ambassador Jones, and a week later the Indonesian women's movement GERWANI sent a telegram to President Sukarno and Foreign Affairs Minister Dr. Subandrio demanding, as *Antara*, March 6, 1965, stated: "the expulsion of Bill Palmer of the American Motion Picture Association of Indonesia by declaring him *persona non grata*. The demand was made in view of Bill Palmer's subversive activities as a member of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, which operates in the interest of American imperialism and which aids in counterrevolutionaries' and neocolonialists' project of Malaysia."

Two days later, Djakarta Broadcasting, Domestic Service, reported Sukarno's speech to the Indonesian women on the occasion of International Women's Day. He said:

> My reply to the active American aid to Malaysia is: we are not afraid of it. We are not intimidated. Even if other imperialists give active aid to Malaysia, we, as an international force of the new emerging forces of two and a half billion people, we face all these imperalist forces. . . . A few days ago I was asked to stop the anti-

> United States demonstrations in Indonesia. I said clearly that these demonstrations were a manifestation of a general feeling, not only in Indonesia, but among the new emerging forces, a feeling of dislike of United States policy as it is being practiced in South Vietnam, in North Vietnam, in the Congo, and elsewhere in the world. . . . My reply was: If you expect me to stop the anti-American demonstrations, I respectfully ask the United States Government to stop all articles in U.S. imperialist magazines, such as *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *U.S. News and World Report*, and all the newspapers which have been saying only bad things about Indonesia. But what did they do? They did nothing to stop them. How can they expect to stop the anti-American demonstrations? Is it fair? . . . To top all of this, the United States now gives active aid to Malaysia, as Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada are giving active aid. If I were Tunku Abdul Rahman, I would be very ashamed. Look who is aiding Tunku Abdul Rahman—the United States, Britain, Australia, New Zealand—all white countries, imperialist countries, I would be ashamed if I were Tunku Abdul Rahman.

Sukarno's words served as incitement to further demonstrations and increasing anti-American feeling. On March 16, an enraged mob numbering about a thousand set upon the office of the notorious American Motion Picture Association in Indonesia, shouting such slogans as "Close Down the American Motion Picture Association!"; "Drive Out Palmer, Agent of the United States Intelligence Agency!"; "Go Home Yankees, Go Home U.S. Ambassador Jones!" During the demonstration, Peking Radio reported in English that the participants approved a statement affirming that

> the American Motion Picture Association is an instrument of imperialist subversion and aggression in the cultural field for weakening the Indonesian revolution. The declaration pointed out that though the association was banned by the Indonesian government last August, it and its personnel have time and again tried to distribute their films in an attempt to split the revolutionary forces of Indonesia. It said that the leader of the American Motion Picture Association, Bill Palmer, is an agent of the United States secret service and should therefore be expelled from the country or arrested and tried.

On April 1, demonstrators assaulted Palmer's villa, though he

was not at home at the time. *Antara,* April 2, 1965, added that five houses owned by Palmer in Gunug Mas were primarily used "for weekend parties for guests from Djakarta and other cities. Bill Palmer was also reported to have held secret meetings with certain people there. Lately, after American films had been boycotted and prohibited, Bill Palmer had often deliberately screened American films at Gunug Mas for himself and his guests."

All these articles, statements, and demonstrations reported back to Prague and Moscow were evaluated there as a good beginning for Operation Palmer. It was difficult to distinguish the direct effects of the operation from the spontaneous acting of Indonesian politicians, newspapermen, and the public, but we did not bother ourselves with such details; we could thus claim even greater merit than we deserved.

The Indonesian government never guessed what a distinguished guest they welcomed to Djakarta in April 1965. The tall, slender Armenian with grizzled hair and mustache and aristocratic demeanor did not arouse much public interest. At the Soviet embassy in Djakarta only a few insiders knew that this man, with the rank of general, was an elite member of the Soviet intelligence service. General Agayants, head of the Soviet disinformation service, had come to supervise the current operation personally and to seek new stimuli. He was satisfied with the consequences of Operation Palmer to date. Indonesian-American relations had reached a critical stage. Palmer was not the only one in trouble.

American Peace Corps Volunteers in Indonesia were accused of being CIA spies and agents of American imperialism, as reported by the New York *Times,* April 11, 1965, and in mid-April were ordered by the Indonesian government to cease their activities. USIA libraries had already been closed. Indonesians took over the management functions of American-owned rubber plantations and the National Carbon Company and placed control teams in several American enterprises, including three oil companies. American businessmen found it increasingly difficult to do business in Indonesia because Indonesians were growing afraid to buy from firms owned by Americans. At the end of March, President Johnson sent a special envoy, Ellsworth Bunker, to In-

donesia to seek an improvement in American-Indonesian relations with President Sukarno. The Bunker mission failed. In fact, Sukarno showed even more hostility toward the United States after Bunker's departure. The fewer than three thousand Americans then living in Indonesia, and the cultural, political, and economic position of the United States there faced an uncertain future.

General Agayants' optimism was disturbed, however, by Communist China's influence in Indonesia. Since 1963, the Indonesian Communist Party had increasingly appeared as Peking's matchmaker. In return for alliance, China promised aid in the military confrontation with Malaysia and in the development of Indonesian atomic weapons. Shortly after Sukarno's meeting with Chou En-lai on November 5, 1964, Indonesia established diplomatic relations with North Korea and North Vietnam and recognized the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front. At the end of November, Sukarno conferred with Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi in Djakarta. The result was the banning of two Indonesian political parties considered by Peking inimical to communism. The first was "The Body for the Promotion of Sukarnoism," and the second was "*Murba,*" the nationalist and anti-Peking Communist Party. In February 1965, twenty-one non-Communist newspapers were also banned. And the pro-Chinese trend continued. With Chinese help, the Indonesian Communists sought to obtain supremacy and the reins of power in Indonesia. Their fantasy, however, extended beyond the boundaries of the country. They hoped that Indonesia would become a revolutionary model for all of the nonwhite nations of Africa and Asia.

General Agayants was not greatly concerned with the Indonesian Communists' mystical vision of the global significance of the Indonesian revolution. He was a realistic man. As a professional intriguer, he was more uneasy about the omnipresent Chinese influence, but could not foresee that the East European intelligence agents' anti-American program in Indonesia would suffer a reversal several months later. Success in the fight against the United States was evident, possible, and alluring at that time.

Shortly after General Agayants' visit to Indonesia, Prague's Department D developed another dramatic plot designed to expand further the successes of Operation Palmer. On February 28,

1965, the Malaysian government accused Indonesia and several Malaysian political extremists of conspiring for a *coup d'etat.* Several Malaysian politicians were arrested. Official accounts linked their activity to a senior Indonesian intelligence officer identified as R. M. Soeinita, a former Indonesian embassy official in Kuala Lumpur.

We decided to hold Palmer responsible for this Indonesian failure. Through our disinformation channels Foreign Minister Subandrio, and through him President Sukarno, received reports that Palmer had divulged information at his disposal about the activities of the Indonesian underground in Malaysia to Malaysian authorities; Palmer was also alleged to have been involved in anti-Sukarno subversive activities in Java and Sumatra; moreover, with the assistance of Soviet advisors, proof was manufactured that the CIA and Palmer personally had participated in an assassination plot against Sukarno, Subandrio, and the army commander Lieutenant General Achmad Yani.

A new and provocative psychological bombshell exploded on May 28. At the annual meeting of Indonesia's regional military commanders, President Sukarno claimed that the imperialists had a plan to assassinate him. He stressed that the imperialist plan was to destroy the Indonesian revolution, which is regarded as the primary enemy of imperialists. "We know that they even have a plan to assassinate Sukarno, Yani and Subandrio—if possible—before the convening of the second Afro-Asian conference," said Sukarno. UPI, May 29, 1965, also reported him as saying that "if the assassination plot failed, the imperialist forces would launch a limited attack against Indonesia." Sukarno added that Bill Palmer was a CIA agent. Alleged proof of this had been found in Palmer's residence in Gunug Mas when it had been attacked by anti-American demonstrators.

On June 2, Reuters News Service reported that the Indonesian Students Federation had demanded a death sentence for William Palmer. Shortly afterwards, the Djakarta procurator decided to prepare for a trial against Palmer *in absentia* for his subversive, anti-Indonesian activities.

Prague greeted world press reports of an assassination plot

against Sukarno with genial surprise. Sukarno's speech showed the success of that state of Operation Palmer; at the same time, official accounts of the discovery of secret documents in Palmer's home which confirmed his espionage activities added an unexpected perspective to the plan. The Czechoslovak intelligence service concluded that Subandrio and Sukarno had chosen this incident as cover for the actual source of anti-Palmer information.

Not fearing the possibility that the anti-American campaign in Indonesia could be traced to Soviet-bloc disinformation, General Agayants ordered Moscow foreign radio broadcasts to Indonesia to intensify their efforts with arguments previously proved effective. The following commentary, broadcast June 8, 1965, is representative:

> Dear listeners: You certainly know a lot of facts about subversive activities by the United States Intelligence Agency. A large number of its agents are posted throughout the world. In employing agents who could be described as "the knights of the cloak and dagger," American experts are directing special attention toward Asian and African countries. They are attempting to change the political climate there with subversion.
>
> As usual, the CIA's agents enjoy the backing of American forces in all parts of the world. This can be proved by United States crimes in Vietnam, Laos, and the Congo. It has been known that the CIA has been preparing similar crimes in Indonesia for a long time. Not long ago a prominent CIA resident agent, Bill Palmer, was caught red-handed. He controlled a network of new plots. Palmer is an agent of wide experience. He disguised himself as a representative of the American Motion Picture Association in Indonesia. For the past nineteen years he has been carrying out in Indonesia subversion which inflicted great losses on the Indonesian people. According to press reports, Palmer maintained wide contacts in Indonesia. He spent the CIA fund and the fees collected from the showing of American motion pictures in Indonesia, pictures which propagated imperialism and aspects of the American way of life, to bribe Indonesians and American agents and to finance counterrevolutionary elements who are organizing plots.
>
> Palmer's most important task was the organization of rebellion in Indonesia between 1957 and 1959, which caused the death of several thousands of Indonesians and large material losses.

Palmer met with such rebel leaders as Simbolon, Kawilarang, and others in his bungalow in Puntjak. Palmer handed money to them and gave them advice. Palmer also arranged a meeting in his bungalow between CIA leader Allen Dulles and ringleaders, where they plotted against the life of President Sukarno in 1957. In the past few years, Palmer has been active in bringing together counterrevolutionaries in Indonesia for eventual new adventures. At the same time, he attempted to undermine the development of the Indonesian economy with subversion and sabotage by his agents. Indonesia was right in charging the CIA and Palmer as the culprits of subversion in late March and early April at military installations in Java and Sumatra which caused losses in human life.

The subversive activities in Java and Sumatra took place at a time when Michael Forrestal, a White House envoy, was in Indonesia. AFP [Agence France Presse] alluded to the connection between the subversion in Java and Sumatra with the visit of Forrestal. It is highly possible that Forrestal expected to employ the subversion as an argument in extending pressure on the Indonesian government and compelling Presiden Sukarno to cancel his plan for the nationalization of foreign enterprises, including American firms, in Indonesia.

The unmasking of Palmer also exposed the improper activities of Ambassador Howard Jones in Indonesia. As is known, Howard Jones resigned his post not long ago to erase his illegal activities. Jones has carried out United States colonialism in Indonesia for about ten years. He personally took part in organizing rebellions against the Indonesian government and maintained contacts with CIA agents and directed their subversive activities.

As stated by American journalists Ross and Wise in their book, *The Invisible Government*, Jones took part in CIA plots in Indonesia. He knew the details of the CIA strategy in supplying arms to the rebels in Sumatra and Java. He also took part in the arms supply. A large number of subversive activities by CIA agents under the leadership of Palmer, activities which took place in Indonesia in the past few years, were approved by Jones. The international press has published articles on Jones's direct involvement in the plot against President Sukarno's life in the Gulf of Sulawesi.

American Ambassador Jones turned over his post to Marshal Green. He will head the so-called East-West center in Hawaii. Palmer has left Indonesia for fear of retaliation. Jones will leave Indonesia also, but the CIA network remains in Indonesia. The In-

donesian people have been demanding the liquidation of the influence of American capital and CIA activities in Indonesia.

General Agayants cabled Prague his approval for the next stage, which was called the British-American Joint Plan to Invade Indonesia. Palmer did not figure in this stage. It had been submitted by Major Louda with this goal: "Sukarno is ripe for accepting any new proof of American conspiracy. Let us give him that pleasure."

Great Britain was included as a partner in the conspiracy to lend credibility to the disinformation campaign. Malaysia, from which the alleged invasion was to be launched, harbored British military bases; consequently, it would have been illogical for the United States to conduct an extensive military operation from Malaysian territory without the support or at least the knowledge of Great Britain. A forged document—a report from the British Ambassador in Djakarta to the British Foreign Office—was to serve as evidence. The forgery was transmitted to Dr. Subandrio.

In all probability, Dr. Subandrio and President Sukarno agreed to publicize the matter not on Indonesian territory but at the high-level conference of Asian and African leaders which was to convene in Algeria, in order to afford greater weight and publicity to the discovery. When the conference was postponed, Sukarno and Subandrio decided to announce it at the end of their stay in Cairo.

Dr. Subandrio granted an interview to a news correspondent from *Al Ahram;* on July 5, the dramatic story appeared in that Cairo newspaper, accompanied by a photocopy of the secret letter from the British Ambassador. In his interview, Subandrio said that with the postponement of the conference he had decided to disclose the document in Cairo so that the world would know that the Indonesian stand toward Malaysia was a purely defensive one. Another purpose of the disclosure was to inform the world about the true purposes of the British military bases in Singapore and Malaysia. Dr. Subandrio added that other documents about operational plans which were to be carried out by the British with American aid had also been seized. According to Subandrio, the

British were planning to carry out their scheme following the second Afro-Asian conference in Algeria. The reported attack was to be launched from Malaya, which is close to Sumatra; from Singapore, the largest British military base in Asia; and from areas in British-controlled North Kalimantan.

The publicized forgery, supposedly authored by the British Ambassador to Indonesia, was addressed to Sir Harold Cassia, under-secretary in the London Foreign Office. It was dated March 24, 1965. The letter included the following statement:

> I have held discussions with United States Ambassador Jones about the matters contained in letter No. 67785-65. U.S. Ambassador Jones has in principle agreed with our stand. However, he asked for more time to study the matters from several other angles.
>
> In reply to a question about the possible influence of the visit made by Bunker, President Johnson's personal envoy, to Djakarta to discuss the improvement of American-Indonesian relations, the Ambassador said that he did not see any possibility for improving the situation, and that it would not alter the plan, but that on the contrary, it would provide time to make more thorough preparations. Ambassador Jones also recalled the necessity of new steps to effect better coordination and said that there was no need to emphasize the necessity of making the plan a success. I have promised to make necessary preparations, and I will report my views on the subject at a later date.

British and American authorities strongly denied the document's authenticity. John Grandy, commander of the British forces for the Far East, termed the Indonesian assertions utter nonsense. But British and American denials only added fuel to the flames. They were considered an attempt to disguise aggressive designs. The Indonesian journal *Harian Rakjat,* July 9, 1965, wrote: "We are confident, however, that the imperialists, with all their tricks and efforts, will deny their own aggressive plan."

M. Dahlan, chairman of the Central Board of the Nahdlatul Ulama Party, remarked that "if the documents on the plans for aggression by the British against Indonesia approved by the United States are authentic, then the whole Indonesian nation and Moslems in particular should prepare themselves to face it by whatever means are at their disposal. It is imperative for all

Moslems to face such a threat as a holy war." Also on July 9, Djakarta radio broadcast a speech by Ido Garnida, a member of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Gotong-Rojong Parliament, in which he termed the planned Anglo-American aggression a continuation of efforts to smash the Indonesian Revolution, which had become the beacon of the Afro-Asian struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism.

Understandably, several Indonesian politicians used the opportunity to recall past American sins. Thus General Sudibjo, minister and National Front secretary, stated on Djakarta radio on July 10 that the criminal intentions of the American and British imperialists had already reached such proportions that in the framework of this so-called limited attack they had also planned terrorism and assassination against the great leader Sukarno and against other progressive revolutionary leaders of the Indonesian people. *Harian Rakjat* printed the July 13 statement of the representatives of the Indonesian Youth Front, workers' and women's organizations, the Indonesian Peace Committee, and the Central Action Committee to Boycott United States Films. The joint statement said that the Indonesian people were well aware of the criminal role played by the United States embassy in Djakarta. Under the leadership of President Sukarno, they had unearthed practices of American imperialist subversion, intervention, and aggression in the political, economic, and cultural fields, including the criminal activities of William Palmer.

A flood of words, idle phrases, and attacks against the Americans again inundated the Indonesian public. The New York *Times,* August 1, 1965, reported the observation of a Western diplomat in Djakarta: "There is really nothing the Americans can do. It's just like the tide coming in."

This statement reflected only part of the real situation. It was indeed like a tide and it was difficult for the Americans to defend themselves effectively; nevertheless, the action later proved to be a failure.

For almost a year, with only the most primitive means and a few agents, the Czechoslovak and Soviet intelligence services influenced Indonesian public opinion and leadership including Sukarno himself. The reasons were inherent in the extremely favor-

able objective circumstances. Operation Palmer was initiated at the proper time. It succeeded in riding the crest of a wave of anti-Americanism. It corroborated the existing views of Sukarno and Subandrio, two major political figures. Disinformation about the assassination plot and the forged British-American invasion plans were accepted almost gleefully by Sukarno. He was flattered into believing that by thwarting American plans and waging a glorious battle against imperialism he could increase his prestige in the Third World.

Sukarno was not the only one who was drawn into the operation. Their mounting achievements led the perpetrators to greater and greater efforts. From the standpoint of original purposes, the intelligence services could judge the operation an overwhelming success. At the end of August 1965, American-Indonesian relations had reached their lowest point in history. Public attacks on the CIA went well beyond Soviet expectations. This success, however, was relative and temporary. Czechoslovak and Soviet disinformation departments, intoxicated by potential gains in the battle against the main enemy, deliberately shut their eyes to the danger that the consequences could also be the heightening of internal tension and intensification of Chinese influence in the country. The Indonesian Communist Party and Peking claimed the political victory of the anti-American provocation; on September 30, 1965, the Indonesian Communist Party struck and failed totally. Half a million dead Communists and sympathizers were the result.

In August and the beginning of September 1965, Operation Palmer was still being hailed as a *tour de force* for the Czechoslovak and Russian intelligence services, and Major Louda was praised as its initiator. By October, no one willingly mentioned it, and in the chaos of the new Indonesian government's drastic anti-Communist measures, all traces of Mr. Arit had disappeared —traces of a man who liked girls.

4

Big Brother

East European Communist intelligence services constructed under Soviet supervision in the early fifties are offshoots of the Soviet service. Their organizational principles, methods, and objectives reflect those of the big Soviet brother. A description of the inner structure of the Czechoslovak political intelligence service and its relations with other partners in the Soviet bloc, a profile of its employees, examples of cooperative operations carried out by Czechoslovak and Hungarian or Czechoslovak and East German intelligence services, and an explanation of how the Soviet service manipulates the satellites will help to clarify the respective positions of Soviet and satellite intelligence services.

A Disinformation Factory

At the time of my Department D assignment, 1964–66, Czechoslovakia had three intelligence services. The first was military intelligence, under the direction of the General Staff. This group collected and processed information of military or quasi-military nature, including information on the development and technology of the enemy's weapons and scientific innovations which could influence the balance of power between the Soviet bloc and its enemies. Although there was a small department for psychological warfare in the Ministry of National Defense, it was

of only a research nature; the military intelligence department did not formulate special operations.

The operational sphere of border guard intelligence, the second group, was confined to a strip of territory about forty to sixty miles wide along the Austrian and West German borders. It collected information on the quality and means of enemy border defense and maneuvers and troop movements along the border.

Special operations were the major responsibility of the third group, state security intelligence, which had about fifteen hundred employees in the Ministry of the Interior and was unofficially called the political intelligence service. Its apparatus consisted of two main groups, the operational and the nonoperational.

The operational group encompassed territorial operational departments, technical departments, foreign counterintelligence, scientific-technical intelligence, and the department of special operations. The four territorial operational departments with the largest number of intelligence personnel were: (1) American (United States, Canada, and the Latin American countries); (2) German (the German Federal Republic and Austria); (3) European (NATO, Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, Turkey, and Scandinavia*); and (4) Afro-Asian (selected countries in the Near and Middle East, Africa, and the Far East). The fundamental goals of these departments were to recruit and direct agents in selected political and economic areas—government institutions, parliament, and political parties—to obtain desirable information, and to carry out special operations.

The second component of the operational intelligence sector was the technical departments, which selected, trained, and directed "illegals." These intelligence officers undergo several years of extensive training at home before assignment abroad, where they live with false documents as citizens of non-Communist countries. This type of duty is among the most complicated and challenging of intelligence tasks. Such an intelligence officer lives on enemy territory with no immunity or protection; if detected he is arrested and risks many years of imprisonment, in contrast

* Czechoslovak intelligence utilized Sweden and Finland primarily for rendezvous with prominent agents from West Germany, France, Britain, or other NATO countries.

to the officers with the "legal" cover of diplomatic or other official positions.

The scope of activity of the foreign counterintelligence department was not restricted territorially. The major targets of this department were American, West German, British, French, and Israeli intelligence services. The department was also concerned with the enemy's police and counterintelligence apparatus, emigré centers, and the enemy's own propaganda resources used to influence domestic affairs in Communist countries.

The department for scientific-technical intelligence operated only in technologically well-developed countries for the purpose of acquiring data on significant scientific discoveries and new technology. Colonel Houska felt that the value of innovations gleaned by this department in capitalist countries annually exceeded the one-year budget of the whole Czechoslovak intelligence service.

Before describing Department D in detail, mention must be made of the nonoperational sector of the service which included the department for research and analysis; the archive of operational dossiers; cadres and training; and the financial-economic department. The Czechoslovak intelligence service was the first in the Soviet bloc to use computers to document intelligence data.

Department D, the nerve center of disinformation activities, was officially designated Department Eight and was assigned the following major tasks: (1) to coordinate the creation and implementation of special operations suggested by operational departments and to maintain the quality of the operations; (2) to formulate suggestions on special operations and to implement them with the cooperation of the territorial departments; (3) to administer instructional activities within the intelligence apparatus so that special operations could become a daily feature of intelligence experience; and (4) to analyze, evaluate, and document all completed special operations.

The foregoing description indicates that Department D had no authority over the remaining operational departments in the area of special operations. Although Department D might refuse to recommend a specific special operation plan advanced by the operational territorial department, it could not demand that any

operation be implemented. Since Department D directed no agents abroad, it performed only coordinating and consultative functions vis-à-vis the operational departments. Only the territorial operational departments determined which agents were to be used for special operations. The sole authority held by Department D with regard to other operational departments concerned its regular biennial evaluations of special operations throughout the intelligence apparatus and its criticism of departments which had not been sufficiently active.

Department D also had no monopoly on the initiation of special operations. All operational officials, whether at headquarters or abroad, were scrutinized in detail at least once a year. Two of the criteria of job competency were the degree of initiative shown and the contribution made by the individual to the conduct of special operations. Department D, in reviewing all operational suggestions, tried to prevent activities from becoming stereotyped. It regulated the quality of operational techniques, recommended new modes of action, considered broadening the scope of local operations to continental or worldwide levels, and coordinated the participating operational departments.

Czechoslovak intelligence headquarters was situated in one of the most frequently photographed buildings of Prague's Old Town, on the banks of the Vltava River next to the six-hundred-year-old Charles Bridge. The building was protected by guards who often had to drive out aggressive foreign tourists seeking to take pictures from inside. It was originally a monastery appropriated from the Roman Catholic Church after the Communist takeover in 1948. Its architecture was so highly valued that the Ministry of the Interior, the new manager, was forbidden to make any structural changes inside or outside the building. As a result, Party and official meetings took place in the monastery's chapel where portraits of melancholy saints looked down from the walls.

A workday in the disinformation factory consisted of study, analysis, discussions, and meetings as well as much bureaucratic paperwork. Our main objective was to note and dissect all the enemy's weaknesses and sensitive or vulnerable spots and to analyze his failures and mistakes in order to exploit them. The formulation of special operations might remind one of a doctor

who, in treating the patient entrusted to his care, prolongs his illness and speeds him to an early grave instead of curing him. All secret or confidential information picked up by intelligence antennae abroad was processed several times within the department in order to determine its potential for reutilization against the enemy.

Intelligence reports from abroad were the primary source of ideas. Information obtained by other components of state security, reports of embassies and consulates, and confidential material culled by Czechoslovak Press Agency correspondents, trade missions, and tourist offices gave useful insights. Many foreign publications—books, newspapers, magazines, and bulletins—which supplied the disinformation kettle with necessary ingredients, were legally accessible.

Individual suggestions for special operations which came from stations abroad were submitted to preliminary assessment. It was my responsibility as Department D's deputy chief to perform this task. The majority of the suggestions were discarded in the first stage of the selection process, leaving only those whose conception corresponded with our long-range plans and whose projected consequences suggested positive results. The suggestions were then transmitted to a panel directed by me or Major Stejskal, where the author of the proposal faced many questions and much criticism in an attempt to uncover any weaknesses. The composition of the critical board varied from case to case, although several Department D employees and experts on particular regions were permanent members. Further supplemented and polished, the proposal was then submitted to the intelligence chief for approval.

In each special operation the channels of disinformation—the modes of conveying propaganda messages—can influence the results to a significant degree. Intelligence services utilize the following major channels:

1. Intelligence agents—citizens of foreign countries operating abroad in positions useful for special operations—can be journalists, diplomats, and parliamentary, Party, and organization functionaries. The Czechoslovak intelligence service could not afford the luxury of maintaining a group of agents exclusively for spe-

cial operations. Therefore, most agents had the dual function of acquiring information and conducting special operations.

2. Agents from the domestic population work for an enemy intelligence service with the full knowledge and guidance of Communist intelligence or counterintelligence services.

3. The diplomatic and state apparatus and the mass media of the home-country intelligence services have devised an extensive network of so-called ideological collaborators composed of native citizens, most of them Communist Party members, who occupy middle- and lower-echelon positions on editorial boards of newspapers and magazines, television or radio, in the state, administrative, and diplomatic apparatus, in trade unions, the leadership of youth organizations, and travel agencies. The intelligence service relies on them for the publication of articles and books, the preparation of television programs, and other assistance. The purposes of intelligence work are concealed even from those people deemed absolutely reliable and loyal to the Communist regime. The intelligence service acquaints them only with those facts essential to the successful performance of their roles. Cooperation with state security is simply a necessary evil for ideological collaborators. They are not brutally blackmailed or pressured as are agents; for them, cooperation is a responsibility fulfilled in most cases for the practical reason that to refuse might damage their positions.

4. Technical channels, such as wiretaps or listening devices, are often installed and controlled by the enemy. When a Communist intelligence or counterintelligence service detects such a device, it is not always dismantled; the enemy's efforts in installing wiretaps can be rewarded with a systematic flow of disinformation.

5. Disinformation material is delivered through anonymous channels in such a manner that even a painstaking investigation is not sufficient to locate the individual or institution which participated in this action. The material is usually sent by mail.

The number of channels is not inexhaustible, and some are used quite frequently. But repetitions can alert the enemy, leading to the exposure of the operation and its perpetrator.

In general, special operations offer two types of risks, opera-

tional and political, but most often both. Operational risks include the possible exposure of an agent, his case officer, and the methods and objectives of the Communist intelligence service. Among the political risks is the possibility that the operation will be publicly exposed and the perpetrators forced to stand the trial of public opinion and face political countermeasures from the government of the afflicted country. This happens rarely in practice, and even when the enemy or victim succeeds in deciphering an action, he is unlikely to have evidence conclusive enough to convict the perpetrator. Another continuing political risk is that the perpetrator's own mass media and even government will pick up disinformation intended for the victim, as in Operation Neptune. This possibility, however, is not a major consideration of Communist intelligence agents.

The principle of risk minimization in formulating and carrying out special operations leads perpetrators to avoid live disinformation channels or agents and to give priority to paper operations such as forgeries delivered in the mails, thereby rendering the actions stereotyped and less effective.

The ethics of special operations is closely entwined with the ethics of intelligence work in general in which Communist-bloc intelligence agencies do not differ significantly from their Western counterparts. The activities of every intelligence agency are amoral because they involve daily infringement of foreign and sometimes even domestic laws and because they conflict with the precepts of generally recognized humanistic principles. In the conflict between legal and ethical criteria and practice, it is the goal—the initiator's practical interest—that has priority. If intelligence agencies are to function as effective components of the state apparatus, they must perpetrate actions abroad that often violate the enemy's legal norms. It would seem that an action's effectiveness is proportional to the extent to which it breaks the enemy's laws. The highly confidential and complex nature of intelligence operations and the difficulties of establishing adequate control by supreme state organs sometimes even lead intelligence services to violate the laws of their own countries.

The very essence of intelligence work clashes with generally accepted humanistic principles. No more than a small percentage

of the agents recruited by intelligence agencies of East and West decide to work for the enemy of their own free will as a result of pure idealism or faith in the enemy's ideals. Anyone offering his services has little chance of being welcomed into the fold, for he may have been sent over by the other side. The intelligence service must therefore seek out agents on its own, and when it finds a likely candidate, it must bring all sorts of pressure to bear on him, beginning with the prospect of a good salary and ending with blackmail.

Ethical problems provide no barrier for special operations. A proposal submitted by a Department D official in 1965 to blow up the Andreas Hofer monument in Innsbruck in order to aggravate nationalistic tension between Italy and Austria in their dispute over South Tyrol was refused not because of the monument's cultural value. The Austrian press had mentioned possible Communist involvement in the Italo-Austrian controversy, and the intelligence service's smallest mistake indicating Czechoslovak connection with it could have had very unpleasant political consequences.

Although every proposal is reviewed at several stages, criticism is continually made of the proposal's practical aspects—the techniques employed and the risks involved—rather than of its ethical validity. Whoever voiced objections of an ethical nature would be suspected of being politically unreliable. The ethical criterion for special operations is none other than the old stand-by that the end justifies the means, a fact which naturally influences the moral standards of every intelligence officer. Cynicism is a part of the working atmosphere of the service. But not all Communist intelligence officers are alike.

Personnel

He lived alone in a small villa in an East Berlin suburb. Several times a month he visited Czech illegals who had been sent to East Germany to adjust to the German environment and thereafter to be smuggled to West Germany as East German

refugees. He taught them the skills of an illegal because he had once been a very good one himself.

Major Karel Petr, or Charlie, as we called him, liked to live alone because such an arrangement gave him relative freedom and independence. He had no characteristics that either Eastern or Western intelligence specialists would consider typical for a Communist illegal.

Before World War II he had roamed through Western Europe and North Africa as a worker doing odd jobs, learning French and German, and building self-reliance. Shortly after he returned home, Germans occupied the country and arrested him for his underground activities and Communist leanings. In prison he learned to be tough. After 1948 he entered the intelligence service, but since he was considered politically unreliable he was thrown out in 1951 and became a miner. His dogmatic wife approved of everything the Party did—even her husband's punishment. "You are a bum—and even worse—a politically unreliable bum," she used to say. Charlie devised a plan for escaping from her, from the Party, and from all the political nonsense which had flooded the country. He offered his services to the intelligence department again, this time as an illegal. Surprisingly, he was accepted. The five years spent in West Germany and France were the most wonderful of his life, despite the danger of his mission, because he was free. His accomplishments were so substantial that the Russians decided to appropriate him from the Czechs to use him for their own purposes. Neither his Czech nor Russian case officers knew that the short trips arranged for him to see his wife in Czechoslovakia during his mission in Western Europe were actually mental torture. This procedure, which is supposed to strengthen an illegal's ties with his family and homeland, was in Charlie's case quite counterproductive. After every home visit he begged his superiors to prolong his mission abroad.

For every Communist intelligence officer, a few years' residence abroad has long-term effects. The first personal confrontation with the capitalist world stimulates a more vital political realism. As a rule, persons returning from abroad spend several months and sometimes years before successfully readjusting to the domestic environment, the chronic economic ailments, and

mainly to the politically restrictive atmosphere regarding independent thought and behavior.

When his mission was completed Charlie came home rewarded with a Russian medal and his memories. Because of his outstanding performance as an illegal, Prague decided in 1960 to send him to East Berlin as a case officer.

Although we were different in many ways, we became close friends. When I needed respite from the frustrations of a spy-diplomat's life Charlie always had his hundreds of stories and unquenchable optimism to cheer me up. He was about fifty-two years old when I first met him in 1961 during my assignment in Berlin—still a Casanova, romantic dreamer, and fascinating liar looking at least ten years younger than he really was. That same year he disappeared from Berlin for several months. Friends in Prague told me that he had been sent to the Congo to develop connections with the leftist revolutionary opposition movement there.

When he returned to Berlin I came to see him. I found him sitting in the living room, darning his socks.

"Are you hungry?" he said without any welcome formalities.

"Yes, Charlie," I said expecting to be served some specialty, as he was an excellent cook.

"Good, have this here, and you'll find some butter in the kitchen," he said, taking a muffin out of the sock, having used it as a darning ball.

"I thought you knew that I don't like German food. I expected you to bring me some good recipes from the Congo," I said.

"How did you know I was in the Congo?"

"Your friends are my friends and they like to talk about Charlie," I replied.

"Well, it wasn't a bad job. Actually I wouldn't have minded staying there a little longer to be even farther away from my dear woman."

"Why don't you divorce her if you hate her so much?"

"Let's talk about something else. Please don't spoil this nice evening. You know I hate her and the reasons are not important," he said.

Yes, I knew. Once or twice I had seen Charlie's reaction when

he was with his wife. He became crushed, depressed, and humorless whenever he was with her.

"OK, Charlie, let's talk about Congolese girls if you want."

"You know, they are really nice, those Congolese. They helped me much more than the two idiots Prague sent. You know one of them very well. He's a former secretary of our Party organization in Prague. He was the commander of our mission despite the fact that political jargon is all he knows. If I had followed his orders I would be sitting now in a dirty Congolese prison along with him."

Personnel from the central Party apparatus infiltrate intelligence services as political reinforcements. They occupy positions of higher leadership, even when they lack practical experience or theoretical knowledge of intelligence work. Nevertheless, the Party's Central Committee expects them to ensure a politically correct orientation to intelligence activity, hoping that intelligence will thereby remain under all conditions an obedient instrument of the Party.

Many of Czechoslovakia's intelligence personnel have worked at some time in the counterintelligence section of the Ministry of the Interior. Although incessant rivalry and quiet warfare exist between intelligence and counterintelligence departments, almost every counterintelligence officer aspires to work in the foreign intelligence service. The attraction is not simply a matter of greater variety and interest but also of financial benefit and the opportunity to travel abroad. Transfer from counterintelligence to an intelligence assignment represents a definite upward change in status and reflects an estimate of political loyalty and individual capability. A majority of middle- and upper-echelon positions are staffed with former counterintelligence officials.

From the mid-fifties, the Czechoslovak intelligence service began to accept young, politically reliable university graduates with linguistic qualifications. And although most of them until 1968 occupied rank-and-file positions, several have progressed in the

interim to middle-level managerial positions. New candidates for intelligence work are also selected from the various central state agencies. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, import-export companies, and the editorial offices of the mass communications media were the primary reservoirs from which the intelligence service most frequently recruited its candidates. New personnel falling into this category are especially valuable because their thorough acquaintance with cover occupations indicates satisfactory adaptation to foreign positions. They need only be oriented to the intelligence trade.

Candidates are subjected to an intensive personal and family investigation in an attempt to detect any weak spots in the earlier life of the candidate or his family, such as relatives living in capitalist countries, sexual deviations, and physical or mental disorders. Work in the intelligence service was initially a privilege of Party members. When in the sixties an increasing emphasis was placed on general education, the personnel department had to seek candidates among the young university graduates, a minimal number of whom were Party members. It was not a generation gap which drove students away from the Party. Double standards of morality—one for the leading Party functionaries and the other for the rest—an insuperable gap between Marxist-Leninist theory and the everyday practice of the Party, the limitations on traveling abroad, the fear of expressing their opinions and doubts freely—all contributed to the young generation's disillusionment. Of course there were those who compromised. Consequently, non-Party members were accepted for working in the intelligence service on the assumption that they would be accepted for Party membership after a relatively short time.

The Cold War period was the golden age of the "tough" intelligence agent who looked on education with disdain. This attitude began to change, however, when it became evident that sheer revolutionary zeal would not suffice, that it was also necessary to have a solid general and professional education. The publication in 1964 of new qualifications for the Czechoslovak intelligence service revealed a radical change. Roughly 25 percent of the operational personnel began further secondary or university studies in order to satisfy the new requirements. The

guidelines stipulated for the category of rank-and-file operational employees included a university education, a knowledge of at least one major Western language, and some theoretical and practical knowledge of intelligence problems and methods. The requirements for departmental chiefs were a university education, extended university study in a second department, a knowledge of Russian and two Western languages, and many years of experience in intelligence work including no less than four years of residence and work abroad.

The level of professional efficiency among Czechoslovak intelligence personnel was quite good. New recruits, for whom intelligence work was the first encounter with the state security apparatus in general, came armed with six months or a year of intelligence schooling, where they became acquainted with the basic methods and techniques of intelligence work. The Moscow intelligence school, whose purposes and standards are discussed later, was intended to be a "graduate school of espionage sciences." The candidates could not apply for this school; they were carefully selected by Czechoslovak intelligence authorities.

Intelligence officers with a diplomatic cover usually have greater success with their foreign partners than do career diplomats, who scrupulously uphold the political line established by the highest Party and government circles in interactions with their foreign partners, so as to avoid accusations of political deviation, opportunism, or lack of principle. This significantly diminishes their personal influence, for their attitudes are only a pulverized, boring extract of positions which the foreign partner may probably discover in the Communist press itself. Intelligence officers holding diplomatic posts are not concerned about this situation for they can represent their disparate political viewpoints as tactics designed to obtain greater trust from the foreign partners, absolving themselves of responsibility to their superiors under this guise. They benefit from much greater self-reliance, informality, and ideological flexibility, which can even be misinterpreted as ideological liberalism.

The younger officers with a university education actually do incline to a liberal conception of communism, while officers who began their careers in the counterintelligence department cus-

tomarily maintain a dogmatic political stance and their voices prevail. There is in this dogmatism a covert instinct for self-preservation because the officers realize that with their particular qualifications, it would be difficult for them to start a new career in civilian life, while democratic socialism might confront them with the risk of legal prosecution for their previous activities.

The problem of discipline varies in intensity among the intelligence services of the Soviet bloc. While the Soviet agency maintains strict discipline, the satirical spirit of *The Good Soldier Schweik* prevails in the Czechoslovak intelligence service with the exception of emergency situations when discipline and morale are strengthened. The ludicrous sight of Russian tanks following falsified road signs as they invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, however, was one example of the humor of the Czechoslovak people under pressure.

For Charlie there were no emergency situations.

"As I understand it your mission in the Congo was very successful. You got another medal, didn't you?" I asked Charlie.

"Yes, but no thanks to that Party-watermelon-head. As a matter of fact they could have saved their own time with those medal formalities. A few thousand bucks would have been better. Nonetheless I managed to save a few dollars in the Congo," he said with a smile, "and girls in Berlin and Prague will be happy for a few months. I often wonder how it is possible that so many idiots found their way into our service. It must have been hard work for the Party to find them in such a small country and above all to find politically reliable ones. Maybe I'm wrong; maybe they're idiots just because they're politically reliable. When I was sent on my first mission abroad, I didn't think I'd survive. I used to get ideologically slanted instructions and recommendations which were professionally incompetent and sometimes quite suicidal. So, I did the whole job my own way and didn't mention in my reports to Prague how I did it. Do you know what helped me very much during the first period of my assignment as an illegal? The

idea of being arrested. I used to think about it often. How the police would come, what questions they would ask, what my cell would look like, what I would do the whole day in prison. After a while the idea of being arrested became so familiar to me that I was not afraid of it at all. Actually, I started looking forward to it."

"Were your Russian case officers better than the Czechs?" I asked.

"Professionally speaking they were better. However, there was one thing I didn't like about them at all. They had no sense of humor. You know, it's terribly boring if somebody considers espionage a deadly serious business, as they do."

Political humor in a totalitarian society is a safety valve to protect citizens against the government's negation of humanistic values and, in the last analysis, an escape from reality to the world of desires and illusions. The spirit of collectivism instilled by a Communist regime finds expression in the collective struggle against institutionalized absurdities with the help of political humor.

The security apparatus of a Communist state is an agency of repression, on guard that people do not poke excessive fun at their own authorities. More than one citizen of Czechoslovakia or the other Communist countries has discovered himself behind bars for too great a fascination with anti-state jokes. One joke widely circulated at the time of purges is that of a Party member who had been interrogated successfully by the authorities. During the questioning, the chief interrogator congratulated him, saying his replies were as doctrinaire as those in *Rude Pravo,* the Communist Party daily.

"But tell me," the interrogater said, "have you no personal opinions?"

"Oh, of course," said the Party member, "but I do not agree with them, I assure you."

Such jokes circulate in the state security apparatus itself.

The specific character of intelligence work sometimes leads to practical jokes within the intelligence apparatus as well as against foreign enemies, in which case the perpetrator receives official

approval and the blessing of the authorities. Intelligence employees play a series of games, the most popular of which are played by the rank and file against the directors.

In 1965 Colonel Houska was the unwitting victim of such a joke during his visit to Paris, where I accompanied him. Colonel Houska liked to travel. He visited Austria and Italy and did not even hesitate to cross the ocean to Mexico, a trip which he particularly enjoyed. These more or less private journeys were called inspection tours of intelligence stations abroad. The intelligence officers, always alerted to Houska's visits, were ready for him; Houska was to see only capable, devoted, and loyal co-workers. Everything had been arranged in advance, even a demonstration meeting of a case officer with a real agent since Houska, knowing operations only from the reports he read, had never seen one. But there were too many toasts at the embassy's welcoming party. When Ambassador Pleskot came to greet the honored guest, the chief of the powerful Czechoslovak intelligence apparatus was barely able to answer. His subordinates were amused and kept filling their chief's glass. The rule that drinking is permissible only insofar as it does not affect the capacity for normal, coldly logical thought was inculcated in every rank-and-file employee. Houska failed this test totally. When he finally collapsed, his officers carried his unconscious body to bed while singing the "Song of Dead Revolutionaries." It was a funeral procession for Houska's directoral competence.

Houska was as much an amateur in intelligence work as was his predecessor, Colonel Miler. With no professional background, no theoretical knowledge of intelligence work, and no practical experience in foreign-policy problems, he succumbed to pressures from above and below, while the intelligence service grew to monstrous proportions. Eventually Houska was unable to determine whether any of the department activities made any sense at all, and he purposely avoided high-ranking officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, fearful that they would discover his incompetence in foreign policy. Houska was not quite sure to whom or what he owed his magic career—circumstances, friends, or the Party.

Around 1948 Houska's first assignment had been that of politi-

cal leader of the Singing and Dancing Ensemble of the Ministry of the Interior. A few years later he was sent to Moscow for two years to learn the police business. On his return he was promoted to head the regional state security directorate in Bratislava. It was a golden period which he remembered happily; he went fishing and hunting, and the local Party leaders accepted him as one of the boys. This pleasant existence might have lasted longer had Colonel Miler, the intelligence chief, not been suspended and replaced by Houska in 1961. At the time Houska gladly accepted the promotion, believing that he could make a success of it. It seemed to him that the political aspects of his job were not complicated; after all, the political line came from above and he had always been good at accepting and enforcing it among his subordinates. However, the Czechoslovak intelligence service was not a bunch of chorus girls, and although surrounded by Soviet advisors, Houska had to take responsibility for the service's failures.

Houska hid his lack of knowledge and treated his subordinates in the manner of a kindly but strict father, trying to create the aura of a resolute, energetic man who was not afraid of obstacles and difficulties. There were times when, in a good mood, he used the informal second-person form of address, and even appeared critical of the "establishment." But hiding his own shortcomings made him overly sensitive to any critical comments by subordinates. During conferences, when individual officers expressed views opposed to his own, he lost his poise: "This is not a club of vegetable growers or beekeepers. You will obey, and if you do not like it you can leave the service right now." A few days after the storm, he was as friendly with his opponent as if nothing had happened. In his weak moments, Houska even admitted to his closest collaborators that he would be glad to relinquish leadership of the intelligence service to someone else.

Individual officers, chiefs, and the intelligence service as a whole tried to present the results of their work to their superiors in the most favorable light possible, playing what might be called "the success game." In 1960 Alfred Frenzel, a member of the West German parliament and a prominent Czechoslovak agent, was arrested in West Germany. The following day, Colonel Miler, then chief of intelligence, called a meeting to discuss the political

and operational consequences of the incident. Several of those present, who shared responsibility for the failure, tried to convince Colonel Miler of the positive aspects of the Frenzel arrest. They emphasized the great publicity elicited in the world press and cited the surprise and admiration expressed by foreign correspondents on how highly placed Czechoslovak agents had become in West German political circles. Colonel Miler, not otherwise noted for a fine sense of humor, declared at the end of a meeting which had lasted several hours: "When I listen to these comrades, I think that the Foreign Minister should have noted the huge success we attained in West Germany when they arrested Frenzel for us."

The relationship between the intelligence service and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was far from ideal. Foreign positions for which career diplomats wait long years were staffed by intelligence officers who had spent only a few months in the central Ministry of Foreign Affairs to become familiar with a new cover profession before assignment abroad. There is a rule that every new official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must present himself to his colleagues at a Party meeting and acquaint them in detail with his background. Intelligence officers arrive with fabricated biographies to disguise their connections with the Ministry of the Interior. Diplomats play this Party ritual as a game which gives many an intelligence officer a hard time, since the diplomats very quickly identify those from the "police." In the days following the Party meeting, they visit the intelligence officer one by one to ask him specific questions about his former place of work of which he usually has only very scanty knowledge. They drive him to embarrassed and evasive answers which prolong their pleasure. Seasoned intelligence "Cossacks," so called for their proved hardihood and ability quietly to withstand any attempts at provocation, defend themselves against this game simply and effectively, though against service regulations. To the question, "Where are you from?" they answer, "From the police." One of the Cossacks had refined this method to the point that he did not even have to speak. He would merely sit down and let his pistol fall from his pocket. And when the question was left unanswered, no one pressed him further.

Miroslav Nacvalac, the Czechoslovak station chief in Austria during the first half of the 1950s, had a reputation as a great practical joker. At that time the Czechoslovak legation in Vienna was not greatly overburdened, since the Cold War dictated that official dealings were to be very rare, and Austrian tourists seeking Czechoslovak visas were infrequent. In addition to espionage, therefore, the legation staff concentrated on practical jokes. The Czech envoy Koubek's sense of humor permitted jokes against him which in other circumstances, under another envoy, would have landed the joker before a Prague disciplinary commission. One day Nacvalac came to the envoy and informed him with a tragic expression on his face that "something would have to be done about the Bulgarians."

"What Bulgarians?" asked the envoy.

"I'm thinking about the catastrophe impending in Bulgaria. Surely you know what has happened there?" said Nacvalac.

The envoy was somewhat shaken by his ignorance of the impending catastrophe in Bulgaria, but he nodded.

"Comrade Envoy, you should telephone the Bulgarian ambassador and convey our sympathy," suggested Nacvalac.

When the unsuspecting envoy picked up the phone to carry out this proposal, Nacvalac slipped out of his office. There is no precise record of the conversation between the Czechoslovak and Bulgarian diplomats, but it came to light in later comments by the Czech envoy that his Bulgarian counterpart, in an effort to conceal his ignorance of "that catastrophe in Bulgaria," avowed that he was informed about it, and asked the Czechoslovak envoy whether he could visit and discuss the details. The Czechoslovak envoy agreed, hoping that he could find Secretary Nacvalac in the meantime for the particulars of the case, for it seemed that no one else knew anything about it. But Nacvalac was nowhere to be found. So the two envoys met at the Czechoslovak legation and talked at length about "the tragic occurrence in Bulgaria," not even knowing what was being discussed. The next day the envoy called Nacvalac into his office to berate him for leading a superior into such an unpleasant situation and to demand an explanation of what happened in Bulgaria.

"But, Comrade Envoy, all the strawberries throughout Bul-

garia died. Imagine what a catastrophe this is for the whole Bulgarian economy," said Nacvalac. The envoy nodded, and by that time he understood.

The best practical joker is usually among the most competent operational workers, for he is endowed with creative fantasy, imagination, and wit—attributes which are also useful in intelligence work. At the basis of almost all disinformation operations is a humorous kernel of inspiration. Of course, only the successful perpetrator would feel pleasure and gleeful enjoyment; neither the victim nor the outwitted enemy would laugh at his own misfortune.

Charlie did not laugh when he reached retirement age in 1965. Intelligence work was fun and a means of escaping his wife. Deprived of both these pleasures, he became an old man physically and mentally in the next two years.

Leaving his villa in East Berlin on that evening in 1961 I said: "Honor Work, Comrade Petr," using the official Party and service greeting in order to provoke him.

"Small honor to small work, you bastard," replied the most successful illegal of the Czechoslovak intelligence service during the 1950s.

Satellites

The activities of the satellite intelligence services are usually underestimated by the West, but these offshoots from the Soviet apparatus play an important role in the over-all Soviet scheme. In providing a large number of personnel, the satellite services permit the Soviet Union to increase its intelligence activities by roughly 50 percent, and in the case of special operations that percentage is even higher. The contribution made by satellite intelligence departments is extraordinarily valuable, not only in its consequences, but also with regard to assuming financial, operational, and political risks. Despite the fact that most of the information obtained and the operations conducted by satellite countries are useless to themselves, their intelligence organizations finance this activity and in the event of failure—such as the ex-

posure of agents—assume responsibility and the risk of enemy retaliation.

The existence of subsidiary intelligence services also facilitates approaching and recruiting as agents non-Communist citizens—men who would refuse a direct Soviet proposal for reasons of nationalism or anti-Russian feeling. In Western Europe, Canada, and the United States many citizens of East European descent retain a sentimental attachment to their ancestral homeland and, in individual cases, are willing to collaborate with its intelligence service, even if Communist. In the German Federal Republic, for example, a significant proportion of intelligence agents are recruited from the ranks of the Sudeten Germans who were transferred from their homes after World War II. This phenomenon is even more marked in those cases of West German citizens recruited by the East German intelligence service. Rationalizing that they are working for the other Germany, not the USSR, they have no feeling of betrayal.

Satellite intelligence services also operate very effectively in the developing countries. At the end of the 1950s and in the first half of the next decade, many former colonies attained independent statehood, opening new horizons to Communist infiltration. Several of the younger black African political leaders were educated in East Europe, in large measure on government stipends granted explicitly to students from developing countries.

Prague's "University of the Seventeenth of November" (named after a Czechoslovak student resistance movement bloodily smashed by the Nazis on November 17, 1939) is one of the institutions serving this goal. The Czechoslovak intelligence service works actively among its student body, trying to establish collaboration even during the period of study. The practice is the same in East Berlin, Warsaw, Budapest, Sofia, or Bucharest, and, understandably, in Moscow itself. Some nonwhite students prefer the East European metropolitan areas to Moscow because social life in Prague or Budapest is more varied and interesting. After completing their courses of study, they return to their homelands. Intelligence contacts are cultivated without regard to whether the individuals succeed in rapidly entering the political forum or not; developing countries are an arena of frequent political change

and upheaval, and opportunities for an educated young man might appear later. Some political activists from developing countries prefer cooperating with the satellite intelligence service rather than the Soviet agency for reasons of political naiveté, believing it to be a service to anticolonialism but not a service to the superpower interests of the Soviet Union.

In 1965, shortly after various disinformation departments had been established, the Soviet intelligence service introduced an important structural modification among satellite services by permitting direct operative relations on the departmental level, that is, the territorial departments for Germany and America, foreign counterintelligence, and disinformation. Although the Soviet Union retained the role of chief coordinator, it supported direct contacts among the other agencies, excluding Romania, in order to increase over-all efficiency. With Romania's growing independence in foreign policy, cooperation between Romanian and other Soviet-bloc intelligence agencies had decreased, by 1965, to mere formalities. Yugoslavia as well as Albania, which, of course, are not part of the Soviet bloc, maintained no relations with Soviet-bloc security apparatuses, not even on a formal level.

Cooperation among Soviet-bloc intelligence services had existed before 1965 but was for the most part limited to an exchange of information. At times two agencies would come into conflict. If, for example, it was unclear which one was to direct an operation involving an agent who worked for both, they communicated in order to discuss their difficulties. To a limited degree, there was also "lustration" cooperation, which, in Soviet-bloc terms, means the gathering and use of dossiers on various individuals. The change in interagency relationships in 1965 opened the possibility of combining our efforts on certain operations. The executive staffs of disinformation departments in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany began to exchange background material for special operations projects, work together on the production of forgeries, and even help one another carry out operations abroad.

Until 1968 the Czechoslovak intelligence service was in all likelihood the most effective satellite service. The defection of several Czechoslovak officers following the Soviet invasion in

1968 was such a blow that all activity was temporarily paralyzed, and many networks of agents still must be completely rebuilt.

Satellite intelligence services have achieved varying degrees of influence in the non-Communist world. The East German intelligence service under the Ministry of State Security was at first oriented overwhelmingly to the German Federal Republic, the occupying authorities, and the troop units stationed on West German territory. Its scope of activity grew as the German Democratic Republic made more foreign contacts. Although the German Federal Republic remains the primary target, the position of the East German intelligence service has grown stronger in several Arab, Latin American, and black African countries.

The sense of common nationality, the bitterness of a divided Germany, the broad kinship and friendship ties between people living in Eastern and Western Germany, and the possibility of blackmail based on compromising material from the Nazi period are among the factors facilitating East German infiltration of the German Federal Republic. The risk for the West, however, is not localized within the borders of West Germany; some West German citizens—agents of East Berlin—are ordered to resettle in other non-Communist countries and conduct long-term intelligence activity there.

East Germany also tries to recruit former Nazis who had concealed their roles in Hitler's designs after the end of World War II. Nazi settlements and individuals in Latin America, the Arab countries, black Africa, and of course, West Germany are traced and their pasts painstakingly researched with the help of extensive East German archives. Those who agree to collaborate are given oral guarantees that they will not face prosecution for their wartime offenses. The East German intelligence service is probably now the largest satellite intelligence organization, and may even be the most effective.

Conditions for Polish intelligence activity are now probably as favorable as were those in Czechoslovakia before 1968. Poland has extensive diplomatic trade, cultural, and scientific contacts which allow her to maintain a large number of intelligence stations abroad. The potential for intelligence activity is expanded still further by means of the Polish commercial fleet and consider-

able numbers of emigrants in Great Britain, France, Canada, and, above all, the United States. Poland's traditionally warm cultural relationship with France offers the Polish intelligence service more effective access to France than any other satellite service save the Romanian. Under pressure from Moscow, the Polish intelligence service is forced to acknowledge the United States as the chief enemy, but the German question and the German Federal Republic are also centers of Polish attention.

Beginning in 1956, the Polish intelligence service maintained a certain isolation from its East European partners. Anti-Soviet outbreaks in Poland caused the Soviet Union to temporize for several years in order to be certain that the danger of radical political change in Poland had subsided. In the early sixties, relations gradually became normal again, but even as late as 1966 they had not reached the depth and breadth of other intelligence relationships. Thus, the Polish element was excluded when Moscow decided to establish direct contact among disinformation departments in 1965.

The postwar development of the Hungarian intelligence service was interrupted by the revolution of 1956, which impaired previous progress and necessitated the complete overhaul of the network of agent contacts. Judging from conversations with Hungarian officers, the range of action of the Hungarian intelligence service is narrower than the Czechoslovak, East German, or Polish scope of operations, and financial resources are more limited. The main areas of concentration are Austria, Italy, the German Federal Republic, and the Vatican. The latter is the subject of interest for all bloc intelligence organizations, but the Hungarian service was most active and probably the most successful in penetrating large circles of the Catholic clergy both in Hungary and abroad.

A large wave of emigration followed the Hungarian revolution. Some people settled in Western Europe while others went overseas, mainly to Canada and the United States. The Hungarian intelligence service seeks among them new candidates for espionage activity.

It is very difficult to assess the strength of the Bulgarian intelligence service. Although the Bulgarians are partners in the

East European intelligence community, their achievements remain hidden from all but the Soviet Union, not because of their exceptional significance—rather the contrary. It is known that the level of loyalty and obedience to Moscow is highest in the Bulgarian service. In view of Bulgaria's territorial position on the southeast flank of Europe, it is probable that her intelligence service devotes special attention to neighboring Greece and Turkey, as well as to Italy and the Arab nations.

The activity of the Romanian intelligence service is circumscribed by the over-all nature of its relationship with the Soviet Union. Romanian tendencies toward an independent foreign policy led to a cooling of relations between the Romanian and other Soviet-bloc services after 1962, degenerating to the point of official, formal, but unproductive contacts. The focus of the Romanian intelligence service is Western Europe, with exceptionally favorable conditions for work in France.

In 1965, when the Russians introduced an innovation—direct contacts between satellite services on a departmental level—Major Stejskal and I were invited to visit our Hungarian colleagues. Stejskal was obessed with the idea of making the visit a show trip to impress the Hungarians and to convince them that the Czechs were even better disinformants than the Russians. A part of the program was a lecture on disinformation methods and techniques given by Stejskal in German for a selected group of Hungarian intelligence employees. He embellished his speech with fantastic examples of operations which had never happened —at least not in the way he described them.

Colonel Houska had made a wise choice in assigning Stejskal as chief of the disinformation department because Stejskal was a born intriguer who loved plotting, trickery, double-dealing and double-crossing, machination, chicanery, and deception games and even made them part of his private life. His personal philosophy was based on the assumption that life is a game of deception in which each person plots against everyone else. I suspected that

in solitary moments he played intrigues against himself in order to kill boredom. As disinformation chief he was the right man in the right place; as a human being he was unbearable.

Stejskal wanted our arrival in Budapest to be flamboyant. He decided not to fly in a regular Czechoslovak Airlines plane but a small four-seat duty airplane. Two days before our departure he was dreaming of how impressed our Hungarian partners would be to see us leaving our own plane. When we landed in Budapest our Hungarian hosts were indeed impressed. Stejskal had become ill and was still vomiting as he left the plane, having made us a couple of crushed, dirty, and stinking vagabonds. It took the Hungarians several hours to change us into decent human beings again. For the trip home they loaned us a car.

Janos Fürjes did not try to conceal the problems and shortcomings of the Hungarian disinformation department he directed. His organization, staffed with ten to fifteen people, had neither the financial means nor the experience of its Czechoslovak counterpart. A significant part of the operational efforts of Hungary's Department D was devoted to Radio Free Europe. The Hungarian intelligence service monitored the broadcasts independently of the Hungarian Press Agency and on that basis planned disinformational actions to mitigate the impact of Radio Free Europe.

All letters sent from Hungary to Radio Free Europe were screened by the Hungarian disinformation department and evaluated individually as to whether or not they could be sent on. On the average, 80 percent of the letters were disqualified. The Hungarian intelligence service created a network of "Radio Free Europe listeners" who posed as students, workers, engineers, or housewives who wrote to the radio station. It was lengthy and laborious work, with consequences that could only be seen in the long run. The objectives of the operation were to mislead the broadcasters of Radio Free Europe as to the desires, interests, and attitudes of its Hungarian audience and to effect a radical shift in programming emphasis from political broadcasts to entertainment and music.

The majority of genuine letters written by Hungarian citizens to Radio Free Europe came from teenagers interested in con-

temporary music. Although their letters were in harmony with the disinformational intentions, they were suppressed for preventative counterintelligence purposes. If the young listener's letter included a return address or some other means of identification, the letter was turned over to the appropriate department within the counterintelligence service. The parents were informed, and an agent talked with him personally, trying to explain the political background of Radio Free Europe, threatening and warning him against continuing to listen and correspond.

Radio Free Europe broadcasts were monitored in all other Soviet-bloc countries as well, of course, but the Hungarian tactic of maintaining daily written contact with the radio organization seemed too tedious to be imitated.

During our visit to Budapest the Hungarians toyed with the idea of an anti-American operation with Cardinal Mindszenty as a scapegoat. Cardinal Mindszenty had been living in a small apartment at the American Embassy in Budapest since 1956. When the Hungarian revolution was crushed he had asked the Americans for protection. From that moment the Hungarian police guarded the embassy building day and night in order to prevent the Americans from smuggling him out of the country. Official relations between the Vatican and the Hungarian government slowly improved, and the Hungarian Communists were willing to permit Mindszenty's departure provided that he would not speak publicly against the Hungarian regime. But until 1971, Mindszenty would not leave the country unless the Communist government withdrew the accusations of treason and disloyalty which had led to his imprisonment in 1949. In September 1971 the seventy-nine-year-old Cardinal finally bowed to the appeal of Pope Paul VI and left Hungary forever. He spared the Americans possible embarrassment from that Hungarian special operation.

What was its basic plan? The Hungarian disinformation department calculated that if Mindszenty had been seriously ill, Hungarian authorities would have readily offered the best medical treatment available in Budapest. After his recuperation Mindszenty would have had to stay in Hungarian hands, of course. Neither Mindszenty nor the Americans would have accepted that offer. If he had died in the American embassy, the Hungarian

disinformation department could have opened a large campaign within European Roman Catholic circles, accusing the Americans of Mindszenty's death and blaming them for sacrificing the Catholic dignitary for political purposes.

As we left Budapest we shook hands with our Hungarian colleagues, promising once more to assist their underdeveloped staff in various ways. In 1967 in Vienna I realized that the Hungarians had taken advantage of this agreement in an unusual way. In the name of the Austrian monarchists they had prepared a leaflet intended to irritate the socialistically orientated segment of the Austrian population. After producing the leaflet they requested that the Czechoslovak intelligence service distribute it in Austria. The leaflets were supposed to be sent by mail from various points in Austria to a large number of newspapers, political organizations, and public officials.

The Czechoslovak station chief in Vienna distributed several thousand leaflets to its employees, all of whom tried to find excuses why they could not participate in an action which they considered ridiculous. It was like a sale where no one wants to buy the merchandise even at a reduced price.

The consequences of the operation were negligible. When the leaflets surfaced, the Austrian monarchist organization stated and proved that it had had nothing to do with them and the operation ended. Several weeks later, although undistributed bales of monarchistic material still littered their offices, members of the Czechoslovak intelligence service received thanks from their Hungarian relatives for their successful cooperation in this venture.

Direct contacts between Czechoslovak and East German disinformation departments were opened in 1965. The first meeting, which took place in Dresden, was organized in an old espionage tradition. Major Stejskal and I came to Dresden to discuss with our East German partners details of "broad mutual cooperation in the sphere of disinformation," a part of a formal agreement which had been signed by General Wolf and Colonel Houska several months before.

Lieutenant Colonel Wagenbrett, chief of the East German disinformation department, and his deputy made contact with us on a street and drove us to a large villa on a hill overlooking the

city. Since this villa was also used as a debriefing place, the rooms were undoubtedly bugged, but Major Stejskal and I were not disturbed by this because we had decided to wait until after our return to Prague to discuss our impressions of our East German counterparts.

Lieutenant Colonel Wagenbrett was a self-confident, jovial man in his late thirties, and together with his younger deputy was a perfect host who tried to make our two-day visit as pleasant as possible. But both sides were cautious. Neither they nor we were prepared to reveal all the strengths and weaknesses of our respective disinformation organizations. Czechoslovak intelligence officers were usually very careful in their contacts with East German partners because of traditional anti-German sentiment and because defections to the West from the East German service occurred quite often.

The first part of the discussion concentrated on Nazis among West German politicians, governmental officials, and diplomats. The last category, as Wagenbrett pointed out, had been successfully attacked abroad by the East German intelligence service, and some diplomats had been withdrawn from their posts. He asked us to join their efforts in hunting every Nazi diplomat from one place to another throughout the world. Priority was to be given to West German representatives in Western Europe and West European integration organizations, such as the European Economic Community, in particular.

The United States was another topic. Wagenbrett indicated that the East German service was preparing extensive documentation of CIA personnel which was to be published in book form some time later, and he asked us to supply them with all available information we had on the subject. We promised to do our best, but we knew that Prague would not be willing to deliver the most valuable data on the CIA for an East German propaganda operation. The East Germans would have reacted the same way if we had made the initiative.

Major Stejskal asked about journalistic disinformation channels that could be used on both sides. He was in fact playing a small deception game because he was not entitled to promise any kind of help but hoped the other side would. The reaction of our

partners confirmed what we had already suspected: the East German intelligence service had access to many publication channels in West Germany. They were prepared in individual cases to allow us use of their channels for launching our operations on the condition that doing so would not compromise their own interests.

When problems of the Third World were discussed and India was emphasized as a country with journalistic disinformation channels easy to use, I knew what both Wagenbrett and Stejskal had in mind—the Indian weekly *Link* which, in the period following our meeting, became a mouthpiece for the German Democratic Republic. But none of us knew at that time that *Link* was actually financed and dominated by the Soviets. *Der Spiegel,* on February 23, 1970, reported that after the Indian magazine had become bankrupt, the publisher. Mrs. Aruna Asif, had accepted a large amount of money as a loan from Moscow through Swiss banks.

The main subject was the last item of our agenda: West German President Heinrich Lübke. His senility had entertained West German politicians and foreign representatives who had met him, and the West German public was amazed by newspaper and magazine reports of their president's latest remarks.

While the East German intelligence service did not spread funny stories about Lübke, it did emphasize his Nazi past. East Germans marshaled all available documents concerning Lübke's career during the Nazi era and launched a campaign which incorporated the following major arguments: In 1934 and 1935, Heinrich Lübke had spent several months in German custody; East German documentation suggested that Lübke had been detained for financial irregularities rather than for a political offense, and in later years, as deputy of the Nazi construction organization *Baugruppe Schlemp* in the Berlin office of Hitler's architect and Reich Minister Albert Speer, Lübke had taken part in building Nazi concentration camps.

East German documents found an audience mainly among anti-establishment elements in the German Federal Republic. There could be no mistake about Lübke's membership in the *Baugruppe Schlemp;* he himself never denied it. The question was whether Lübke had knowingly taken part in building concentration camps or whether the East German material was

forged. This question remained open for Czechoslovakia's Department D as well. In our discussions the East Germans did not openly admit to having fabri ated the Lübke documents, but their pressure on us to "adjust ' several documents about Lübke found in Czechoslovakia implied that forgery had been used in the former case.

Because the *Baugruppe Schlemp*'s scope of activity had extended to occupied Czechoslovak territory, the East German intelligence service requested that Prague search for additional, as yet unknown, documents, which might compromise Lübke politically. After an extensive probe of the Czechoslovak archives in 1965 and 1966, documents were found which Lübke wrote or which at least mentioned him. However, we could not resolve to "improve" their contents. It would have been too risky in view of the gravity of the case. The original documents would have to be made available to Western experts, and the slightest tampering by the Czechoslovak forgery workshop would have unpleasant political repercussions. The Czechoslovak intelligence service had no desire to jeopardize the positive results of Operation Neptune; all the documents employed in that operation were genuine, capable of passing any test by Western experts. Doubts elicited about the validity of the Lübke documents presented by Czechoslovakia might generate suspicion of all documents "discovered" in Czechoslovakia.

In 1966, therefore, Czechoslovakia's Department D merely arranged a press conference at Litomerice, the site where the Nazis, with the help of tens of thousands of prisoners, many of whom lost their lives there, had built a gigantic underground factory for the manufacture of, among other things, German rocket weaponry. The speech to reporters mentioned the fact that the *Baugruppe Schlemp,* and its employee Heinrich Lübke, had worked on similar constructions.

In 1967, Department D published photocopies of several documents dealing with Lübke through *Pragopress,* an unofficial offshoot of the Czechoslovak Press Agency supplying foreign media and Czechoslovak embassies with feature material. None of the documents had sensational value since they merely verified Lübke's employment with the *Baugruppe Schlemp.*

The East German–Czechoslovak action did not cause legal investigation of Lübke's past in West Germany but was at least partially successful. Many West German periodicals delved into the president's career, raising politically provocative questions. It is not without interest that several of Lübke's political friends, and his wife Wilhelmina, contributed, although indirectly and unwittingly, to the success of the East German operation.

Professor Arthur Büllow, a lawyer and former West German state secretary, prepared a voluminous brief in Lübke's defense, dealing with his internment in the years 1934 and 1935. The analysis was intended to show that Lübke was detained for political rather than criminal activity. *Der Spiegel,* No. 48, 1968, reported that Professor Büllow also scored Dr. Bernhard Kaehlig, a lawyer living in Hanover, who was the prosecutor in the Lübke case in 1934–35. Dr. Kaehlig refused to accept Dr. Büllow's assertions in silence and expressed willingness for a judicial investigation, adding the opinion that Lübke's offense was not political.

The climax of this operation was the initiation in 1968 of proceedings against the West German president's wife for an offense which was understandable in a woman of her age, but hardly tolerable for the wife of such a prominent figure. According to West German press reports, Wilhelmina Lübke's personal documents recorded her as ten years younger than she actually was, listing her birth date as 1895 instead of 1885. In March 1968, a group of West German citizens filed a complaint against Mrs. Lübke, on suspicion that the birth date on her personal documents was forged. The error had occurred in 1947, when an official mistakenly wrote her year of birth as 1895, but the error persisted in subsequent documents, to the time when Wilhelmina Lübke was the first lady of the German Federal Republic. Proceedings against Mrs. Lübke were halted at the end of 1968, since statutory authority for considering the factual substance of the case had expired in 1959. The offense in question was so minor, according to the court, that the inquiry was discontinued. Mrs. Lübke responded to the incident by avowing that it had never occurred to her that such a thing was criminal. The reputation of President Lübke's family, however, had suffered another blemish.

Thus the business begun in East Berlin ended in West Germany, with the assistance of the president's wife which neither the East German nor Czechoslovak Department D could have envisioned.

A year after the 1968 climax of the Lübke operation I was reminded again of the Dresden meeting with East German disinformants. Browsing in a bookstore in Washington, D.C., I discovered a book, *Who's Who in the CIA,* published in Berlin in 1968 by Julius Mader. It occurred to me that this was probably the final product of an operation by East Germany's disinformation department to which the Czechs had been asked to contribute in 1965.

The book, proffering a *curriculum vitae* of American intelligence employees, raised several questions. Either this book contained correct information, in which case no individual or group of researchers could possibly have obtained all the data from legally accessible material, and the source must have been a Communist intelligence department; or the information had been culled from material published in the West, such as various editions of *Who's Who,* directories, telephone and diplomatic listings, and so forth, in which case many of the people designated by the book's author as CIA employees might be so listed only on the basis of intuition and blind guesses, assuming that the author sometimes hit the mark. The book seemed to be constructed from both of these sources. It attempted to gain the reader's confidence with verifiable data while interpolating the names of a broad circle of American diplomats, newsmen, public officials, bureaucrats, Peace Corps Volunteers, and USIA employees, thereby complicating their working conditions abroad. In the book's Preface the author himself acknowledged it as a warning "of the CIA machinations" to "the people of all nations." Mader accused the United States, and the CIA in particular, of all possible intrigues, including the employment of "dirty methods of subversion and psychological warfare," although the book itself is an example of those very methods.

To most Western and especially American readers, the name Julius Mader means no more than does his publisher's address—1066 Berlin, W 66, Mauerstrasse 69 (the publisher is Mader him-

self). The inexperienced reader can fall into the same trap as did United States Senator Joseph Clark. As the author of books dealing mainly with espionage, Julius Mader corresponds with various personnel working in Western archives and organizations. Sometimes he receives the information he requests, sometimes merely a courtesy reply. In *Who's Who in the CIA*, Mader published a letter from Joseph Clark, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which said:

March 9, 1967

Dear Dr. Mader:
Thank you for your letter of December 30, 1966, which I am sorry not to have answered sooner. It was kind of you to take the trouble to suggest additional readings on the CIA.

Sincerely,
Joseph S. Clark

This letter, with its two courtesy sentences, inspired Mader to claim that he, the publisher, "had helped the United States Senate in investigations against the CIA," an assertion as absurd as if it had been made by General Agayants, then chief of the Soviet disinformation service.

The Moscow Center

"Agayants is coming. I hope you realize what an honor it is for our service and especially for your department," Colonel Houska said.

General Ivan Ivanovich Agayants, chief of the Soviet disinformation department, showed us no special attention by his visit in 1965. Before coming to Prague he was in Budapest and East Berlin and thereafter in other capitals of his disinformation empire. He came not to share his experience but to inspect us and gain direct information on the capacity and effectiveness of the new satellite disinformation departments he manipulated from Moscow.

His visit confirmed my expectation. He told us nothing about Soviet disinformation methods or successful operations. He pre-

ferred to listen and answered our questions politely but only in general terms.

General Agayants, a thin, tall Armenian with a trim gray mustache, did not look at all like a Communist revolutionary. Well dressed and soft spoken in the manner of an old Russian aristocrat, he was more a figure from a Tolstoy novel than one of the world's most important intriguers. He could discuss Russian classic literature and old Russian painters for hours, admiring their descriptive realism. Only twice did he express dissatisfaction. Long-legged chorus girls in Prague's "Alhambra" cabaret and exhibitions of modern surrealistic painters implied to him that Prague's atmosphere had become too liberal and that Western decadence had penetrated Czechoslovakia's socialist culture.

While the Czechoslovak intelligence service was the second largest producer of disinformation in the Soviet bloc, it would be deceptive to measure Soviet disinformation activities only by Czechoslovak standards. Without a doubt the Soviets had many more people, greater financial means, and more disinformation channels at their disposal. While Czechs were mostly involved in black propaganda actions in the Third World, the Soviets probably concentrated on long-term influence operations in an attempt to deceive not only the public but the decision-makers of major non-Communist countries.

In several official sessions, Agayants praised our accomplishments. He was favorably impressed with all branches of our department, and he was particularly interested in the system of documentation and control of special operations, introduced by our department to prevent operational mistakes before launching any operation.

"What about the People's Republic of China? Do you think it is time to start direct operations against them?" I asked during one session. The first period of the Sino-Soviet split, roughly to 1962, was a period of passivity for Soviet-bloc intelligence activities, since the schism manifested itself primarily in a sphere in which intelligence had no legitimate voice—ideology. The second period, 1962–65, involved the investigation of Chinese influence and the collection of information regarding Chinese subversion in non-Communist areas. Not until 1965 did satellite intelligence

services receive approval to develop anti-Chinese special operations.

"I think," General Agayants said, "that it is our common duty from now on to stop Chinese penetration of the international Communist movement and in relation to Western powers to show China as the main present and future troublemaker."

One problem concerned him more than any other. He said that the Soviet Union attached great importance to the situation in Syria. Referring to the influence of the Soviet disinformation department on two Syrian newspapers, he added that the position of the Soviet intelligence service was threatened and requested our department to become active in Syria.

With the exception of the new emphasis on the People's Republic of China, Agayants' visit to Prague brought no changes in the orientation and daily routine of the Czechoslovak disinformation factory. The organizational structure, as well as methods and channels of Soviet influence, remained the same.

The subordination of the Czechoslovak intelligence service was threefold. An official line of command extended from the Minister of the Interior and the Prime Minister to President Novotny, who was at the same time the First Secretary of the Party. The chief of the intelligence service was in daily contact with the Minister of the Interior, who consulted on problematical special operation proposals with a department of the Party's Central Committee Secretariat or, if necessary, with the First Secretary himself. Although both of these institutions could reject or approve operations, their signatures never appeared on any proposal. The Minister of the Interior took all responsibility for such authorization.

The second line of subordination ran directly from the intelligence apparatus to the Central Committee Secretariat and from there again to the First Secretary, who held responsibility for directing state security matters. The Secretariat was informed of all significant questions concerning intelligence activities and directed the Party organization within the intelligence apparatus. All leadership positions in the intelligence service, beginning with the departmental deputy chiefs, could be staffed by new employees only with the approval of the Central Committee Secre-

tariat. The Party organization within the intelligence service could not directly influence the content of intelligence activities, but it did share responsibility in personnel questions. Every promotion or long-term assignment of an officer abroad also depended on the approval of the Party's intelligence organization.

The third and most important line of subordination led from the Czechoslovak to the Soviet intelligence service. During the first few years of my intelligence career Soviet presence in the Czechoslovak intelligence service did not strike me as unusual. To me, the Soviet advisors were experienced professionals who were helping us; as a disciplined Party member I accepted the theory of a Soviet leading role in every sphere of Soviet-bloc political life. Only very slowly and hesitantly did I admit to myself that a conflict existed between Czechoslovak and Soviet foreign interests. The reports of Czechoslovak agents from abroad were not used for independent Czechoslovak foreign-policy actions. In all important foreign-policy questions the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, who received the intelligence reports, waited for Soviet initiative or directives. The Soviet intelligence service, on the other hand, appreciated the accomplishments of the Czechoslovak service whether they were the acquisition of secret information and documents or special operations carried out against political enemies.

The direction of satellite intelligence activity stems from the center in Moscow, as with all Soviet-bloc foreign policy. The inspirational, directive, coordinating, and controlling roles of the Soviet intelligence service are assured along the lines of ideological-political influence, organizational-operational influence, and personnel influence.

Communist doctrine as a creed stresses the international nature of the proletarian revolution. The Soviet interpretation of proletarian internationalism, that is, its identification with the superpower interests of the USSR, became the theoretical base for the expansion and manipulation of countries which installed Communist regimes, either with Soviet help or by themselves. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet exposition of proletarian internationalism and the interrelationships of socialist countries was subjected to sharp criticism. A certain segment of

the international Communist movement (mainly the Communist Parties operating in non-Communist countries with democratic parliamentary regimes), with an eye to its own position and aware of the danger that Soviet policies could induce voter defection from Communist Parties, raised objections. Soviet leaders not only rejected this criticism but contributed a new theory to the storehouse of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, that of limited sovereignty which was to facilitate Soviet manipulation of socialist states.

The application of the Soviet version of proletarian internationalism to relations between Soviet and satellite intelligence services rests on a theory of international responsibilities and national interests of Communist intelligence agencies. Under the mask of international obligation is hidden the imperative of absolute obedience to the fulfillment of the line and aims of the intelligence center in Moscow.

The ideological-political influence of the Soviet intelligence service on the satellite services is directly contingent on the current climate within the bloc as a whole and on the pliability and obedience of satellite governments and Party apparatuses. If the leading governmental and Party organs acknowledge the USSR as the ideological and political center of the Communist movement, it is understandable that the Soviet interpretation of Marxism-Leninism is primarily applied in state securities, the pillar of a pro-Soviet regime. Soviet officials attach importance to ideological influence not only because convinced adherents are obedient to the administrator's order but also because they are capable of independent initiative.

The organizational and operational influence of the Soviet intelligence service can be seen in the daily activities of the satellite services, which are structured along the lines of the Soviet model under Moscow's close surveillance. This organizational scheme, the intelligence service, its departments, and divisions, is adjusted to Soviet needs without regard to the interests of the satellite state.

The organizational structure of Czechoslovakia's state security apparatus has been subjected to many changes since 1948, but each was effected either on the basis of Soviet "recommendations"

or in consideration of such views. Advisors not only gave advice to employees of the satellite service but also had the power to command. In 1948, the first group of advisors headed by Likhachev, who was later hanged by the Soviets as a member of the Beria group, arrived in Prague and arranged political trials to which many Czechoslovak citizens, including the Party's General Secretary Rudolf Slansky, fell victim. In most cases, the interrogations were conducted by Czechs, but on occasion, as in Slansky's case, advisors personally attended the questioning sessions. The number of advisors gradually grew as the state security apparatus enlarged under their influence. Not one but several advisors were attached to each component of state security such as intelligence, counterintelligence, and military counterintelligence departments. At their head was a chief advisor, usually with the rank of general, who simultaneously served as personal consultant to the Minister of the Interior. In 1963 and 1964 their formal title became that of liaison officer, but even though certain operational methods had changed, the primary mission remained the same. Until that time, the advisors had personally directed every operation and decided even the most minute details. Before signing a written proposal for any kind of intelligence operations, the first question always was "Does the advisor agree?" After an affirmative response, the proposal was endorsed by the authorized official.

Because the Czechoslovak intelligence service proved an apt pupil, the Soviets permitted a modification; after 1964, they left details to the responsibility of their Czechoslovak partners and monitored only the major problems. Continuity was maintained to the extent that any intelligence document deemed interesting by the advisors, including reports from Czechoslovak agents, was sent to Moscow. Important information was dispatched immediately in a coded telegram; if time was not a crucial factor, Czechoslovak documents were turned over to a special advisory secretariat staffed with especially trustworthy men who translated all the material into Russian and sent it by Soviet courier to headquarters. Thus, the Soviet service kept detailed files on the Czechoslovak intelligence service, including knowledge of each agent.

Advisors were present at all important intelligence service

staff meetings, and their opinions had decisive impact. The line of advisory command is hierarchically formulated so that high-level advisors can veto the decisions of lower ones. For example, the opinions of a low-level advisor assigned to monitor one or several departments can be vetoed or modified by the chief intelligence advisor, who in turn can be overruled by the chief advisor to the Minister of the Interior. This system of multilevel control prevents the Ministry of the Interior from approving any document without Moscow's consent.

Until 1963, the rank-and-file intelligence officer was in frequent, almost daily communication with his advisor. However, it was difficult to deduce the whole strategic orientation of the Soviet intelligence service from these conversations, since the subjects of these meetings were the banal details of daily work. When Moscow required the fulfillment of certain operational goals, the orders were transmitted through the chief intelligence advisor, and the Czechoslovak intelligence chief then issued the command.

Long-term general plans and collaboration problems are negotiated at the level of official intelligence delegations. This practice was increasingly utilized in the sixties to give the satellite service a sense of importance and formal equality.

With regard to the professional and personal quality of the advisors, it may be said that most of them have had many years of experience in intelligence work abroad, and their professional capabilities are quite high. To spend several pleasant years in the relative luxury of Prague is a change of pace for the Soviet advisors. They live in privacy, isolated from local society save a few higher Czechoslovak intelligence service officials with whom they generally hunt or fish. They maintain a cordial tone but formal aloofness in official contacts. This generalization relates to behavior obviously inspired by instructions. Otherwise there were not only flesh and blood men among them, reeking of human frailty, but also dry products of Russian chauvinism for whom all superlatives applied exclusively to Russia. A second type was insufferable not only for his opinions, but for the penetrating odor of Russian cologne. It was comical to hear pathetic renditions of the heroic deeds and sacrifices of the Soviet people from a man

who was so saturated with cologne that a distinct scent remained after he had left.

Soviet operational influence extends beyond the communication lines between Moscow and the satellite intelligence headquarters; each Czechoslovak station chief abroad is in direct contact with his local Soviet counterpart, who may request on-the-spot aid at any time. Direct interrelations among satellite intelligence services abroad are exceptional and depend on the prior consent of headquarters.

One of the small palaces in an older part of Moscow, which formerly housed families of the Russian aristocracy, conceals the Soviet school for Czechoslovak intelligence officers. The students of espionage arts and sciences from individual satellite countries are separated by nationality in order to maintain anonymity. There is a different school, with its own staff, including guards, for each satellite intelligence organization. The considerable financial burden for their maintenance is borne not by the Soviets but by the satellite services themselves.

From the early fifties, many Czechoslovak officers were selected to attend school in Moscow, the Mecca of intelligence science, which often proved a steppingstone later to the highest positions. The term of instruction was originally two years, shortened in 1964 to one year. Every intelligence course had an enrollment of fifteen to thirty students. In the mid-sixties this number was around ten to fifteen. Although the school's graduates were rewarded with an open door to rapid career progress, the predominant reaction to it within the Czechoslovak intelligence service was one of disdain. The one or two years spent in Moscow were considered a waste of time. The professional curriculum was essentially a repetition of what the students already knew, either through the Czechoslovak intelligence school or from personal experience. Soviet experts had no intention of sharing their latest experience or most modern intelligence techniques with the satellites. In 1964, the leadership of the Czechoslovak and Soviet intelligence services agreed that every Czechoslovak intelligence official, beginning with the rank of deputy departmental chief, must have Soviet training. Despite the fact that the tour of duty was shortened to a year, the majority of the chosen candidates

refused. Several months of pressure and persuasion followed. Those who conformed and went to Moscow were spared, but those who refused were removed from their positions.

The curriculum covered the following major areas: To further the students' indoctrination, Marxism-Leninism was presented in a strictly dogmatic spirit. Even though some of the students had university educations in Marxism-Leninism and were undoubtedly more knowledgeable than the Soviet instructors who lectured on the topic, the Soviet leaders persisted in the ritual. Mechanically repeated answers were required on examinations. Any independently thought-out approaches signaled the danger of ideological deviation rather than a thorough mastery of the subject. Every student continued the study of a major Western language (English, German, French, or Spanish). Professional theory was presented as a generalization of the basic principles of intelligence work. In this part of the program, students learned how to look for and develop intelligence contacts, the methods of recruitment, direction, remuneration, and control of agents, and the methods and problems of covert communications. Professional practice included practical exercises in photography, surveillance, counter-surveillance, the construction of "dead drops," meetings with agents (several Soviet intelligence officers always played the role of agents), and other practical disciplines.

The school is extraordinarily important to the Soviet intelligence service. Soviet experts have an excellent opportunity to familiarize themselves thoroughly with a large portion of the satellite services, to discover the political profiles, personality traits, strengths, and weaknesses of individuals, and to obtain information on those who can be relied upon for staunch support of the Soviet regime—and those, on the other hand, who show various anti-Soviet tendencies, although perhaps in germinal stages. The utility of such practices was manifest in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Poisoning international relations and obstructing understanding among nations is not a rewarding job. My first attempt to escape intelligence work was made in 1964, the same year as my Department D appointment. I submitted a resignation and asked to be dismissed from the service. It was categorically refused.

Leaving a Communist intelligence service is a very difficult task. Once one is involved, there are others responsible for decisions concerning one's own life. The Party, colleagues and superiors, the personnel department, a group of special security officers protecting the apparatus from being penetrated by foreign enemies—all are watching. A Communist intelligence service would rather keep its rebellious officers behind bars to insure silence than let them go, thereby risking that criticism, disillusion, or hatred toward the service will result in defection or top-secret information leakage. In 1964 one of my colleagues from the department of foreign counterintelligence was arrested. He was accused of being a member of an underground organization planning to overthrow the regime and to establish a pro-Chinese government. When he and some friends who were government officials had met at private parties, they criticized the First Secretary of the Party, Novotny, and his close associates. It was impossible to establish any connection between these dissidents and the West; so the Secretariat of the Central Committee invented the theory that they were Maoists and ordered their arrest.

Soviet advisors in Prague said that the relation between a Communist intelligence officer and his service is a life-death contract. There were exceptions, even if very few; in some cases the intelligence service would fire an employee. Every such case, however, was carefully studied and handled individually. If the reason for an officer's dismissal was not political, he might be helped to get a good position in the state hierarchy outside the Ministry of the Interior; if there were political reasons, but not serious enough to arrest him, he was on his own—under surveillance, prohibited from traveling abroad, his correspondence checked, and obstructed from starting a career he would like.

In 1965 the Czechoslovak chief of the German operational department offered me a position at the intelligence station in Vienna, combined with the diplomatic cover of press attaché. It was more than a year before Colonel Houska approved my leaving Department D and signed a document bringing me to Vienna in December 1966. While in Vienna I was still a part of the intelligence apparatus, but at least I was out of the disinformation department and the position of press attaché was valuable experi-

ence for realizing my goal of teaching at the School of Journalism in Prague. I knew that breaking the contract with the intelligence service would be difficult and risky, but I hoped that my four-year assignment in Vienna would give me time to organize my strategy. I could not know in 1966 that not even two years later the Russians would help solve my problem.

5

Victim

Communist Czechoslovakia was for a long time among the most faithful of Soviet allies and a very active and successful creator of psychological warfare operations against the non-Communist world. In 1968 Czechoslovakia herself became target and victim of Soviet-bloc special operations. A description of Soviet-bloc special operations against Czechoslovakia from my perspective as an observer in Vienna and as a participant in the clash between liberal and conservative forces within the Czechoslovak intelligence service will help to explain Soviet successes in August of 1968.

One December day in 1967 I left Vienna for Prague. The intelligence headquarters was evaluating my first year on the job in Austria, and I was to give my personal comments.

Every trip home was a distressing experience because in crossing the Czechoslovak border one had to face the barbed wire electric fence, border villages with houses falling apart, and apathetic, disillusioned people whose needs and hopes had been forgotten by the ruling Party bosses. Czechoslovakia, once a highly developed country, had become the victim of economic and political mismanagement and a paradise for idlers and empty-headed babblers.

Shortly after the first Czechoslovak border village I saw a man waving for a ride. I stopped the car and opened the door. He hesitated a moment but then stepped in. When I started the

car again he addressed me in broken German apologizing for troubling me.

"You can speak Czech with me because I am your countryman," I said.

"Are you an emigré coming home?" he asked.

"No, I am not. I am with our legation in Vienna."

"You're a lucky man," he said.

"Why do you think so?"

"Well, you can travel abroad, you can go out and forget the misery we are in."

I did not comment on his remark. Was I really a lucky man? The year I had spent in Austria had been a very busy one. Acting as a case officer for several agents, looking for new candidates for agents among Austrians and West Germans, and carrying out the duties combined with my diplomatic cover was an all-consuming job. As a press attaché of the Czechoslovak Legation in Austria, I often had to defend events which were indefensible. In June 1967 Czechoslovakia blindly followed the Soviet example and broke diplomatic relations with Israel immediately after the beginning of the war. Czechoslovak media presented a totally one-sided picture of the situation in the Middle East, suppressing all facts favorable to Israel and characterizing the country only as an instrument of American imperialism. As the press attaché, I had to study the coverage of the war by West European media, and I was embarrassed to discover that the arguments of the Czechoslovak government and press—especially *Rude Pravo*, the Communist Party daily—was very similar to that of the West German neo-Nazi weekly *Deutsche National Zeitung*. Thus, as a spokesman for the Czechoslovak legation, I found myself in official sympathy with old Nazis. The official Czechoslovak view was in contrast to the genuine sympathies of Czechs and Slovaks for Israel. Israel's fight for existence and survival was considered as a parallel to the Czechoslovak situation in 1938, although at that time Czechs and Slovaks were prevented from fighting by West European powers and so lost to Hitler.

In August of 1967 Czechoslovak border guards shot at a Czech family with several children trying to escape to Austria, wounded several of them, caught their twelve-year-old son Tibor, and held

him as hostage while the rest of the family reached Austrian territory. Two similar incidents occurred during the following two weeks, ending with the death of a Czech and an East German youngster. I was ashamed when I had to face foreign correspondents and explain to them that the drastic Czechoslovak border rules were justified by the threat of infiltration by Western spies. I knew very well that Western spies no longer crawled over barbed wire fences; they entered Czechoslovak territory in luxurious cars, by planes or trains, supplied with valid Czechoslovak visas just as did Czechoslovak spies going in the opposite direction. I sent several telegrams and reports to Prague asking for Tibor's release and felt some satisfaction when the government decided to release him after the first wave of an anti-Czechoslovak campaign in the Western press.

The situation in Czechoslovakia promised no change for the better. Antonin Novotny suppressed the June 1967 rebellion of the Czechoslovak writers who had tried to challenge the Party's dogmatism, and both the counterintelligence and intelligence services helped him to do the job.

In the early sixties Novotny had been greatly irritated with the Paris-based review *Svedectvi,* published in Czech and edited by Pavel Tigrid, a Czech journalist who had been living in exile since 1948. From time to time the review published authentic classified Party documents from Prague disclosing Party tactics against the population and articles from Czechoslovak writers and journalists who used *Svedectvi* as a forum for freely expressed opinions. Novotny urged the state security apparatus to initiate effective countermeasures, and Lieutenant Colonel Molnar, deputy chief of the regional counterintelligence service in Prague, took the leading role in fulfilling Novotny's order. Molnar spread his nets and found traces which finally led to the arrest of writer Jan Benes and film director Karel Zamecnik in August 1966. Molnar's people succeeded in intercepting several letters believed to have been written by Benes and published in *Svedectvi,* but preparations for the trial of Benes, Zamecnik, and Tigrid were protracted. The former cooperation between police, prosecutor, and judge, typical in political trials in the fifties, failed to materialize as Molnar wished. He indeed possessed letters pre-

sumably written by Benes, but they had been obtained illegally by surveillance of correspondence.

Molnar knew that the Benes-Tigrid-Zamecnik case could mean a decisive change in his career—an opportunity to clean his Party record which had been stained since his dismissal from the intelligence service. He turned for assistance to Colonel Houska, requesting that copies of the incriminating letters be sent anonymously to the Ministry of the Interior from Vienna with a cover letter. It was to be the "patriotic deed" of an emigré or Communist sympathizer.

The trial convened in July 1967, shortly after the stormy congress of Czechoslovak writers where author Ludvik Vaculik, in a courageous speech, had said:

> I am speaking as the citizen of a state which I will never renounce but in which I cannot lead a satisfactory life. Although my mind is full of issues relevant to all citizens, I find myself in a delicate situation: I am also a member of the Communist Party, and I should not and do not want to talk about Party matters. . . . It must be admitted that no one human problem has been solved in the last twenty years—from such elementary needs as housing, schools, and economic prosperity to more subtle needs which the undemocratic systems of the world cannot provide: a feeling of one's full worth in society, a feeling that politics is subordinate to ethics, a belief in the meaning of humble work, the need for confidence among people, the advancement of education for the people. And I am afraid we have not taken our proper place in the world arena. I have the feeling that our republic has lost its good name.*

Novotny struck back in order to stop the intellectual rebellion. Pavel Tigrid was sentenced *in absentia* to fourteen years, Jan Benes to five, Karel Zamecnik was acquitted; Ludvik Vaculik, together with several other writers, was expelled from the Party, and *Literarni Noviny*—a press organ of the Czechoslovak Writer's Union—was taken away from them and subordinated to the Ministry of Culture.

But *Svedectvi*'s popularity among Czech and Slovak intel-

* *The Protocol of the Fourth Czechoslovak Writers' Congress* (Prague: Ceskoslovensky spisovatel, 1968).

lectuals was not challenged. Now it was the intelligence service's turn to take measures against Pavel Tigrid—to sever his contacts with Czechoslovak writers and to discredit him in a campaign based on rumors. Rumors are a political fact of life in any form of government. Through this invisible delivery system reports are spread from ear to ear, with subsequent distortion of the original message which, intentionally or not, was leaked from the circle of the "informed." In Communist countries, the conditions for disseminating rumors are quite favorable because the range of state interests, classified or unclassified, is so broad that an individual in search of the truth in a matter that does not correspond to the Party line will meet an insurmountable wall of opposition and threat.

Before and during the trial, intelligence and counterintelligence employees, working jointly, spread rumors that Tigrid was in fact a long-time Communist agent responsible for the arrests of Benes and Zamecnik. Remarks of this type were dispersed through Prague's literary circles and transplanted abroad, mainly to France.

When I arrived in Prague in December 1967 and asked my former subordinates about the results of the rumor campaign against the writers, an operation I had become acquainted with on my previous visits to Prague, they were unable to give me a satisfactory answer. It was still too early to judge the operation's success or failure. At that time personnel at headquarters was not interested in charting fluctuations in Pavel Tigrid's popularity in Czechoslovakia. Rumors were circulating that Novotny's position was in danger. Through his son, who had friends among intelligence officers, Novotny let the intelligence service know that if he were overthrown the service would be deprived of his protective hand and would be purged by the pseudo-liberals. He passed similar messages to other sectors of the state security apparatus, hoping that its members would come to his aid if requested.

No other messages were received from Novotny and the secret police remained uninvolved. It came as a surprise when the Czechoslovak press announced during the first week of Janu-

ary 1968 that Novotny had been replaced as the First Secretary of the Party by Alexander Dubcek, but initial public reaction was indifferent. After twenty years of political reversals, contradictory pronouncements, and sudden changes in Party politics, the Czechoslovak public assumed that the new changes were merely a further round in a circle of meaningless change.

When the news of Dubcek's assignment as First Secretary reached Vienna and I asked one of my intelligence service colleagues his opinion, he said: "Dubcek? Don't be ridiculous, he won't introduce any changes, at least not in the Ministry of the Interior. After all, even Dubcek will need someone to protect him, just as Novotny did. Politicians come and go, but the police stay; we will always be needed."

Fear

Czechoslovakia's political spring of 1968 was neither anti-socialist nor anti-Communist. Many Communists who took part in the democratization process considered it the last chance for communism in Czechoslovakia; their leading motive was to save communism, to give it new life, to restore the people's trust in the Party. While Dubcek and his closest associates saw the changes as moderate reforms, most Communist intellectuals shared the views of the majority that only a socialistically oriented democracy could carry the country through her political, economic, and moral crises. They thought that the revival of communism was possible only if the Party would openly admit its mistakes, punish all those responsible for the crimes of the old regime, and install a completely new type of political and economic management based on democratic principles.

At the beginning of February 1968 the public was still hesitant to believe that the new Party leaders were heading in that direction; some of Dubcek's associates, such as Josef Smrkovsky, who later became chairman of the National Assembly, had to encourage people to speak out openly and critically. They did not think that soliciting public support would change the focus of

their initial intentions, but by March, Czechoslovakia was a boiling political cauldron.

The Czechoslovak Communist Party, its apparatus, and the methods and practices of the state security department were subjected to sharp criticism. The standard Soviet economic model of socialism was criticized and rejected as unsuitable for Czechoslovak conditions. In public, the discussion of the ideological problems of Marxism-Leninism continued regardless of whether or not the expressed views conformed to official Soviet interpretations. The press could present different views and opinions because it was no longer censored. On March 14, the Czechoslovak Press Agency published a statement by Czechoslovak censors in which they said that the Central Publication Board (the official name of the censorship organ) had been established in 1953 with no legal basis by a mere government decree, and they called for an end to censorship.

It was like a dream. There was hope that Czechoslovakia would free herself from stupid practices, illegal acts, and the Big Lie which had dominated the country for two decades. An independent foreign policy could be a beginning for a new intelligence service ruled only by Czechs and Slovaks and working only for the interests of the country. It was only a chance, but it seemed better to attempt a change rather than sit idly by.

By the end of February I had submitted to Prague intelligence and Party authorities a memorandum outlining the aims and dimensions of a new Czechoslovak intelligence service, and I was pleased to discover that there were people in the service who shared my ideas of removing the service from the Ministry of the Interior, abandoning its police character, and subordinating it directly to the Prime Minister. It should be given a new orientation to reflect honestly Czechoslovakia's foreign interests, to reduce the number of intelligence employees, and to provide it with a firm legal, political, and moral base including the possibility of being controlled by the government and the parliament. The idealism which encouraged the formulation of these goals was as naive as it was inflammatory. We had forgotten how deeply enmeshed the Czechoslovak intelligence service was with the Big Soviet Brother and how small were our chances of success.

The call of the Czechoslovak censors and the discussions among intelligence personnel about the future of the intelligence service reflected only partially what was taking place within the Ministry of the Interior. Every day press, radio, and television revealed new facts about the political show trials of the 1950s, the brutality of the investigators, and the tragic fates of the victims. Nearly all state security officers who had been involved in these actions were still on duty. The public demanded complete exposure of those who bore responsibility and punishment for those who were guilty. It was not unusual to see clippings from newspapers dealing with trials pasted on the apartment doors of certain state security officers with the caption, "Here lives a murderer." The Ministry of the Interior was filled with fear.

The avalanche of political show trials against Communists had begun later in Czechoslovakia than in the other Soviet-bloc states. Laszlo Rajk, Hungarian foreign minister, had been executed in October 1949; Traicho Kostov, the Bulgarian deputy premier, had followed in December of the same year; and Moscow's pressure for more radical measures against "anti-socialist and hostile forces" within the Communist parties had been growing. While Czechoslovakia's President and Party Chairman Klement Gottwald had approved prosecution of anti-Communists as far back as 1948, he had resisted pressures to open wide the floodgates to trials of Communist Party members. Stalin's theory of the sharpening of the class struggle under socialism prevailed, however, and Gottwald was forced to give in. In 1952 he sent to the gallows his closest associate of many years, Party General Secretary Rudolf Slansky, and with him and after him many other prominent Party members.

In 1956, when Khrushchev exposed the evils of the Stalinist system and its methods as well as the background of soviet political trials, the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC) leadership met to follow the example of its Big Soviet Brother and to make a similar analysis of its own situation. But it failed to muster enough courage to initiate a thorough process of rehabilitation. Only Dr. Alexei Cepicka, defense minister and member of the Party Presidium, was removed from office and branded the principal bearer of the "personality cult" in Czechoslovakia. A few of the more bla-

tantly compromised officers of the state security service were arrested. The Party's then First Secretary Antonin Novotny authorized the formation of a commission which was to review the validity of some carefully selected trials, but neither he nor the chairman of this commission, Interior Minister Rudolf Barak, was ready to permit an honest reexamination of the trials and rehabilitation of the victims. Antonin Novotny refused to admit that, as first secretary since 1953, he shared responsibility for the political trials, especially for the fact that as late as 1954 a wave of executions had taken place in Czechoslovakia. When in 1963 a new KSC rehabilitation commission completed its investigation, the public again was not told the full truth. In fact, evaluating the personality cult period in 1964, Novotny stated that those who were responsible for initiating the excesses had finally become the victims of their own evil doings. Thus, according to Novotny, everything was in the best of order.

The term "rehabilitation," as well as its implementation, was handled with the greatest degree of caution and tact. Those not executed and quietly pardoned, who returned from prisons in the late fifties or early sixties with broken bodies and bitter hearts, were to be forgotten. They had the choice of accepting menial employment and again humbly bowing to Party dictates or of living quietly in retirement. Most of them chose the latter alternative.

In the spring of 1968 the public began asking itself ever more searching questions. If it was possible to organize show trials of prominent personalities who had been thought "untouchable," what was the truth concerning the lesser trials in the regions and districts which had not received as much publicity? Doubts arose about the justice of trials even of Church dignitaries and landowners, all of whom had traditionally been branded as potential enemies of socialism. In these cases, however, the Party allowed no questioning as to the validity of the sentences but justified the mass nature of these trials since 1948 by insisting on the existence of a widespread anti-Communist conspiracy.

It was only after January 1968, when the last secrets of the Slansky trial were unveiled, that the public and newspapermen focused fully on the trials of non-Communists. These included

the trial of the so-called subversive anti-state group led by Milada Horakova, a member of parliament representing the National Socialist Party. This trial would enter the history of postwar Czechoslovakia as the first in a long series, as a dress rehearsal for the trial of Slansky and others.

Dr. Milada Horakova was an official of the National Socialist Party and the women's movement in prewar Czechoslovakia. She was arrested by the Nazis in 1940 for her part in the anti-fascist struggle and until the liberation in 1945 was held in a concentration camp. After the war, she again became active in political life as a member of the Central Committee of the National Socialist Party and as a deputy in parliament. The tense political situation in 1948 climaxed in the death of Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk. The official announcement that his death was a suicide generated severe doubts, and Milada Horakova, in an act of defiance, resigned her seat in parliament. This was followed by the exodus from Czechoslovakia of many non-Communist ministers, deputies, and politicians to the West, but Milada Horakova remained in Prague. She was arrested on September 27, 1949, and charged with preparation of an anti-state conspiracy with the aim of overthrowing the people's democratic regime. Eight months later, she was sent "in the name of the Republic" to the gallows. Her last words under the gallows were: "I have lost, I die like a soldier—with honor. I love my country and its people. . . . I wish for you. . . . I wish you. . . ."

She was not allowed to finish.

Eighteen years passed before the Czechoslovak Supreme Court recalled the sentence on Milada Horakova in July 1968 pronouncing it unlawful—thanks to several Czechoslovak journalists. They believed it was their duty to find the truth about Horakova and others, since it was impossible to build socialism with a human face based on uncertainties and suppressed facts about tragic past mistakes and crimes.

A team of editorial members of the Socialist Party daily *Svobodne Slovo* invited Vaclav Pesek to their offices for a conversation. Strangely enough, he came, though he must have suspected what was behind the invitation. Pesek had been one of

the interrogators of Milada Horakova. The interview was published by *Svobodne Slovo,* June 2, 1968:

"Yes, my name is Vaclav Pesek and I was one of the investigators and later interrogators of Horakova. What didn't I like? In the whole case, I didn't like the fact that one investigator didn't know what the others were doing."

"Prior to the investigation, what did you know about the Horakova group?"

"Someone told us in the Ruzyne prison that this was a big case."

"Who told you this?"

Pesek thought for a long while and then answered:

"Moucka, yes, Milan Moucka. You must understand that we were confronted with a case that had already been decided [by the Party]; we didn't know the background, no one could blame us for moving slowly. Right at the beginning, Svab* came to see us and shouted 'you think with your asses and not your heads. Watch out, or you will end up with them!' This was like a cold shower and naturally from then on we went after it a little harder. But believe me, with Horakova we used no physical violence."

"Did you interrogate at night?"

"Oh, yes, there were long sessions during the day and night. But Horakova had enough time for sleep.

"Wasn't there someone else who interrogated Dr. Horakova when you were tried or when you were away?"

"I know nothing about this, but it's possible."

"It was said about Dr. Horakova that the court had proved that she favored a war. Is this true?"

"I asked her about this during the interrogation. She didn't say so to me; in fact, she steadfastly denied it. I finally told her that it didn't make any difference what she said, as long as others were saying otherwise. You know, I and all the other investigators believed that Horakova would never get the rope. I even told her quite frankly that she needn't be afraid. No, she certainly should not have gotten the rope."

* Karel Svab was Deputy Minister of National Security and later became a victim in the purge. In February 1951 he was arrested, accused of espionage for the West with the intent to overthrow the government, and the following year tried and executed as a member of the "Slansky group."

"How did she live in Ruzyne?" another journalist asked.
"I don't know."
"How did you yourself treat her?"
"I once shouted at her because she was a very smart woman and I couldn't keep up with her. You can imagine, it was difficult, she kept changing her statements. . . ."

Vaclav Pesek kept stressing that as an interrogator he had not behaved badly and that he had never beaten any prisoners. When after a two-hour conversation, the newspapermen were saying good-bye, he started crying: "I beg you, do everything to expose all the horror of the fifties. I have growing children . . . you know . . . yes, I beat prisoners, I did, sometimes even with a night stick."

The spring of 1968 revealed the moral degeneration of the previous period and with it the determination to attempt honestly and sincerely to repair the horrible acts of the past. The publication of the tragic fate of many people was meant not as an attack on citizens' nerves and hearts but as a solemn warning for the future. The Czechoslovak Communist Party, however, was unwilling to take full responsibility for past crimes. They excused themselves by claiming that it was not the Party but a few individuals who were guilty.

Lieutenant Colonel Bohumil Doubek, once chief of the investigation department of the Ministry of the Interior, felt differently. In 1955 he was arrested and made a formal statement telling the truth about the interrogation methods. A year later, at an all-state Party conference, Rudolf Barak criticized Doubek for inconsistency during the trial of Slansky and his co-defendants. In 1957, the higher military court in Pribram sentenced Doubek to nine years in prison. Through two amnesties, his sentence was reduced to four years, and he was released after two and a half years because of good behavior. Doubek was interviewed by journalists from the Slovak daily *Smena*,

I do not want to comment on the trials. I said everything and in detail when I was arrested in 1955. I admitted my guilt and I admit it today. I was punished for my share of the responsibility. The guilt I carry in the eyes of my children and the remorse for what

I have done will be with me to the end of my days. My share cannot be minimized; it is connected with everything that was then going on at the Ministry of the Interior. These were tragic events. When I brought the interrogation materials to the Ministers, be it Kopriva or Bacilek, their first question was "have the Soviet advisors seen the materials?" If not, I had to take them back and let the Soviets review and approve them before they were submitted to the minister. I don't want to use the advisors as an excuse and I don't want to talk about them. Only this: the fact that they were here cannot be denied. You ask why I left the Interior Ministry even before my arrest. I didn't want to be there anymore. I had had it up to here. No, it was not my conscience, although I don't mean to say that I don't have any. I knew there would be death sentences, but I believed to the last minute that they would not be carried out. When they were, it was a terrible blow to me. I, better than anyone, knew whether these people were guilty or not. Their deaths had a horrible effect on me. I attended the execution of Dr. Clementis [who succeeded Jan Masaryk as Foreign Minister and was arrested in 1950 and in 1952 sentenced to death as a defendant in the Slansky trial] in December 1952. It was a terrible night. I didn't stay till the end. I've had enough. I am no angel but after that I had had enough. Why? I knew these people, the accused, I got to know them well. Whether one likes it or not, a certain relationship develops between the accused and the interrogators, even though they stand on opposite sides of the barricade. Clementis behaved bravely before the execution. He was a human being and a brave man. I don't want to minimize my responsibility. I am at the end of my life. I believed in everything but even that is no justification. I did not want to harm but I did cause great harm, I am aware of my guilt. You ask where one should search for the roots of all this evil. There were the well-known influences from abroad, as well as our own internal situation. An erroneous understanding and interpretation of Party discipline also played a role. When I got out of prison in 1958, I learned that it is said that I and Kohoutek [another interrogator and co-defendant in Doubek's trial] are the only two responsible for all the crimes. I disagree with this. Is it conceivable that all this was done exclusively by me and Kohoutek? Could I or Kohoutek, for example, have ordered the arrest of the Party's General Secretary, Rudolf Slansky? Could I have influenced the sentences?

In the spring of 1968 Prague's Interior Ministry officials who were lucky enough to wear civilian clothes crept to work every morning making sure that no one saw them enter one of the infamous buildings. Among them were those who were guilty of nothing. But by now the public did not differentiate. "What will tomorrow bring?" was the question of the day. The apparatus of the Ministry of the Interior ground to a halt. Many were not willing to continue to work until the situation was clarified; they came to the offices merely to create a semblance of activity. A similar situation existed among judges and prosecutors. How could a man rid himself of the burden of responsibility?

Deputy Minister of National Defense General Vladimir Janko shot himself in his official car on March 14. Josef Brestansky, deputy chairman of the Supreme Court, disappeared from Prague under mysterious circumstances. On April 2, he was found in a wood near Prague—hanging by his neck. Lieutenant Colonel Jiri Pocepicky, chief of Prague's Department of Public Security, solved his problems the same way on April 25. Malicious rumors circulated in Prague that since the public had asked for the head of Defense Minister General Lomsky, he introduced himself on the telephone: "Hello—this is the Minister of Self-defense."

Even the intelligence service was struck by fear. In the smoke-filled offices of intelligence headquarters, all through the day, there was more discussion than work. Several cars with foreign license plates were parked in the side streets around the building housing the service. Officers stationed abroad came to try to appraise the situation, to determine the true state of affairs which, judging by reports in the Western press, seemed incredible to them.

The intelligence service was still outside the circle of public discussion, but on May 19 the trade-union daily *Prace* broke the silence. It published the life story of Bohumil Lausman—a man whose fate had been tragically marked by the Czechoslovak intelligence service.

Bohumil Lausman was one of the former leaders of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party. In 1939, he managed to escape to England before the Nazi occupation, and on his return to liberated Czechoslovakia became a minister and later deputy

prime minister of the Czechoslovak government. He held the latter position for several months after February 1948, when the Communists had seized power completely. Seeing that further government service was futile, he resigned to become director of a power plant in Bratislava, but the political situation had changed so drastically that Lausman decided to emigrate. His son-in-law was arrested at that time, and one of the braver Communist officials secretly warned Lausman that he faced similar treatment. On December 31, 1949, he and his wife and two daughters attempted to leave the country; he escaped, but the rest of the family was detained and given long sentences.

Lausman went to Yugoslavia, where he wrote two memoirs. Wishing to be closer to home, however, he made the fateful decision to move to Salzburg. After his arrival in Austria the leaders of the Czechoslovak intelligence service decided to kidnap him as a threat to prominent Czechoslovak political emigrés living in the West and as a propaganda maneuver directed at the domestic public, for there could be little doubt that Lausman, once he found himself on Czechoslovak territory in the hands of "interrogation specialists," would be willing to say anything. His testimony and the public reaction in Czechoslovakia were to reanimate the anti-emigration and anti-Western campaigns. The choice also fell on Lausman because Austria, considered an espionage jungle, offered favorable conditions for kidnapping a prominent emigré.

Two Czechoslovak intelligence agents, who were also Austrian citizens, took part in Lausman's kidnapping. One had gained Lausman's confidence by offering to mail packages to his imprisoned family in Czechoslovakia, and Lausman, tormented by the memory of his dear ones, accepted the offer. At Christmas 1953, this agent visited his quarry in his Salzburg apartment. The Merry Christmas toast was the last thing that Lausman remembered. Drugged, he was taken first to the Soviet occupied Zone and then to Czechoslovakia. When he awoke in handcuffs, he realized that he was really "home." His long trip from Salzburg ended in Prague's Ruzyne prison.

In the second stage of Operation Lausman Czechoslovak state security agents enacted a new, more tragic drama. In order to

force him into making a prepared public statement, he was promised release. Weighing the odds of helping his imprisoned family, Lausman consented. For six weeks he was "prepared" for a press conference, and learned the speech by heart, as well as the answers to various questions. He knew that he would be denounced again when the second propaganda stage was completed. He was not released but instead waited two years for a trial at which he received a seventeen-year prison sentence.

State security agents did not dare risk releasing Lausman for fear that the details of his abduction would come to light. Intelligence service was also afraid that Lausman's release would threaten the two Austrian agents who had helped to kidnap him. After serving eight years of his term, Bohumil Lausman died in prison in May 1963. All data presented in the *Prace* article were true, and intelligence employees, who had thought they were publicly untouchable, were thoroughly frightened.

The Czechoslovak intelligence service was an integral component of the Ministry of the Interior. Many diplomats in agencies within Czechoslovak embassies and officers in Prague headquarters had begun their careers in the counterintelligence service as organizers of carefully staged provocations against undesirable citizens—for example, the intelligence station chief in Vienna, Lieutenant Colonel Jan Prihoda, or the station chief in Berlin, Major Zdenek Sykora—or as interrogators in prisons. For them, the past ceased to be a pleasant memory of magic power carried in the identity card of an Interior Ministry officer. The past had become a merciless threat. All speculation about the future brought them to the same conclusions: at best, loss of their jobs, high pay, and standards of living to which they had become accustomed so quickly and easily. And instead of admitting their guilt, they felt self-pity: "If I had not dirtied my hands, as these saviors are saying, if I had stayed in my original profession, I could have been at peace today and maybe even been Mr. Somebody. I gave days and nights to my work, my best years. And today? Can I start from scratch?" Worries about livelihood were a Damocles' Sword even for those who had committed no crimes but remained in their well-paying jobs because of opportunism.

If the liberals were to succeed in introducing all their reforms, who would help them? The liberal-minded officers were advancing not only bold schemes of reducing the ranks of the intelligence service, but some of them were even doubting whether there was any need at all for intelligence work in Czechoslovakia.

The chief of the Czechoslovak intelligence service, Colonel Houska, was tormented by the same problem. He sought help to no avail. He could not join the group of young, liberal officers, some of whom he had helped to get ahead, because they now relied on the new, liberal-minded Minister of the Interior, General Josef Pavel, a political prisoner of the 1950s who had ignored Houska from the moment they had met. Houska might have considered aligning himself with those Communists who had dedicated their lives to the police apparatus, who had always believed or pretended to believe in the Party, and who had even killed for the Party. Some of them still had Stalin's portrait in their homes, and small, living Stalins kept directing their thinking in which, forevermore, the world was divided into Communists and those whom it was necessary to destroy. Colonel Houska hurried to work every morning not knowing what the next day would bring. When he was greeted with the traditional "Honor Work, Comrade Chief," he replied between his teeth, "Progress, Comrades, progress," and raised his fist. He quickly took care of pressing work in his office and then meditated or went to visit his Soviet advisor, Colonel Vorobyev.

During this time of tension in the state security department I thought much about myself. Was I better than Houska or Prihoda only because I had submitted a courageous memo identifying myself with a liberal stream while many others were still waiting? I had been lucky in that during the early fifties—the worst years of postwar Czechoslovakia—I had been in university classrooms instead of hunting and killing counterrevolutionaries. If I had been a few years older I might have become a murderer for the Party because at that time I had followed Party orders as blindly as these men had. Even other Doubeks, Peseks, Prihodas, and Houskas were victims. Under a different regime they could have been decent men. Czechoslovakia's political spring

came too late for them. They had no more strength and courage to separate themselves from their pasts. For them, the Soviet Union was the only hope, the only way out of the confusion.

Comrade Brezhnev's Tears

Comrade Brezhnev, receiving the Czechoslovak parliamentary delegation in June 1968, said that the USSR was prepared to defend herself, even before an international tribunal, against unjust accusations pertaining to events in Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev stated that the Soviet Union had no intention of influencing the internal politics of its neighbors. According to *Lidova Demokracie* (People's Democracy), June 18, 1968, Zedník, a member of the Czechoslovak parliamentary delegation, said after he returned to Prague that there were tears in Brezhnev's eyes at the moment he made the statement.

But those tears were deceptive. Brezhnev had been already decided to crush Czechoslovakia's socialism with a human face whatever the cost. According to Czechoslovak conservatives* consternation had already begun by February 1968, when Brezhnev received the text of a speech which Alexander Dubcek was to deliver in his presence on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the February coup in Prague. In a telephone conversation with Dubcek, Brezhnev protested that there would be a scandal if that speech were delivered and implied that the Soviet delegation would certainly have to walk out. The Dubcek report, deemed revisionist and liquidationist, had to be reworked. By March, public investigation in Czechoslovakia had already unearthed facts about the incompetence and brutality of the previous police bureaucracy. The former political leadership, including the Party's apparatus as well as Czechoslovak state security methods and practices, was subjected to incisive criticism. The public was openly informed for the first time of Soviet involvement in the Ministry of the Interior in the 1950s. The press, radio,

* Vasil Bilak at the Central Committee meeting of the KSC in the spring of 1969, as reported in *Svedectvi,* X, 38, p. 282.

and television began to take interest in the circumstances surrounding the death of former Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk who, according to official accounts, had committed suicide on the night of March 9–10, 1948, although there were indications of political assassination. The general discussion, outspoken and spontaneous for the first time since 1948, leaned toward the beginnings of a democratic socialism, which would guarantee not only economic and social justice but also civil rights and freedoms.

The Soviets were undoubtedly afraid that the success of the Czechoslovak experiment could have a negative impact on the domestic situation in the Soviet Union and other bloc countries by spreading the disease of democracy. The international Communist movement was torn between pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese elements, and with Yugoslav, Romanian, and even Cuban deviants trying to become independent of Moscow, the movement was already sufficiently divided. The success of democratic socialism in Czechoslovakia would certainly lead to further desertions from the Moscow center.

Finally, the Soviets were afraid that a new Czechoslovak foreign policy could undermine the military status quo in Europe. This strategic reason was perhaps the most conclusive in the Soviet decision to intervene. In the Russian view the whole Warsaw Pact would be weakened if democracy continued to develop in Czechoslovakia.

Moscow's reactions between March and August 1968 indicated that the Soviet plan to suppress the democratization process presupposed a military invasion only if the attempts to split the movement and accomplish a "silent invasion" with official sanction of Czechoslovak authorities proved unsuccessful. Until the end of July the Soviets' main tactical objective was to secure official Czechoslovak permission for stationing their troops on Czechoslovak territory. Brezhnev tried to convince Czechoslovak leaders that this would reduce Czechoslovakia's defense expenditures. When this plan was rejected, Brezhnev forced Dubcek to accede to huge Warsaw Pact maneuvers on Czechoslovak territory. Dubcek was well aware of the risk to his country's freedom, but he agreed in order to avoid provoking the charge of evading the obligations of membership in the Warsaw Pact. The maneuvers

were scheduled for June 20–30, but the first Soviet units set foot on Czechoslovak soil at the end of May. They left on August 3 after Czechoslovak protest.

Despite these attempts at coercion, Moscow did not attain its main tactical objective of permanently stationing Soviet troops on Czechoslovak territory or at least prolonging their presence until the September Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. The decision of the Czechoslovak Central Committee on June 1 to convene an extraordinary Fourteenth Party Congress on September 9 had played an important role in Soviet tactical judgment. The delegates to the congress selected at regional and district Party conferences were predominantly liberal in orientation. A real danger existed, from the Soviet point of view, that the foremost advocates of Stalinism would vanish from the political scene after the Fourteenth Party Congress, making it even more difficult to bring Czechoslovakia to her senses. Thus the Czechoslovak Central Committee's decision on June 1 had inadvertently set a three-month deadline for the final Soviet decision on the future of liberal communism in Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet tactics of internal erosion and pressure did not bring about the expected results. Although the fiery democratization drive of March and April which swept away the main spokesmen of the old regime—including Novotny's deposition from the presidency—slowed down considerably in May, the following months gave no indication that the balance was shifting in a direction favorable to the Soviets. Moscow had presupposed the active support of several elements within Czechoslovakia. Foremost was a group of dogmatic Party functionaries who successfully preserved their prominent positions. Among them were Presidium members Bilak, Svestka, and Kolder and Central Committee Secretary Indra. Under the strong pressure of public opinion, however, these men could not summon sufficient courage to identify themselves openly with Soviet policies and demands.

The Czechoslovak state security service was another important Soviet pawn. The new Minister of the Interior, Josef Pavel, had attempted to reorganize and purge the security apparatus of Stalinists; this purge, launched with the removal of several influential headquarters and regional officials, could not be com-

pletely effective in the short space of several months. With the help of the Soviet intelligence service, several Czechoslovak state security officers who faced arrest for their activities during the 1950s slipped quietly into the Soviet Union or the German Democratic Republic. But most of the Stalinists in the Ministry of the Interior kept their positions and under the surface actively collaborated with the Soviets. With their help, Soviet intelligence agents launched a series of special operations against the democratization movement.

Beginning in May 1968, more and more traces of these activities were seen in the Czechoslovak press. The investigation of Jan Masaryk's death was reopened.

Jan Masaryk, the first postwar Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, was an acknowledged figure in international politics. He was among those democratically oriented Czech politicians who sought to establish the country's position as a bridge between East and West and to preserve it as a democratic state despite the clear socialization course. When the Communists attained full power in February 1948, Masaryk remained as Foreign Minister in the reorganized cabinet. Several days later, however, on March 10, 1948, he lay dead under the window of Cernin Palace, which housed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The official accounts stated that Masaryk's death was a suicide caused by ill health and insomnia. Domestic propaganda even blamed "internal reaction" in Czechoslovakia for having contributed to his death by saying that reactionaries had bombarded him with threatening letters for having remained in the government after the February events.

Despite the fact that the 1948 investigators found important indications pointing to murder, there was a unanimous verdict of suicide. Masaryk was found dead several meters from an open bathroom window. Everything in the usually neat, orderly minister's apartment was in disarray. There were even cushions in the bathroom. Physiological traces of fright, usually absent in suicide, were found on the body and on the window sill. The position of the body indicated that he had fallen backwards from the window. Straka, a clerk at the Foreign Ministry, who was on duty the night of March 9–10 in the building, reported that his telephone

had stopped operating during the night and that he had discovered the door to his office locked from the outside when he tried to leave. Unusual traffic was noted in the vicinity of the building, as well as noise in the building itself. Later, in the 1950s, several people who had taken part in the investigation committed suicide.

In the spring of 1968, queries about Masaryk's death resurfaced in conjunction with discussion of the illegal practices of the fifties. On April 3, 1968, political scientist and philosopher Dr. Ivan Svitak addressed an open letter to the Prosecutor General requesting a clarification of Masaryk's death. Dr. J. Kolar, head of the investigations department, was entrusted with the task.

Although the investigation and public discussion were a very unpleasant experience for the Soviets, they could not at that time simply prohibit it by directive. The Soviet intelligence service therefore resolved upon using the mass media in a campaign to convince the foreign public of Soviet innocence. The news agency TASS announced on May 7, 1968:

> In recent days, articles have appeared in several Western and Czechoslovak news organs with various speculations about the cause of the death of former Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk, who is known to have committed suicide in 1948. At present, enemy propaganda is attempting to portray a connection between Masaryk's death and Soviet security advisors. TASS is empowered to assert decisively that the aforementioned information is false from start to finish.

Moscow erred in angrily disclaiming not only its part in the Masaryk case but also the activities of Soviet advisors whose former role had been publicly acknowledged even by the Czechoslovak Communists.

The campaign against the investigation of Masaryk's death continued in an *Izvestia* article on May 16. In this instance, Soviet intelligence agents utilized ammunition obtained in Czechoslovakia. *Izvestia* bore heavily on a certain Benno Weigel, who in 1965 published an article on Masaryk's death in the West German weekly *Der Spiegel* under the pseudonym Michael Rand. Later in 1965, the Czechoslovak disinformation department prepared extensive material on Benno Weigel with the aim of under-

mining his authority and thus discrediting the contents of his article; the material appeared in the Czech press but did not meet with too great a response. *Izvestia* wrote:

> Benno Weigel (a Czech citizen), a notorious adventurer, imposter, and British agent, began his career in the early thirties by defrauding an Arab sheik to whom he sold Hradcany [Prague's famous castle] and attained quite a large amount of money. During the war it is said that he worked in British intelligence as an expert on Czechoslovak affairs.
>
> Unforunately, three years after publication in *Der Spiegel* his rubbish appeared in the Czechoslovak weekly *Student*. University professor Ivan Svitak seized on this version, and after him, *Lidova Demokracie,* and *Svobodne Slovo*. The investigation really began and continued from this point. . . . It is surprising that no one remembered the prewar and wartime behavior of the adventurer and English agent Weigel. Such forgetfulness is used by enemies of socialist Czechoslovakia, who, with the help of forgeries produced by Western intelligence, aim to sow suspicion among friendly countries.

Material about Benno Weigel from the Czechoslovak disinformation department reached Soviet intelligence agents sometime in 1966, at which time the Soviets did not attach undue significance to the matter. When the situation changed in the spring of 1968, however, the Soviets used the Czech material in their own defense. The practice of personally discrediting the author is typical in such cases. When it is difficult to disprove all or part of an author's contentions, the intelligence service assembles basic facts about him, fills them out with unfavorable particulars, and presents this package to the public as proof of the author's immorality, thus indirectly refuting his allegations. In the case of Benno Weigel, it was not difficult to find sufficient personal data; in conversation with Czechoslovak news correspondents in London, Weigel remarked about himself that "no page is blank," as reported by *Lidova Demokracie,* May 26, 1968.

Soviet efforts to halt the Masaryk investigation were unsuccessful. The question of Masaryk's death was so important to the Czechoslovak people that the investigation officially continued even after the Soviet invasion. By that time the facts had been

widely publicized; the Office of the Prosecutor General in Prague could not merely reiterate the results of the 1948 inquiry, and thus in December 1969 Masaryk's death was announced as an "unfortunate accident." According to this version Masaryk had slipped and fallen while sitting on a window sill during a bout of insomnia.

In May and June 1968, anonymous pamphlets and threatening letters began to proliferate. On the doors of houses, telephone poles, and telephone booths pamphlets often appeared with the affectionate salutation:

> Dear friends and comrades!
>
> We workers, Communists, exhort you to fulfill your civic responsibilities to the socialist state! We are warning you against the revisionist group which has penetrated the Party and state apparatus and which, with the help of the press, radio, television, films, and literature, is demoralizing the people. This group stands intellectually against the workers and seeks to put an end to the leading role of the working class, to liquidate the Party as a whole, and thus to deliver a death blow to the socialist achievements of Czechs and Slovaks.
>
> Put an end to unrestrained discussion, stamp out the screechers and careerists!

There was no signature to the pamphlet. In its place was the appeal, "Don't waste time or it will be too late."

Liberal writers, considered by Moscow as the "brain trust" of the liberalization movement, received many threatening anonymous letters. Eduard Goldstücker, as the first Czechoslovak envoy to Israel, had fallen victim to the political trials of so-called Zionists and anti-state conspirators in the early fifties. In the spring of 1968 he was among the most active propagandists for the democratization movement. He lectured in Czechoslovakia and abroad to gain adherents for the Czechoslovak experiment in humanized socialism. In June 1968, Goldstücker, who was also head of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union, received a letter reminding him of the years he had spent in Czech prisons in the fifties and the vocabulary used by his interrogators:

> Mr. Goldstücker—you swindler and Zionist hyena!
>
> On your birthday we send several million curses from the work-

ing class, not only in our country but those in other socialist states. All honest Czechoslovak Communist Party members hate you, you swindler, despot, and subversive. Not until recent events were the eyes of honest Czechoslovak people, workers, and Party members opened to the fact that you, like Slansky, should have received a noose instead of a life sentence. Honest members of the KSC do not acknowledge you, as a Western agent, to be a Party member, no matter what cunning mask you may wear. You will have to found some other party, perhaps an ISRAELI organization, for the workers will not permit such a hyena in the KSC. We well know with whom you are on good terms, that you have friends in England, Israel, and elsewhere, and that they are intelligence representatives, and we have photos and other materials which we will before long leave to the disposition of the relevant authorities, mainly in the USSR and elsewhere, from which the necessary measures for your exposure will be launched in the international arena. You are such a wretched philosopher that you don't know that the KSC is primarily a party of the workers and their allies. Of course, you despot, you have turned this upside down. You should found a new Jewish intellectual party with Mnacko, that horror, that advocate of Jews and Israeli aggression. You want the Zionist cause to rule not only in Israel, but throughout the whole world, wherever possible, and on that score you are fit to shake hands with Hitler. And therefore we well know that the roots of recent events, here in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and elsewhere, are Zionist, launched in the framework of fulfilling the conquest plan of international Zionism. Therefore honest party members, workers, and our MILITIA also have our own plan, and will put a stop to your machinations. The Jews will again be deprived of television, radio, and the press, and the media will belong to the workers again. But you will soon get what is coming to you, you despot. You disgusting Jew.

Eduard Goldstücker assumed that this diatribe, published together with his comment in *Rude Pravo* on June 23, 1968, was not the isolated voice of a fanatic but perhaps the premeditated action of a group of people who, after the surprise and dismay brought about by the first wave of democratization, decided to fight the new political course and its representatives with less than fastidious means. At the time, Goldstücker saw but one possibility of self-defense—to publish the letter and trust that the

democratic forces in Czechoslovakia were strong enough to protect him. He said: "I surmised from the anonymous letter that someone in our country is fantasizing about the possibility of plotting another trial against supposed Zionist plotters, and that I seem to be cast in the role of chief defendant. I know that my life is at stake. I put myself under the protection of my fellow citizens in the full belief that this is the best defense." Goldstücker even openly expressed the hypothesis that the letter originated, directly or indirectly, with the state security service.

Other leading journalists and writers, such as Pavel Kohout, Ladislav Pluhar, Jiri Hanzelka, and Ludvik Vaculik, received similar letters as reported by *Literarni Listy,* Nos. 18 and 19, 1968.

In the anonymous letter received by Vaculik, one passage was interesting not for its crude expression but rather for the psychology of its author, who let slip the statement that Vaculik could not rely on the help of the "fizlove" (snoopers—the nickname for state security employees), thus inadvertently corroborating his employment with the Ministry of the Interior, also reported by *Literarni Listy:*

> We're not going to monkey with you anymore. One bullet will be enough to give you what you deserve. We've already taken care of you. Make yourself scarce. The decision is made, it depends on you. We hope that your widow will be happy that we've taken such a villain off her hands. The FIZLOVE CERTAINLY WON'T COME TO YOUR DEFENSE, FOR THEY ARE TO BE DISCLOSED ACCORDING TO YOUR ADVICE AND THEREFORE THEY WILL BE USELESS TO YOU. And even if you had thousands of them (like the Kennedys) you would perish all the same. Death to Ludvik Vaculik and the future to the Czechoslovak nation!

The leaflet activity and threatening letters were not the work of individuals, of course, but a joint operation of the Soviet intelligence service and its collaborators in the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior. The authors were trying to terrorize and intimidate the liberals and to create the impression of widespread opposition among the "healthy party cadres." There were several recorded instances in the same period of leaflets dropped from small airplanes. In no case, however, were the perpetrators identi-

fied, since the investigation was in the hands of the Ministry of the Interior.

The attempted colloquialisms and consciously bad grammar of the pamphlets and letters revealed that the perpetrators had tried to hide behind the language of the common man. A striking analogy exists between the political slogans and arguments used in these letters and leaflets and the arguments applied later in the occupation journal *Zpravy* and on the occupation radio station *"Vltava."* The victims of the anonymous letters protected themselves as Eduard Goldstücker had—with the public. A wave of popular support swelled against the machinators, endorsed even by leading political figures such as Party Presidium member Bohumil Spacek. Although the possibility that the chief malefactors sat in Moscow was not suggested in the Czech press, open suspicion of the involvement of Stalinists was voiced in Czechoslovak security organs, and the scheme failed to produce the desired psychological impact.

Soviet propaganda sought any scrap of evidence for the previously conceived theory that Czechoslovak democratization was primarily an operation of Western intelligence agents who awaited the suitable moment for converting the process into open counterrevolution. In this spirit, on May 9, the East Berlin journal *Berliner Zeitung* stated that American troops and eight American tanks had arrived in Prague. They were said to be making a rendezvous with *Bundeswehr* troops and three West German tanks. The editorial office of the *Berliner Zeitung* had allegedly learned from well-informed sources that soldiers of special American units garrisoned in the German Federal Republic were also preparing to go to Czechoslovakia. They were to disguise themselves as tourists on West German buses.

The East German efforts were probably not well coordinated with Soviet directors because the improbability of the report was obvious and demonstrable. An American movie *Remagen Bridge* was then being filmed in Czechoslovakia, and the actors, dressed in American uniforms, "proved" American military presence in the country, according to East German disinformants. The same day this fantastic story appeared in *Berliner Zeitung*, the Czecho-

slovak Press Agency published the statement of Alois Polednak, director of the Czechoslovak State Film Agency:

> The film *Remagen Bridge,* which is now being shot, has nothing to do with our liberation but describes the defeat of fascist troops in Germany. No American tanks were used for the filming; our own tanks were properly repainted and modified. Reports of the presence of West German Soldiers and the arrival of *Bundeswehr* tanks are pure nonsense. No American soldiers have roles in the film, only a group of about fifteen American actors, who live in the Hotel International. Our soldiers will stage the film's battles.

The Soviet intelligence departments next formulated a better operation, which in its methods and means was strikingly reminiscent of Operation Neptune.

Moscow needed pressing arguments both for propaganda and for the pending meeting of Warsaw Pact representatives, who were to warn Czechoslovak liberals against continuing democratization and the danger of counterrevolution. On July 12, two days before the Warsaw meeting, employees of the district security department in Sokolovsko were anonymously informed of a cache of hidden weapons in the area between the towns of Mytina and Arnoldov, in a canal under the bridge leading from the main road to a field. Security employees indeed found a store of weapons at the designated place, including twenty Thompson submachine guns, caliber 11.43mm; thirty-five full chambers, each with twenty-one cartridges; 756 machine gun cartridges in metal boxes; and thirty Walter pistols, caliber 7.65 mm. This small arsenal was packed in five knapsacks with the English inscription "NORD-WEST-ORAIL-PACK" stamped in white with an illegible text and the year of production 1968, as reported on July 20, 1968, by *Rude Pravo.*

Seeking quick reaction, the perpetrators left obvious clues on the site of the "discovery" to suggest shipments from the West. But in this case, that very precaution awakened the suspicion that the East, rather than the West, was behind the affair. Shortly before the discovery, Soviet armed forces had conducted maneuvers in the area. Several days passed and the Czech press was silent. First to attack was the Bulgarian press, publishing reports

that forces of reaction and counterrevolution were actively preparing for the decisive blow. Hidden weapons were reputedly being discovered throughout Czechoslovakia. A wave of tourists were flooding the country, as they had thronged on the eve of the Munich agreement. *Rude Pravo*, July 22, 1968, reported an attack of the Bulgarian Communist daily *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Worker's Affairs) on Czechoslovak government and Party officials for their passivity toward counterrevolutionaries.

Josef Pavel conducted a thorough examination of the case; on July 22, *Rude Pravo* published his statement that weapons had been found only in Sokolovsko, adding, "the general consensus is that the hidden arms were a provocation aimed at dramatizing the situation in Czechoslovakia." The argument over the hidden counterrevolutionary weapons was waged thereafter in articles, commentaries, and speeches in the five Warsaw Pact states, but the matter was dropped in Czechoslovakia. This action, which was to be the culmination of the Soviet intelligence service's pre-invasion disinformation effort to create at least one pretext for the invasion, was again a failure.

American imperialists and West German militarists were not the only scapegoats to be found as directors behind the scenes. World Jewry was to be presented in a similar role. To lend credibility to the connections between Czechoslovak Jews and anti-socialist forces abroad, a forged letter in the name of Simon Wiesenthal, the head of the Jewish Documentation Center in Vienna, was produced in poor German and mailed to several hundred people in Czechoslovakia. *Der Spiegel*, February 8, 1971, reported that in the forged document, dated May 21, 1968, Wiesenthal called on Czechoslovak Jews to support the democratization process, since it would lead to improved relations with Israel and the German Federal Republic. At the same time Wiesenthal asked Jews to collect information on anti-Semitism in Communist states, including Czechoslovakia.

When he realized what happened, Wiesenthal issued a statement branding the document a forgery. He was able to prove this very easily because the letterhead on the document had not been used for years. In his testimony to the Austrian police Wiesenthal speculated that it was a Polish operation since a

Polish diplomat had attempted to get Wiesenthal's authenic stationery.

After the failure of the political and military pressure and the intelligence service's special operations, the Soviets made one last attempt. At a joint meeting of the Presidiums of the Soviet and Czechoslovak Communist Parties, held from July 29 to August 1 at Cierna nad Tisou and followed by a one-day conference in Bratislava of five Warsaw Pact countries and Czechoslovakia on August 3, they tried to create division within Czechoslovak leadership or at least to obtain permission for the prolonged presence of Soviet units in Czechoslovakia. When neither the Cierna nor Bratislava conferences yielded the desired results, there remained but one alternative: military invasion in the weeks before September 9, the opening date of the Fourteenth Party Congress. The consequences of such an unmistakably liberal congress could only complicate the Soviet position further; it was therefore necessary to strike prior to its convocation.

During the final ceremony in Bratislava when the strains of the "Internationale"—the anthem of communism—touched the hearts of those present, Comrade Brezhnev began to weep again. Less than three weeks later the invasion began.

Invasion

On the morning of August 21 I was awakened in Vienna by a ringing telephone. "What the devil does anyone want at this hour?" I thought.

"The Russians are invading Czechoslovakia," said a voice on the other end. It was like the blow of a hammer. That summer morning will never be forgotten by Czechs and Slovaks. In the name of revolution, Russian, East German, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian armies invaded Czechoslovak territory; the short period of freedom was at an end.

I turned on the radio. The voice of the Radio Prague announcer was stammering: "It is seven minutes after seven

o'clock. Military cars are approaching our building. Friends, when we speak to you at this moment we want to express the opinion of our nation, the wish of citizens of this country for freedom, national sovereignty, and independence. Dear friends, the final moment is obviously coming. We want to mention once more that calm and caution and forethought are our only weapons. If you throw a stone, the occupiers may answer with machine guns. We have to look for other ways to fight. We believe that Czechoslovakia will remain socialistic, democratic, sovereign, and independent. When you hear our Czechoslovak anthem—it will probably be the end of our broadcast." And then, the tones of the Czechoslovak national anthem.

I rushed to the Czechoslovak Legation. By the time I entered the office nearly all the intelligence employees stationed in Vienna were already there. I expected to find resolute opposition to the Russian invasion, but there was cautious approval instead: "Yes, the Russians are right. We have been too tolerant of the liberals. It was not a democracy but anarchy."

"From now on our ways definitely go in different directions," I thought as I looked at them, and then I left the room.

The direction and implementation of the invasion plan designed by the Soviet Party, state, and military leadership, in conjunction with the intelligence service, confirmed the hypothesis that it had required long-term planning and preparation. Several of its details, primarily the introduction of selected Czechoslovak Stalinists into various roles, had been completed in August, a few days before the invasion. The chief components of the plan were as follows: the pronouncements of leading Czechoslovak Stalinists in high Party, state, and legislative positions were to afford the pretext for intervention by terming the situation in Czechoslovakia critical and therefore in need of Soviet military measures; there was to be a *Blitzkrieg* occupation of Czechoslovak territory, especially Prague, which was the main center of opposition; with the assistance of selected officials in the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior, leading liberal figures were to be arrested and transported to Soviet territory. A new, conservative government was to be established, all liberals were to be removed from key positions, a contract for the stationing of Soviet troops in Czech territory was

to be signed, and Dubcek's post-January policy was to be liquidated gradually.

Moscow counted on the direct help of the conservative Central Committee Secretary Alois Indra (who was slated by the Soviets to become head of the new conservative government), and of presidium members Drahomir Kolder, Vasil Bilak, Oldrich Svestka, and Emil Rigo. On Tuesday, August 20, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the KSC convened at eight o'clock with two main issues on the agenda: a report on the preparations for the Fourteenth Party Congress, and a discussion of the Czechoslovak Communist Party's position in the country.

The basis for the second point was a statement prepared by Alois Indra and Drahomir Kolder. Their material essentially recapitulated the accusations delivered to Czechoslovakia by the signatories of the Warsaw letter several weeks previously. The Soviets hoped to create division within the presidium, to receive majority support for their proposals, and, in the name of that majority, to justify the incursion of Soviet troops which was to occur several hours later. The Indra-Kolder material, however, was rejected after stormy discussion. Indra left the council room several times during the meeting to provide the Soviet ambassador with running commentary.

At 8:30 P.M. Dubcek received a decoded telegram from the Czechoslovak ambassador in Budapest, notifying him that: "On August 20 at five P.M. an anonymous caller contacted a reporter of the Czechoslovak Press Agency in Budapest and agitatedly informed him that today, beginning at midnight, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic would be invaded. He asked the reporter to convey this information immediately to the military attaché." Evidently, Dubcek did not attach excessive significance to this anonymous communication.

Shortly before midnight the presidium received a telephone report that troops of five Warsaw Pact countries had crossed into Czechoslovakia. Over the objections of Bilak, Kolder, Rigo, and Svestka, the presidium then accepted a resolution announcing the intervention of foreign troops, characterizing it both as a violation of the basic principles of socialist-bloc relations and a breach of the fundamental norms of international law.

In providing legal cover for the invasion, important roles were entrusted to Miroslav Sulek, director of the Czechoslovak News Agency, and Karel Hoffman, director of the Central Communications Administration. Miroslav Sulek unexpectedly and quickly returned from leave in the USSR on August 20, and in the evening of that day issued an order to news agency employees forbidding the transmission abroad of any information concerning Czechoslovakia without his approval.* In the early hours of August 21, Sulek handed his subordinates the anonymous text of a declaration by Party and government functionaries, allegedly requesting the Soviet intervention. News agency workers refused to issue the announcement. Karel Hoffman, as director of communications, made it impossible for Dubcek and his group to communicate with the Czechoslovak public or the outside world. On Hoffman's instructions, the Prague transmitter was cut off just at the moment when the announcer began to read the Dubcek group's statement regarding the invasion. Several hours later, however, the radio was again in operation and, after the seizure of the central radio station in Prague, resumed activities in an auxiliary radio station unknown to the occupation forces. Moscow anxiously awaited the announcement of the unnamed Czechoslovak spokesman; when it was not forthcoming, the Soviet news agency TASS was directed to publish it. The interesting fact remains that, even at the moment of the invasion, even in the ensuing period of so-called normalization, not one of the Czechoslovak Stalinists was willing publicly to acknowledge his signature on the document requesting Soviet military intervention. A year after the invasion, at the KSC Central Committee meeting of September 1969, Vasil Bilak was still evasive and equivocal on this point. In a theatrical address to the remaining liberals who raised the question of who had called for Soviet troops, he answered: "[The invasion] was evoked by disorder and disruption in this republic, which you yourselves helped to provoke."

From a military standpoint, the invasion was conducted quickly and confidently. Around eleven o'clock on the evening

* *The Czech Black Book,* edited by Robert Littel, prepared by the Institute of History of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 5.

of August 20, Soviet, Polish, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and German units crossed the Czechoslovak border and began to occupy the most important strategic areas. The New York *Times*, August 24, 1968, reported that, according to members of the Soviet armed forces who participated in the invasion, Soviet units had been ready since August 11. Invasion operations were accompanied by the landing of Soviet troops at the civilian international airport in Prague, from which units moved into the center of the city, occupying all politically or militarily important locations. The landing of a previously unannounced Soviet plane shortly before midnight preceded the landing of Soviet troops at Ruzyne airport. Its crew played a surveillance and security role in the event that the situation at the airport required violent measures against Czechoslovak airport personnel, prior to the main landing at 1:30 A.M. Airport personnel, suspecting nothing, remained calm until the moment of the landing of the first military transport plane, followed quickly by the occupation of the airport and the isolation of its personnel. Also involved in the successful Soviet troop landings was the air squadron commander of the Ministry of the Interior, Lieutenant Colonel Elias, one of the "trustworthy" group who had been informed of the invasion beforehand. I. G. Pavlovski, commander of the invading units, mastered this exacting military task in the relatively short space of a few hours. Of course, the *Blitzkrieg* occupation of Czechoslovakia was also facilitated by the obedience of the armed forces to the presidium's appeal (the Dubcek group) not to offer resistance. The total size of the invading force has been conservatively estimated at from one hundred fifty thousand to two hundred fifty thousand men.

The important task of arresting leading liberals and transporting them to the Soviet Union fell to the Soviet intelligence service. Moscow was convinced that the presence of Dubcek and his closest collaborators in Czechoslovakia would complicate the process of establishing a new government and incite his supporters to provoke anti-Soviet disturbances. The manner of dealing with Dubcek and his friends suggests that Soviet leaders were prepared to liquidate them physically as well as politically. After the consolidation of the new conservative government, it would not have been difficult to send them to the scaffold under the

formal legal cover of a Czechoslovak revolutionary tribunal along the lines of the Imre Nagy trial. Because of the ruthlessness of its action, however, Moscow wished to retain a semblance of legality. Therefore it was necessary for Czechoslovak state security officials to participate personally in the arrest of the Dubcek group. The Soviet intelligence service decided to arrest the following persons: Alexander Dubcek, First Secretary of the KSC; Oldrich Cernik, presidium member and prime minister; Josef Smrkovsky, presidium member and chairman of the national assembly; Frantisek Kriegel, presidium member and chairman of the National Front; Cestmir Cisar, chairman of the Czechoslovak National Council; Josef Pavel, Minister of the Interior; and Bohumil Spacek, presidium member.

In addition to these prominent political figures, those officials of the Ministry of the Interior who had by their opinions and actions supported Pavel and the liberalization movement in the previous period were also arrested in the first phase of the invasion. The arrests occurred on August 21. A selected group of state security officials, instructed by Lieutenant Colonel Molnar and accompanied by Soviet troops and intelligence agents, entered the KSC Central Committee building and took Dubcek, Smrkovsky, Spacek, and Kriegel into custody "in the name of the revolutionary government of Indra." Cernik was arrested in the government presidium building. Soviet intelligence agents recorded a failure in the cases of Pavel and Cisar. Cisar was indeed arrested, but managed to escape en route to the Soviet embassy with the help of several Interior Ministry employees and to hide outside of Prague. Pavel's whereabouts were not known for several days. The public did not discover that he was still in Czechoslovakia until August 24. On that day, Pavel announced that he was resuming his duties, and ordered the removal of Salgovic (who was a Moscow-oriented deputy minister of the Interior) and Molnar pending an investigation of their activities. He called on all Interior Ministry employees to act in accordance with established Czechoslavak law, the Party Action Program, and in the spirit of the post-January policy, a situation which, because of his open opposition to the invasion, caused him to be fired immediately after Dubcek's return from Moscow. The others, who either did

not succeed in escaping or did not attempt it, were arrested and taken to the USSR.

In the Ministry of the Interior, confusion and division reigned. While the younger officials, sympathizing with the democratic movement, did not want to be party to any activity on behalf of the occupation forces, experienced leaders were inclined to the Soviet side. Soviet troops took over the intelligence service's headquarters and the majority of the remaining buildings of the Ministry of the Interior. The Soviet intelligence service sent Prague a large group of its own officials who had worked there as advisors in previous years. Together with Soviet advisors then serving in the Ministry of the Interior, they formed the basic cadre of experts on the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia. In the foreground were Kotov, Molchanov, Nalivaiko, Mukchin, Vinokurov, and Vorobyev. Several intelligence officers who had left Prague for Vienna after the invasion reported the events that took place in intelligence service headquarters. On the morning of August 21, former intelligence chief Colonel Josef Houska, removed by Pavel several weeks previously, entered headquarters. After short consultation with particular individuals, he authorized the arrest of liberal intelligence officials. By previous arrangement, Houska awaited the public proclamation of the new revolutionary government of Alois Indra to legalize his actions. When this did not occur, he lost his nerve and released the officials.

The spontaneous anti-Soviet resistance of the Czechoslovak people had contributed to ideological confusion among Interior Ministry employees and in large measure had paralyzed pro-Soviet activity. The major result of this influence was that, despite Soviet insistence, the Czechoslovak state security service could not carry out the mass arrest and internment of so-called anti-Socialist elements.

On the third day after the invasion Lieutenant Colonel Prihoda, station chief in Vienna, asked me to come to his office. I expected him to question the interviews I had given to Austrian radio and television on August 21 condemning the Russian invasion. Instead, he handed me a decoded telegram from Prague: "The situation in the country is growing calm. Continue in your work. Collect all available information on prominent liberals who

left for Austria; we are eminently interested in their political activities and contacts. Take all necessary measures against possible defectors."

I handed the telegram back to him: "What do you want from me?"

"I don't want anything. You have just read my instructions from headquarters," he said. Since the invasion Prihoda had regained his self-confidence and a measure of inner peace. In the springtime he had feared that the democratization movement would smash him, and he had found consolation in alcohol. Now, the future looked brighter.

"Sorry, I'm not willing to spy on our people. These instructions have been issued by people who don't represent Czechoslovak interests. Don't count on my support in this matter," I said.

"Don't be hysterical. All members of our group must stick together now and be calm; yes, that's the most important thing."

"It is very important for me to know for whom I work. I say openly to you—I am not willing to collaborate. I have fourteen years of wasted life behind me spent with the service, and I'm not going to dirty my hands any more. Sure, I know a lot about the people who came here from Prague, and I can imagine that the Russians are very interested in them, but you will not get anything from me."

"We shall speak about it later," he closed our discussion.

The occupation forces had not at that time succeeded in breaking Czechoslovak resistance. Newspapers and radio stations were still fighting. The unity of Czechs and Slovaks actually saved the lives of Dubcek and his arrested companions. When the Russians realized that they could not establish a pro-Soviet government, they changed their tactics and accepted the arrested Czechoslovak representatives as negotiation partners.

Not wanting to stand by as a passive observer, I found a teletype connection from Vienna to Prague unknown to the Russians and sent to the Free Czechoslovak Radio a daily detailed account of the sympathetic reaction of the world public. Editors there had no access to the world press. My apartment became a lodging for those who escaped from Czechoslovakia, but that was not enough. The moment came when it was necessary

to do much more—even to use my intelligence experience in the fight against the occupation forces. But was there anyone among the intelligence employees stationed in Vienna I could rely on?

The results of the negotiations in Moscow solved my problem. Dubcek's speech on August 27, interrupted by his own sobbing, was nothing less than a capitulation. The fight was over.

Prihoda made one last attempt. This time I knew the subject of our conversation very well when I entered his office: "I need certain particulars from you. I have information that a group of people in Vienna would like to establish something like an exile government. What do you know about it?"

"Nothing."

"Don't play games with me. It is time to sit down and write out everything you have done and know. Since August 21 you have spoken with many dangerous individuals—some of them have slept in your apartment. What do they want to do, what are their plans?"

"I think we have already spoken on the subject. I repeat that I am not willing to do that dirty work."

"Do you refuse to follow an order?"

"Yes," I answered, realizing that I had passed sentence on myself.

On my way back to my office I stopped at an open door. Nearly all of my colleagues were there, with joyful voices, toasts, and laughter. They were supposed to be having a birthday party, but it was actually a thanksgiving day for Russian "help." The Stalinists were celebrating their victory.

On my way home several cars followed me. I was a black sheep who had strayed away and my superiors wanted me back in the fold. That night I broke out of Vienna, out of my past. Defection is a terrible price to pay, but I knew that it was the last service I could render—an attempt to stop the Czechoslovak intelligence machine's attack on innocent victims whose only crime was the dream of socialism with a human face.

"Counterrevolution"

After the successful military invasion, Soviet psychological warfare experts initiated a massive onslaught on Czech public opinion. From the first day of the invasion the voice of Radio *Vltava* resounded in the air; Soviet helicopters dropped leaflets in large numbers; a newspaper with the prosaic title *Zpravy* (News) was distributed among the population with the help of collaborators. The Soviet Department D encouraged preparation of the *White Book* on counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia, circulating it throughout the country in Czech translation.

The common line of the published material was the unremitting repetition of the theme of counterrevolution—the atmosphere of moral and physical terror against "honest" Communists, the caches of counterrevolutionary arms, the secret radio broadcasts transmitted from the German Federal Republic. On August 31, *Pravda* demanded the liquidation of forty thousand counterrevolutionaries, referring to Western sources to validate their existence. The mass media of the intervening states inveighed sharply against prominent liberals—Kriegel, Smrkovsky, Sik, Hajek, Cisar, Goldstücker, Hanzelka, and Kohout. After the return of Czech representatives from Moscow, crude personal attacks on Dubcek and Cernik ceased, for both were signatories of the capitulation.

In the first days of the occupation, Soviet helicopters dropped large quantities of pamphlets, primarily in Prague, Bratislava, Kosice, and Pilsen. These flyers consisted of public speeches, reprints, or excerpts from Soviet press articles justifying the invasion and calling on the population to collaborate with the occupation forces. Reprints of the *Pravda* article of August 22 about the situation in Czechoslovakia were disseminated in abundance. In some cities, Bratislava, for example, this form of political communication was accompanied by Soviet radio trucks proclaiming Russian slogans—in Russian, as Agence France Presse reported a monitoring of Free Radio Prague on August 26. The vague content of the leaflets, with their hackneyed Party functionary phraseology, doomed this propaganda drive to failure. More dangerous

were leaflets distributed in the same city by Soviet helicopters. In these, President Svoboda called for cooperation with the occupation forces. Free Radio *Dunaj* (Danube), aware of the possibility that such disinformation could confuse a sizable portion of the population, warned of these forgeries and asked that they be burned.

Radio *Vltava* began operations several hours after the first troops entered Czechoslovakia. In the course of its transmission, it was ascertained to be broadcasting from East Germany in the vicinity of Dresden. The linguistic aspect of the broadcasts showed them to be jointly directed by Soviet and East German experts on black propaganda. The programs were replete with Russianisms and Germanicisms, several of the announcers spoke with pronounced Russian accents, and it was evident from their speech that most of them had had no professional announcing experience. According to reliable Czechoslovak sources, a group of Czech collaborators assisted in the preparation of the broadcast material, among them Dr. Pavel Auersperg, former secretary to President Novotny. The transmitters professed to speak as Czechs to Czechs, but the content and language left no doubt as to the true editors. The station stopped broadcasting on February 13, 1969, when its services were no longer necessary.

The irregularly appearing occupation newspaper *Zpravy,* whose title was intended to connote a rational and logical approach to the Soviet occupation, was the most effective of the various forms of Soviet propaganda. *Zpravy* reacted more flexibly to the internal situation in Czechoslovakia. It smoothed over the crudest atrocities and praised certain Czechs and Slovaks, mainly Husak and Strougal, and even—with definite reservations—the post-January policies.

Zpravy began to appear in Czechoslovak cities and villages in the first days of the occupation, circulated anonymously. Bales of *Zpravy* were left on the street, where passers-by could serve themselves, or were added to the mail delivery. There were instances of subscribers to *Rude Pravo* getting copies of *Zpravy* that had been inserted into their daily newspapers. *Zpravy* was circulated openly in the Ministry of the Interior with the expecta-

tion that the employees would transmit it to their relatives, friends, and acquaintances.

In the early post-invasion period, when the Soviets had not yet "normalized" the situation, popular resistance to *Zpravy* was so strong that even Czechoslovak governmental institutions asked that *Zpravy* be banned. In the middle of September, the Government Press and Information Bureau appealed to the General Prosecutor with the suggestion that the distribution of *Zpravy* was contrary to Czech law because of its libelous attacks on Czechoslovak officials. An exchange of correspondence between the Government Press Bureau, the Office of the General Prosecutor, and the Ministry of the Interior was directed to the examination of *Zpravy's* publishers, printing offices, and distribution practices. The Cultural Committee of the National Assembly called on the Office of the General Prosecutor and the government to take definite measures against *Zpravy*. The Ministry of the Interior avoided responsibility with an anouncement, published in *Rude Pravo*, December 5, 1968, that "the conditions surrounding the publication and distribution of *Zpravy* are generally known. It is published by the editorial council of the Soviet troops, and it must be judged by the competent authorities." Despite its avowed origins, publication continued, for Czechoslovak institutions were too weak to enforce a ban.

The best grasp of *Zpravy's* orientation can be deduced by quotation from its commentary on the death of a Czech student, Jan Palach, who burned himself to death on January 16, 1969, in Prague's Wenceslas Square to protest censorship and the dissemination of *Zpravy*. Of his death, *Zpravy*, January 25, 1969, wrote:

> The tragic case of the twenty-one-year-old philosophy student Jan Palach is well known. There need be no doubt that his imprudent act was guided by the assumption that he was achieving good, that his action was truly motivated, as he himself supposed, by the best intentions and resolves, the ideals of love for humanity, homeland, and freedom. I do not wish to speak of what Western propaganda has created of this tragic incident. Let us pause however to

reflect on his concern with censorship and the publication of *Zpravy*. A twenty-one-year-old student never experienced capitalism and did not know of it. He could not know or comprehend occupation, fascist concentration camps, lack of freedom. He did not experience the events of February 1948 or even later periods. Indeed, not until the sixties could he begin to understand, to form his own opinions. Indisputably, others manipulated these opinions. Who is guilty of this tragic occurrence? Those who formed his world view, who influenced his moral sense. Obviously before January, universities inculcated nihilism, existentialism, and so forth, instead of education in Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism; in so doing, they have sown the poisonous bourgeois ideology. And today, those who are guilty, at home and abroad, shed crocodile tears and want to misuse this tragic case. I feel that the responsibility is wide-ranging. Let us put our hands on our hearts and sincerely admit what was done after August. On one hand, some elements manipulated and poisoned the atmosphere; the leadership, instead of resolving the situation, continually shifted from one foot to the other.

By the spring of 1969, the Stalinists had so consolidated their positions in the party and state apparatuses that they could openly voice the same views as *Zpravy* without fear of being pilloried by the press. *Zpravy* thus lost its original reason for being, and the Soviet occupants stopped publishing it.

In November 1968, several West European papers and journals received a letter from Prague's Charles University, formulated as an appeal to universities of the whole world to support it in the battle against Soviet violence. The letter was reported in *Der Spiegel*, No. 49, 1968: "Over the past twenty years, our universities have been degraded to the level of Soviet universities. Today, enslavement threatens the whole Czechoslovak people. . . . We do not need to be protected either against ourselves or against our German neighbors. On the contrary: we are fortunate, after centuries, to have finally achieved good neighbor relations." The authors requested amnesty for those Czechoslovak demonstrators who had publicly repudiated the celebration of the fifty-first anniversary of the Soviet Revolution and continuing efforts for Czechoslovak neutrality despite Soviet opposition. The letter's signature was illegible.

The academic staff and students of Charles University were at first surprised, then horrified, for it was clear that someone was playing a game behind their backs. The appeal was formulated as a resolution approved at a student-faculty meeting on November 8, 1968. No such meeting had occurred. A more detailed analysis exposed the falsification: the "official" letterhead of Charles University used by the perpetrators had never existed, although similar official stationery had been in use in 1960; the official seal of Charles University was very poorly reproduced and several words were undecipherable; linguistic experts showed that the letter's author was ignorant of modern Czech; the phrase *"Rector ac senatus designatus"* was not used by Czechoslovak academicians. The term "scientific counsel" had been adopted in 1950. *"Rector ac senatus designatus"* was, however, part of the German university tradition. The disinformationists (probably East Germans) tried to create further proof that Czechoslovak universities were seedbeds of counterrevolution in their requests for Czechoslovak neutrality, an unforgivable political offense in Moscow's eyes. Professor Oldrich Stary, rector of Charles University, termed the act provocative. Shortly after the dissemination of the forgery, Radio *Vltava* denounced Rector Stary as a revisionist.

The "normalization" of Czechoslovakia was a multiphased process, the most important element of which was the removal of Dubcek as First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and his replacement by Dr. Gustav Husak in April 1969. The brunt of power and propaganda measures against liberal forces could thus be shifted to the Czechoslovak Party and government organs who, accepting fully the Soviet invasion, themselves dealt the death blow to the unity of the Czechoslovak people, which had been formed at the moment of threat to the republic. The victim began to praise and defend the invader.

Minister of the Interior J. Pelnar, who replaced Pavel shortly after the invasion, presented the theory in the course of May 1969, first to his employees and later at a Central Committee plenum on May 29, 1969, which was called Operation Lyautey, and was to document the cooperation of Czechoslovak anti-socialist forces with Western intelligence services. According to Pelnar, British specialists worked out Operation Lyautey some-

time in 1953. *Der Spiegel,* No. 29, 1969, reported that Pelnar had stated:

> Figuratively speaking, the operation consists of the suction of intelligence information from various sources, the distillation of collected material, and its utilization against previously selected targets —drop by drop. . . . Western intelligence is not only interested in classified information but in information at first glance meaningless and worthless in isolation, but which, when fit into the mosaic, may become a significant factor in obtaining the whole picture of reality. According to the plan, the second phase is disintegrative, subversive tactics—drop by drop—at any time, in any Communist country, where weak places, mistakes, and failings become manifest; in such cases the aim is to create floods from countless small subversive droplets.

The publication of the Lyautey plan was conceived as a propaganda campaign employing all available mass media, incessantly repeating the arguments presented by Pelnar. The Minister of the Interior also tried to pinpoint the main culprits, according to the Washington *Post,* June 7, 1970: Eduard Goldstücker, chairman of the Czechoslovak Writers Union; Ludek Pachman, Czechoslovak chess master; Ivan Svitak, scientist; Benno Weigel, a Czechoslovak emigrant living in London; Pavel Tigrid, publisher of the Czechoslovak review *Svedectvi* in Paris; Tad Szulc, correspondent for the New York *Times;* Cecil B. Parrot, former British ambassador to Prague; Deryck Viney, BBC correspondent; Vilim Blazej, former Secretary General of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, then living in London; Dr. Vaclav Cerny, professor at Charles University; university students Lubos Holecek, Jiri Müller, and Karel Kovanda; and Premysl Janyr, who was one of the initiators of the movement for the renewal of the Social Democratic Party in the spring of 1968.

The plan of Operation Lyautey had at least two interesting aspects. Before the invasion neither the Czechoslovak intelligence service nor counterintelligence service had obtained any plausible evidence linking liberals with Western intelligence services. The theory forwarded by Minister Pelnar tended to indicate that it was impossible to construct such proof satisfactorily and that the

Czechoslovak security service had to support its claims with an alleged British plan that was fifteen years old.

The second aspect was even more revealing to me personally. The subversion tactics as described by Minister Pelnar precisely reflected the tactics of Soviet-bloc special operations, and the phraseology of his speech implied that it was prepared by my former colleagues in Department D.

The Deceivers and the Deceived

Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was an example of strategic deception and surprise operations initiated by top Soviet decision-makers. The success of these operations was influenced by the conduct of the victim who, by refusing to consider the possibility of intervention, facilitated its realization. The events of 1968 and 1969 illustrate special operations as well, conducted in this case by Soviet intelligence agents in collaboration with the intelligence services of other intervening countries, and the pro-Soviet elements within the state security, Party, and government apparatuses of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

The Soviet invasion greatly surprised Czechoslovak Communist liberal spokesmen although there had been numerous indications and threats of invasion in the period preceding the attack. At the moment the troops were discovered on the night of August 20–21, Alexander Dubcek assured the assembled presidium: "I declare on my honor as a Communist that I had no suspicion, no indication, that anyone would want to undertake such measures against us."* Dubcek's statement confirmed not only the success of Soviet deception and surprise operations but also reflected a considerable degree of naiveté and self-delusion among Czechoslovakia's liberal Communists. Adressing them in September 1969, as reported in *Svedectvi*, X, No. 38, the conservative Bilak said: "Comrades Dubcek, Mikova, and other speakers say that they did not expect the allied invasion. Any Pioneer [a member

* *Viva Dubcek*, Christian Schmidt, Haver and Adolf Müller (Köln: Kiepenhever and Witsch, 1968), pp. 109–10.

of a Czechoslovak children's organization] who has studied topography for two weeks, who knows a little of the political situation, and had attended these meetings as a bellhop would have known that there could be no other outcome."

The Soviet invasion had been prepared several months previously as one alternative solution to the "Czechoslovak problem." The final decision to invade was probably not taken until August, however, when all previous measures to settle the problem by political means and to obtain a "silent invasion," with the approval of Czechoslovak institutional leaders, had failed. The primary motivation for Soviet intervention was anxiety over the change in the *status quo* in Europe. The invasion served as psychological shock therapy against liberals and critics within the bloc and as dramatically convincing evidence to the West that the USSR was willing to use military means should its sphere of influence be threatened in the future.

The military success of the invasion was total and decisive while related political measures, such as the immediate establishment of a collaborationist government, failed. The surprising unity of the Czechoslovak people during the first weeks after the invasion forced Moscow to reevaluate its political tactics, to release Dubcek and his associates, and temporarily to accept him as First Secretary again. By signing the capitulation document in Moscow in August 1968, Dubcek signed his own political death sentence. Dismissal from his position was only a matter of time. Moscow could therefore permit a slower tempo of normalization, concentrating first on the division of popular unity while seeking opportunists and collaborators, isolating Dubcek, and accumulating new forces and allies to conduct the decisive anti-Dubcek campaign, which culminated in his removal from the post of First Secretary in April 1969.

In evaluating the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia, it is also necessary to look at the role and posture of the Western powers and the question of possible allies in the Czechoslovak liberalization movement.

Western mass media gave considerable attention to post-January developments in Czechoslovakia, covering them with understandable sympathy, for they were regarded as possible seeds

of internal democratization throughout the whole Communist bloc. Western military intervention was absolutely out of the question, however, even had the Soviet Union publicly announced the threat of occupying Czechoslovakia. This was clear to the West, to Soviet Leaders, and to Czechoslovak liberals themselves, who feared that excessive Western sympathy could provoke the Soviet Union still further. Primarily for ideological reasons, the Czechoslovak liberal elite expected no effective help from the West. It should be understood that its real concerns were to salvage communism in Czechoslovakia, to preserve the leading role of the Communist Party, and to conduct further reform rather than to initiate radical change in the political system.

Immediately after the invasion, Foreign Minister Hajek, denouncing the illegal act in the forum of the United Nations, anticipated that the only result would be moral pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw its units from Czechoslovak territory, rather than Western military involvement. From this standpoint, it is necessary to look at unverified reports of various Western efforts to warn Czechoslovak liberals of the impending Soviet invasion. Insofar as this information was available through channels to Czechoslovak foreign intelligence agents or to counterintelligence personnel in Czechoslovakia itself, the effort was doomed to failure, for the apparatus of the Ministry of the Interior was under the control of Soviet advisors and under the supervision of remaining Czechoslovak Stalinists. Even presuming that Dubcek himself could have received such a warning, his ideological views could not have permitted him any recourse save the search for new means of reconciliation with the Soviet Union, rather than a determination to defend Czechoslovak territory militarily.

In the eyes of the Czechoslovak liberal elite, their only foreign allies were Romania, Yugoslavia, and several Western Communist Parties who feared that a Soviet attempt to influence the internal situation in Czechoslovakia might lead to a split in the world Communist movement. Czech liberals attached disproportionate significance to this argument, considering it the main inhibition which could restrain the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was indeed surprised by the strength of Western Communist criticism during the invasion, but came to realize that the

pacification of the international movement was, as was the "normalization" of the internal situation in Czechoslovakia, merely a question of time. This premise was fully validated; those Communist Parties such as the French and Austrian, which were critical in the first weeks following the invasion, gradually changed their positions on the pretext that anti-Sovietism was an inconsistent policy for any Communist Party. In reality, however, those parties were faced with the threat that regular financial support from Moscow would cease.

With the exception of moral condemnation, the Soviet Union could therefore calculate from the very beginning of planning that the invasion would evoke no effective counterreaction and that the Czechoslovak democratization effort would have to rely on its own internal forces and maneuvering abilities. Forced to rely on the mercy of Soviet goodwill, the Czech experiment was doomed to failure.

The active role of the Soviet intelligence service in the events of 1968 and 1969 in Czechoslovakia centered on the systematic implementation of political provocation, disinformation, and propaganda campaigns aimed at influencing Czechoslovak public opinion, terrorizing a selected group of liberals, and creating supportive arguments for the legitimation of the Soviet invasion.

Special operations had a very limited, if not negligible, impact, either individually or collectively. The failure of these actions in Czechoslovakia resulted from an erroneous appraisal of the internal situation and of public opinion. In the pre-invasion period, the Soviet Union either underrated the press or failed to allow for the fact that freedom of the press had created a new environment—a completely novel form of communication for Communist countries—in which victims could stymie the attacks of Soviet intelligence agents and Soviet propaganda machinery. Freedom of the press in Czechoslovakia in its broadest positive sense became an important instrument of public diplomacy.

The Soviet intelligence service did indeed attempt to avoid methodological stereotyping in the forms of propaganda and disinformation (pamphlets, brochures, anonymous letters, radio broadcasts, newspapers, and forged documents, for example) but failed to avoid stereotyping of content. To convince the popula-

tion of Western intrigue at a time when the simple Czechoslovak citizen felt the weight of twenty years of Soviet influence on his shoulders, when his fear, terror, and hate were focused on the USSR, was unrealistic.

Thus Soviet activity in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and 1969 was not only an example of contemporary Soviet techniques of subversion, but it also demonstrated the qualitative difference between subversion instigated and directed by higher government officials (strategic deception and surprise) and the special operations in use in the Soviet intelligence service. As instruments of public diplomacy Soviet special operations in Czechoslovakia were second-rate by comparison with political-diplomatic maneuverings and Soviet military technique, which are the most effective arguments for Soviet success.

After 1968, actors in the Czechoslovak drama faced a variety of futures. Some found themselves in Czechoslovak prisons, some became refugees in the West. And the people who remained home live in exile, too—but a special and more difficult one. They must live with two faces, and the honest one can be revealed only to trusted friends.

The heroes of the other side fared differently. In September 1969 Lieutenant Colonel Molnar, Colonel Houska, and other collaborators were cleared of charges of having committed any illegal or dishonorable actions. Molnar was appointed chief of the counterintelligence service with the rank of general, and Lubomir Strougal—once the Minister of the Interior who took pleasure in disinformation operations—became the prime minister. The future of Czechoslovakia is in "reliable" hands again.

6

The Game Continues

In this last chapter examples are presented of those special operations which I have been able to trace in the world press since coming to the United States, to show that Soviet-bloc intelligence services continue in their efforts at disinformation and black propaganda. The reader is invited to analyze these examples with me and to test my conclusions on the accomplishments of Communist special operations in view of the pattern of disinformation operations described earlier.

Now that my intelligence activities are finished, along with the tragic experience of the Russian invasion and even the first psychological crises of an exile in a new political and cultural environment, I am only an observer of international relations. But traces of the activities of my former colleagues in Czechoslovakia, Russia, and East Germany continue to fill the pages of the world press.

The amnesty period for Czechoslovak citizens who left the country after the Soviet invasion ended in September 1969, and I then wrote a letter to Minister of the Interior Jan Pelnar asking him for a public trial for myself and to be represented by a lawyer of my own choice. These requests were not granted. A public trial of a former intelligence officer who had been involved in top-secret disinformation operations would attract too much negative attention. Thus the trial was secret, and my defense counsel was an army officer selected for me by the court. That is all I have been able to find out. I do not know the charges or the verdict.

My letter to Minister Pelnar was certainly studied carefully

by the intelligence experts in Prague and may even have given them an idea for a special operation which was carried out a year later. I had asked for a defense counsel, and the Czechoslovak authorities decided to give one automatically to every refugee, whether or not the refugee had requested or approved such counsel.

In the autumn of 1970 large numbers of Czechoslovak exiles in Great Britain, the United States, Canada, Switzerland, Australia, West Germany, and other Western countries received letters from "Legal Advisory Centers" in Czechoslovakia notifying them of impending trials *in absentia* for illegal stay abroad. They demanded immediate transfer of 700 to 1,000 crowns in hard currency (about $70 to $100) as a down payment for legal defense, as reported by the New York *Times*, January 8, 1971. Those who were not willing to pay could cause trouble for their relatives at home. The letter said: "Should you fail to transfer the required sum within 15 days, the Legal Advisory Center is entitled to obtain payment from your nearest relatives in the CSSR." Seventy thousand Czech and Slovak refugees were to be blackmailed financially as well as politically. The operation was meant not only to bring several million dollars into the state treasury; it was a special operation undertaken by the Czechoslovak intelligence service with the approval of the highest Party authorities. The Legal Advisory Centers played only a subsidiary role.

The letter brought pressure on an addressee not only to make an initial payment against an unspecified amount, but also to supply the Czechoslovak intelligence service with information that could later be used against him: "It is in your own interest to let me know if any circumstances exist, which, as your lawyer, I could use for your defense in these proceedings. Especially, let me know whether you submitted an appeal asking for permission to prolong your stay abroad, or whether such an appeal is under consideration by the authorities," as reported by *Features and News from Behind the Iron Curtain* (London), November 18, 1970.

Anyone who had submitted to that pressure could have been politically blackmailed later. Through this operation the Czechoslovak intelligence service tried to establish a large circle of po-

tential candidates for intelligence recruitment among refugees. The operation failed, however. Australia, the United States, and other governments protested the blackmail. Public exposure and a campaign in the Western press, together with these protests, caused Gustav Husak, the Party's First Secretary, to stop the operation, saying that he had not been properly informed.

During 1969 and 1970, several forgeries surfaced in America, Europe, and in the Middle East but with no widespread effect since they were easily revealed as forgeries from the very beginning.

In November 1969, several American newspaper and magazines received anonymous letters expressing displeasure that the chief presidential advisor, Henry A. Kissinger, was affiliated with the Zionist movement. To the letters were attached photostatic copies of a pledge allegedly signed by Kissinger bequeathing twenty thousand dollars to the Zionist Organization of America. Kissinger, as stated in the Washington *Post*, November 20, 1969, branded the document a forgery and said that he had never made any contributions or signed any pledge to bequeath funds to the Zionist Organization. The Director of the ZOA Foundation Fund, Jacob Rubin, added, "unfortunately, we don't have such a pledge from any Henry A. Kissinger, the White House Kissinger, or any other."

The perpetrator's intention was to suggest that Zionists guided American foreign policy in directions contrary to American interests. This disinformation campaign never gained a foothold, since the letter was acknowledged a forgery by the American press. Although the objectives were in harmony with both Arab and Soviet interests, the methodological pattern which appeared pointed to the Soviet bloc.

In June 1970, Riccardo Lombardi, an Italian left-leaning socialist, submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies in Rome a document which according to him was an official press release made available at the end of the meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Rome on May 25. The document said that "the allies [NATO], realizing the weakness of democracy in Italy and the lack of political stability in that country," had suggested the transfer of American troops from West Germany to

Northern Italy because of Communist strength there. The Italian Communist Party daily *L'Unità* characterized it as a "most grave NATO intervention in Italian domestic affairs." The document was denounced both by the Italian Foreign Ministry and NATO officials as a fake, as stated in the New York *Times,* June 21, 1970.

In November 1970, *Haolam Hazen,* an Israeli sensationalist left-wing weekly magazine, published a letter supposedly sent to the American embassy in Tel Aviv in 1959 which was to be a directive to recruit Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan for the CIA. The accusation was so clumsy, however, that it stimulated popular jokes instead of serious investigation.

British parliamentarians, municipal councillors, and trade union leaders received letters from Paris in June 1971. These letters were actually manifestoes addressed to diaspora Jews by the Information Department of the World Zionist Organization. The Jerusalem *Post* quoted from the manifesto on June 6, 1971: "Every Jew in diaspora must have the courage of declaring openly the double loyalty. Every Jew has one homeland only—land of Israel. Every Jew's duty is to defend and consolidate the position of Israel by all accessible means without regard to interests of the country he lives in." The June 1967 war, the document said, "has proved once more to the world that united Jewish nation is determined to sacrifice everything including the atomic holocaust of the world in defence of its state in the historical boundaries," the lands between the Euphrates and the Nile. The document was full of misspellings and grammatical infelicities and was undoubtedly a contribution by Soviet-bloc intelligence services to the fight against Zionists, presenting them as warmongers and potential traitors.

While it is true that these operations show the increasing anti-Israeli orientation of the Soviet-bloc disinformants, the United States remains Enemy No. One. This opinion is substantiated by two larger anti-American operations which were developed in the same spirit and with the same techniques as the operations I had participated in during my disinformation assignment in Prague. The first came to my attention in the late summer of 1969.

Testimony of a Dead General

In June 1969, the editors of several periodicals in West Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy received copies of a politically explosive letter, sent from Rome. Photocopies of top-secret American military plans were enclosed. The writer claimed that he was distributing these documents "in fulfillment of a desire expressed by a dear friend of mine, Major General Horst Wendland," deputy director of the West German Intelligence Agency, who was found dead of a gun-shot wound at his desk on October 8, 1968. The death was officially declared a suicide. The West German government said Wendland had been mentally ill with "incurable depression."

The letter which was printed in the Washington *Post*, August 27, 1969, and *Der Spiegel*, September 8, 1969, stated:

> Major General Wendland reached a prominent position in the German intelligence service (BND) and had access to classified information which greatly depressed him. Shortly before his untimely death, he entrusted me with copies of several documents, to be made public after a specified time. . . .
>
> My friend was particularly disturbed by the fact that the Americans could use atomic, chemical, and bacteriological weapons without prior consent of the United States Congress or the President, since permission to use them follows automatically when these weapons are supplied to special groups. . . . The targets to be destroyed are determined by the commanders of these groups. In other words, the lives of millions of people depend on the decisions of a handful of American officers. . . . It well may be that knowledge of this was one of the reasons that led to my friend's tragic death.

The thirty-three page photocopy contained a detailed outline of air, land, and sea operations, including the use of atomic, chemical, and bacteriological weapons. An annex listed troop strengths, weapons storage sites, logistics, electronics, and the conditions and priorities under which activation would be planned. The Preface to the document said in part: "The purpose of this plan is to provide guidance and delineate the responsibilities for the initiation and conduct of unconventional warfare

in the USCINCEUR [U.S. Commander-in-Chief-Europe] area of coordinating responsibility."

The top-secret document was a contingency plan worked out by American military experts in the event of a military conflict with the USSR, and it outlined the creation of partisan units on Soviet-occupied territory throughout Europe. "In the course of the chaos which may be expected at the outbreak of war," the document stated, "the population will take active measures, individually and collectively, against Soviet troops." According to the American plan, the partisan groups were to emerge in twenty-three countries and one hundred and one operational districts. Unlike traditional partisan wars, conducted with primitive arms, the American Operational Plan Directive Number 10-1 postulated the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the struggle.

Who was the secret benefactor who tried to carry out the bequest of his good friend Wendland? The contents of the document, the anonymity of its author, and the methods and circumstances surrounding the affair pointed to Soviet Department D.

In all probability, the Soviet intelligence service had received secret documents—not only those sent anonymously from Rome in 1969, but others as well—from an agent who was exceptionally valuable despite the fact that he was no more than a sergeant in the United States Army. Sergeant Robert Lee Johnson worked as a military courier until his arrest in April 1965. The opinion that Moscow had obtained the top-secret documents from Sergeant Johnson was expressed by several West European and American newspapers. Official American sources, however, failed to confirm this version. An American military tribunal later sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison.

From that moment, the contingency plans lost their direct strategic value for Moscow, since the United States, knowing or guessing that they had fallen into Soviet hands, could change or completely eliminate them. With the arrest of Johnson, Moscow lost a source of valuable material. The Soviet intelligence service therefore reevaluated the documents and put them at the disposal of their own Department D for propaganda and disinformation purposes.

Dissemination of the material was intended to evoke fear that American military planning was conducted without regard to the security of the civilian population of Europe. The aim was to provoke anti-American sentiment, a goal openly expressed in the anonymous writer's letter. Since the details of the contingency plans were not known to West European governments, their publication might at least contribute in limited measure to the weakening of the NATO partnership. Finally, the Soviet Department D decided to reanimate speculation on the death of Horst Wendland. References to his anti-Americanism were to drive a wedge between American and West German intelligence services. Moscow was probably not displeased by the publicly debated theory that Wendland had worked for the Soviet intelligence service. On the contrary, such a hypothesis might cripple the German service by suggesting that the Soviets were aware of all West German operations and agents.

Fulfillment of the first objective depended upon the contents of the American documents. The Soviets chose an anonymous method of distribution because any agent who received such material with instructions to publicize it would have found it difficult to explain plausibly how it had fallen into his hands. While anonymity reduced the likelihood of publication, it was a safer course of action for the perpetrators. Even had the material not appeared in the press, the possibility still existed that the documents would be transmitted to high government circles if the recipients had conveyed them to their national security agencies.

The first attempt to publicize the documents in the West European press was made in 1968. In January of that year, the Soviet disinformation department tried to surface them in the Italian paper *Paese Sera* and in several Norwegian journals at roughly the same time. The Hamburg political and sex magazine *Konkret* reprinted an article from the Norwegian press discussing the presumed American reaction to Soviet military intervention in NATO countries. The attempt failed, for the scattered articles did not stir up great interest; Department D was not able to initiate a long-term press campaign.

In 1969, Department D made a new attempt, this time along

with the letter from Wendland's friend. The material received the greatest coverage in West Germany but was picked up by French, Italian, British, and American newspapers as well. Although the complicity of Soviet intelligence agents was considered a possibility, the press nevertheless dealt with the contents of the American documents. Several even permitted critical remarks about their American allies.

This success encouraged the Soviets to further measures. In January, 1970, the West German weekly *Stern* was presented with additional secret American documents—actually a nuclear yield list which named more than a thousand potential targets in East and West, including bridges, ammunition depots, canals, dams, harbors, and troop installations. The implication, according to *Stern,* as reported by the Washington *Post,* January 29, 1970, was that the United States was prepared for a war of nuclear annihilation or "scorched earth" in Europe if need be. The document, allegedly taken from the American "Handbook of Nuclear Yield Requirements," listed a number of West German cities, as well as points in Yugoslavia, Finland, Iran, and other countries, as tactical nuclear targets.

Shortly afterwards, when the first group of American documents had been delivered, the editors of *Stern* questioned the American authorities in West Germany and NATO representatives in Brussels about the authenticity of the material. An unnamed deputy at NATO headquarters, to whom *Stern* had submitted the documents, admitted that they might be genuine. *Stern,* August 31, 1969, reported that United States authorities had acknowledged that the material was genuine but had labeled it as outdated.

From the standpoint of disinformation and propaganda purposes, the operation was most successful in the German Federal Republic, for it occupied public attention for more than half a year and the anti-American slant was striking. *Stern,* September 14, 1969, quoted postwar West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer: "in the case of a military conflict between the United States and the USSR, the German Federal Republic, as a NATO member, will not become a European battlefield," juxtaposing his assertion with the starkly contradictory contents of the con-

tingency plans. The magazine charged that American planners had not only failed to consult with their European partners in NATO but had not even informed them of the existence of such plans. The magazine, in considering the possible practical consequences of the American plans, commented: "It is unnecessary to think of the worst—atomic weapons and biochemical warfare. The very thought of a European partisan war on German territory is appalling. Suppose that German partisans, under American guidance, leave their hiding places, shoot a guard, and retreat again to cover. The population, who cannot hide, must pay the consequences. The only result would be the execution of hostages and further repression by the occupation authorities [the USSR]."

The leftist German press rebuked the United States for preparing for a war of nuclear annihilation or "scorched earth." It asserted that the documents, which had been secret to the other NATO allies and to the Germans, had long been known to the Russians. Moscow had been able to adjust itself to Washington's atomic planning, but German politicians and military personnel and the German people had not.

On September 8, 1969, *Der Spiegel* remarked that American military and diplomatic representatives had undergone a test of credibility with their own allies, for they had discovered one of the operational plans only from the press. Thus, the Defense Ministry in Bonn asked *Der Spiegel* for copies of the plans.

The propaganda use of authentic enemy documents is a standard procedure in disinformation activities. However, the Soviet intelligence service would not have approved the operation had the source of the documents not been cut off. The knowledge of enemy plans, and the possibility of responding and developing effective countermeasures, is understandably more valuable than any propaganda operation. The very fact that the material was used as propaganda indicated that it was no longer valid.

The operation could have been considered successful by its perpetrators to the degree that it aroused anti-American emotions in the German Federal Republic. Although the press correctly pinpointed Department D's role, some journals unwittingly became instruments of the department by launching stringent criti-

cism against the United States. The Washington *Post*, January 29, 1970, deliberating over a *Stern* article, wrote that "the magazine's report seems sure to make chilling reading for more than a million German readers this week. . . . Suggestions that West German territory is marked for nuclear bursts are filled with political dynamite because of the long-standing view of successive Bonn governments that American defensive plans should spare the German territory the horrors of nuclear annihilation."

While a certain part of the West German press publicized the documents and gave vent to anti-American emotions, the West German government reacted calmly, arguing that the strategy for defending NATO has changed from the old concept of massive retaliation formulated by the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to one of flexible response placing more emphasis on conventional forces. In the same spirit, General Wolf Graf von Baudissin, former Deputy Chief of Staff for Planning in NATO headquarters for Europe, wrote in *Stern* that the documents, dating from 1962, were strategically obsolete. The stationing of NATO military forces in Europe is the mission of military experts of NATO and not only the United States; military planning is the function of the NATO Council, as the highest political organ of the alliance. Von Baudissin stressed that not one atomic charge could be set off in Europe without joint allied consent. On the surface, the operation left no apparent scars on official United States–West German relations. Nevertheless, the operation itself might have been one small element that helped to cool the political atmosphere between the two countries, clearly evident in 1969 and 1970. One obvious aspect to consider in evaluating this operation is the fact that Soviet success in this case was conditioned by the existence of United States military plans whose connotations were terrifying for the peoples of Europe.

General Wendland's anti-Americanism, manufactured by the Soviet Department D as a pretext for the revelation, did not arouse much further speculation, since an investigation revealed that he could not have had access to the documents. The possibility cannot be excluded, of course, that Moscow deliberately arranged the situation, hoping to suggest that Wendland re-

ceived the documents not because the Americans gave them to him but because West German intelligence agents operated in the United States.

The Malagasy Case

In June and July of 1971 an interesting scandal with international implications shattered the tranquility of the relatively stable Malagasy Republic—a former French colony with seven million citizens on the island of Madagascar.

Thirty thousand farmers assembled at a rally in the western town of Mandriandrano on May 31, cheering "Long live Tsiranana—death to the hirelings" after Malagasy President Philibert Tsiranana had accused the embassy of an unnamed power with colossal economic potential of plotting against his government. He said that "the government is at present in possession of irrefutable proof of interference by this embassy into our affairs," and he promised to release the compromising documents later. Agence France Presse made this report on May 31, 1971.

The following day André Resampa—ten years a Malagasy strong man and designated successor to President Tsiranana—was dismissed from his post of second vice-president and arrested. Immediately after Tsiranana's speech a great controversy arose over the identity of the country he had referred to. Since neither the Soviet Union nor China had embassies on Madagascar, the circle of suspects was narrowed to the Western powers. The West Germans and British were visibly relieved when it became clear that the United States—the notorious troublemaker—was the accused.

United States Ambassador Anthony D. Marshall, as the chief "instigator" of the plot, had to leave Madagascar a week after Tsiranana's speech. He was surrounded only by members of his embassy at the Tananarive airport. No one else wanted to shake hands with the man accused of drastic violation of the Malagasy Republic's sovereignty. Agence France Presse reported, on June 6, 1971, that Marshall had told newspapermen that there was no

truth in the charges leveled by the press and that during his contacts with the Malagasy Foreign Minister over the past few days no formal proof of United States involvement had been furnished. He added that he had met Second Vice-President André Resampa only twice. These denials were to no avail because Marshall's former CIA connections had been cited. *Newsweek,* July 5, 1971, stated that Marshall, after entering the government service in 1950, had worked both for the State Department and the CIA. He did not deny his former association with the CIA, although he had not been mentioned in Mader's *Who's Who in the CIA.* When he had received his Tananarive appointment in 1969 the Malagasy government had known about his CIA affiliation and had not objected. The State Department categorically rejected the accusation that Marshall had abused his diplomatic privileges. The State Department felt that Marshall had done a good job. He was enthusiastic and energetic and had worked hard to create favorable conditions in Madagascar for United States private investments, primarily in cattle ranching and oil explorations. He was a very popular man even with President Tsiranana.

No "irrefutable proof" was submitted to the Malagasy public, but as is usual in such cases the wheels of anti-American propaganda were put in motion. Reuters, June 8, 1971, reported that the Congress Party for Malagasy Independence had accused the United States of using a space station in Madagascar: "Under cover of scientific activities it forms part of the military projects of American imperialism." It called for closing the island's American Cultural Center, stating that "it must certainly cover the activities of information agents." It also requested cancellation of the agreement between Madagascar and the United States under which a NASA station was operated there.

Richard Andriamanajato, leader of the Congress Party, stated on his return from Moscow that he had been astonished and dumbfounded when he read the news in *Pravda.* As to the identity of the major power implicated in the Resampa affair, Andriamanajato revealed, in *La Presse Malagasy,* June 9, 1971, that Soviet leaders were immedately sure that it was none other than the United States. On June 11, *Hita Sy Re*—a publication of the Congress Party—attacked the "sinister aims of the American

imperialists" and said: "What has happened is sufficient lesson; we must be careful in our relations with imperialists." Several days later the same newspaper added:

> In spite of the absence of any official statement, it is clear that American espionage is mixed up in the events in Madagascar, and has been the accomplice of some of the Malagasy citizens accused of treason. . . . The danger can no longer be brushed aside, for because of the CIA and its fellow plotters, the nation and the government were almost put in real danger. For this reason, everyone with any common sense is urging that diplomatic relations with the United States be broken, that the NASA facility at Imerintsiatosika be vacated, and that the American Cultural Center be closed. In addition, we must force the departure of the various American enterprises, since they are beyond doubt the hiding places of spies and, as such, are not to be trusted.

The "conspiracy" continued to be a focus of local speculation, but strangely, the Malagasy government by its own silence appeared to rank it of secondary importance, and at the end of June the diplomatic implications of the affair—the complicity with the United States embassy—apparently vanished. President Tsiranana showed some of the mysterious documents to parliamentarians of the ruling Social Democrat Party, but he scarcely indicated their content. Instead, Tsiranana mentioned his suspicion of Vice-President Resampa's collusion with the "National Movement for the Independence of Madagascar," an organization infiltrated by Communists which had instigated an unsuccessful revolt of Malagasy farmers in April 1971. This was a paradoxical mixture—an imperialist conspiracy combined with a Communist plot, as reported in *Lumiere,* June 13, 1971.

Several theories and speculations confirm or deny the possibility of United States involvement and mention France or even Israel as possible perpetrators of an anti-American intrigue. The first theory claimed that Ambassador Marshall's CIA background revealed CIA involvement and confirmed the justice of Tsiranana's accusation. The second theory suggested that Marshall had worked hard to improve conditions for American private investments in Madagascar, but he was caught in the crunch of Malagasy politics, becoming a victim of that country's internal

problems. Tsiranana, looking for a scapegoat for growing economic and political troubles in his country, found it in André Resampa and the Americans. The third theory held that American expansion in the Malagasy Republic had threatened Israeli business interests there, and thus the victim—the USA—should look to Israel as the perpetrator. The fourth theory hinted that the French government, alarmed at growing American influence in Madagascar and worried about possible future competition with the USA for Malagasy oil, had decided to undermine American positions by a well-organized plot—an accusation against the United States Ambassador. The alleged mastermind of this idea was Jacques Foccart, the strongly anti-American head of the French intelligence service in Africa.

While the expression of authoritative views on the Malagasy affair without convincing evidence or hard proof may seem to rest on a less-than-firm foundation, and while no more information is available to me than to any other foreign-relations observer whose sources are limited to press reports, I cannot forget what I experienced behind the disinformation desk in Prague. Too many parallel events seem plausible—operations which could be easily considered a blueprint for the Malagasy affair. Here, then, is my own speculation.

There is no doubt that the mysterious documents came into President Tsiranana's hands at a particularly opportune moment. A long time before that, André Resampa had ceased to be Tsiranana's beloved friend. In November 1970 rumors of a plot had circulated through the country. Tsiranana immediately placed the National Security Forces, formerly controlled by Resampa, under his own authority. In February 1971 Resampa was demoted from first to second vice-president and entrusted only with the management of the Department of Agriculture, as reported in *Lumiere,* June 13, 1971. He lost the position of Secretary General of the ruling Social Democrat Party. And finally, on June 1 he was dismissed from the post of second vice-president and arrested. The breach between Resampa and Tsiranana, which had grown steadily until the break, may have had its origins in each man's different political conception of how to solve the country's domestic and international problems. A year before the 1972

presidential elections the documents provided Tsiranana with the opportunity of eliminating a possible rival. Whoever the generous donor was, he chose the right moment.

Ambitious and active, Ambassador Marshall attracted the attention of local and even foreign enemies of the United States. His former CIA affiliation offered a favorable focus for an attack. However, it is hardly believable that the United States would try to overthrow a government that was fighting against a pro-Communist underground and trying to develop economic ties with the United States.

Could Israel have played the game against the United States? Madagascar's economic potential was not yet big enough to justify an Israeli attack against the United States—the only power which still showed sympathy for the Israeli position in the Middle East and the only supplier of vital military equipment.

There may be some justification for the theory that France could have been the perpetrator. The Malagasy Republic is still under dominant French influence, and the French would not like to be pushed aside, especially by the United States. Could the French government have been worried over possible future competition with the United States for Malagasy oil, though not a single oil deposit had yet been discovered there? Had French-American relations deteriorated to the point that France would launch cheap provocations and forgery-based intrigues against her NATO ally? The relations between the two countries do not seem bad enough to justify such an assumption. Could Jacques Foccart have wanted to take revenge on the CIA for leaking to the press a story reported in *Life* magazine, April 29, 1968, marking him as a Soviet agent responsible for worsening French-American relations?

It would appear that only one power could profit from the Malagasy affair—the Soviet Union. It is tempting to see Jacques Foccart, an alleged Soviet agent in the French government, as a part of the Soviet disinformation operation against the United States, but even without him significant reasons point to Soviet-bloc intelligence services as the perpetrators. Madagascar is a pivotal point in a coveted zone of the Indian Ocean; to deprive her main opponent of the possibility of exploiting it would be

advantageous to the Soviet Union. Labeling the United States as the main troublemaker in Africa is nothing new since a long-range plan of Soviet-bloc intelligence activities and many previous operations support this claim. Mutual suspicion between the United States and France falls into the same category; it can only help the Soviet Union to deepen mutual misunderstanding and alienation.

As stated earlier, this explanation is only speculation. But the truth could be known with Malagasy government cooperation. President Tsiranana made a mistake common to most leaders of underdeveloped countries when forged evidence of imperialistic intrigues is leaked: he accepted it because it seemed credible and because it served his own political purpose. Objective, unbiased investigation could reveal the real perpetrator—whoever it might be.

First, it would be necessary to investigate thoroughly the channel through which Tsiranana came to possess the incriminating documents. Were they mailed by an anonymous "patriot"? Did one of the Malagasy diplomats abroad get them from a "friend"? Did a Malagasy police agent receive them from the American embassy in Tananarive? Did the documents come to the President's attention in an unusual manner in at least some way? Tracing the origin of the documents to a man who was the successful receiver or discoverer might be the first clue.

All disinformation factories and their forgery laboratories suffer from the following mistakes and weaknesses: They incorrectly estimate the psychology of the author in whose name the forgery was disseminated. The documents are usually mailed to periodicals and newspapers along with a letter from a mythical sender. The tone of such accompanying letters is that of an embarrassed, deeply disturbed man whose nationalistic or moral feelings have been hurt, and so he decided to bring the "truth" to light. This contradicts the material itself, however, which is usually dispassionate. There should be consistency for credibility.

Second, the contents of the forgeries are riddled with mistakes caused by ignorance of formal procedures within the enemy state's bureaucracy, of its administrative principles, and practices. Communist intelligence services construct forgeries according to

various models which are generally several years old and have sometimes been superseded or even become invalid.

Third, watermarks on official stationery and the correct quality and chemical composition of the paper are difficulties which technically could be resolved, though at too great an expense of time and money. In individual cases, chemical laboratories can reproduce a watermark, but it would be impracticable to request such precise work from them in every case because of the vast number of forgeries produced. For the most part, therefore, intelligence services disregard this problem, contenting themselves with less than perfect imitations.

Fourth, the text of the forged document is first prepared in the native language of the given intelligence service, then translated. Every Soviet-bloc disinformation department has a pool of translators at its disposal, usually defectors from the West. The forged documents teem with crude linguistic errors, primarily because intelligence agents give the translator a modification of the falsification rather than a complete and precise text, in order to prevent the translator from deducing the exact purpose and target country. Some of the translators (defectors, for example), after long stays in Communist countries, have lost contact with their own native tongues, and their translations become stilted. In addition to such defects, a further unavoidable hazard arises when intelligence service secretaries later type the translated document in its original form, often with superficial knowledge of the language or none at all. Typographical errors or poor word divisions at the end of lines can therefore serve as an indication of the nationality of the perpetrator.

It might be that knowledge of the problems involved with forgeries could lead President Tsiranana's subordinates to discover the truth of the American "conspiracy" which shattered the tranquility of the Malagasy Republic.

The belief that the Moscow subversion center is responsible for most or all of the domestic and international problems of the

United States is as senseless as the conclusion that the CIA inspires and directs every rightist *Putsch* in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Neither Soviet nor American intelligence services are omnipotent institutions with supernatural powers. Just as the leading dogmatic elements in the Soviet bloc attempt to convince the populace that the malevolent hand of imperialism lurks behind every regime's failure, so there are people of the same conviction in non-Communist countries—with biases in the opposite political direction.

The failure to analyze one's own mistakes and failings objectively or the expediency of accusing the enemy as the root of one's problems, may lead to tragic conclusions. A frightening example of such an attitude can be found in the Soviet political trials of the thirties, forties, and fifties, in which thousands of Communists died, falsely accused of subversive activity on behalf of imperialism.

The acceptance of "Communist Rules for Revolution," probably a right-wing forgery, reported by the Boston *Globe*, August 23, 1970, as proof that the major problems of the United States or any other non-Communist country are merely the consequence of Moscow's subversive intrigues would conceal or obfuscate the very real sources of these problems. Faulty diagnosis leads inescapably to faulty treatment. Should a reactionary climate of opinion prevail in the United States, it would be pointless and disadvantageous, for the situation could only create favorable conditions for actual Soviet subversion.

To what extent, then, is contemporary anti-Americanism the result of special operations? Anti-American agitation, demonstrations, and riots became a commonplace phenomenon in the second half of the 1960s. American flags were burned, American embassy buildings were the targets of terrorist attacks, and American diplomats were kidnapped or even assassinated. Less than twenty years before, the United States had been considered a model society by the majority of its own citizens and many abroad as well. The predominant opinion was that the universal application of the model of American democracy and way of life could solve the world's problems. The sixties alter this viewpoint even in the United States itself. American students—hitherto a com-

paratively apolitical community in a world of their own personal interests—awoke to politics. Unresolved issues such as racial questions, poverty, environmental pollution, mounting criminality, the problems of medical care and education, and, of primary importance, the American role in the Vietnam war, became, with the assistance of American mass media, the subjects of discussion and the objects of a search for new solutions, not only among the students but in other areas of society as well.

Foreign and domestic problems, of which the American public had previously been unaware, appeared in new forms, sometimes resulting in feelings of guilt and self-hatred. It has become fashionable among certain American intellectuals to be extremely critical of the existing "establishment" and tolerant of the extremist and sometimes violent Left (considering it a "moral force") or of the Soviet dictatorship (in their reaction against blind anti-communism). These views, disseminated worldwide by mass media (often in such a manner that America's positive features are, knowingly or unknowingly, suppressed), are interpreted by many non-Communist peoples as reflecting an objective, overall picture of American reality. Thus, one source of contemporary anti-Americanism is the United States herself.

Although Western Europe looks enviously at the economic expansion of the technologically oriented American society, it is aware of negative aspects and seeks to create a social model which would permit dynamic economic development as well as the subordination of political decision-making to ethical criteria. This effort, however, is conditioned by the contemporary reality that decisive questions are dominated by the two superpowers: the United States and the USSR. Thus, while West European political authorities recognize that close collaboration with the United States is at present the only effective guarantee against the danger of European sovietization, the European intellectual elite, repudiating the economic relations which govern American politics and culture, seems to find in anti-Americanism an at least temporary defense of its own threatened position.

After the first wave of elation over independence and hopes for rapid economic growth, the developing countries—especially

those which attained independence during the past two decades—began to realize the difficulty of their position and their dependence on industrially developed countries for economic progress. The Third World, whose social and economic problems were multiplied by the population explosion, expected effective assistance, especially from the United States as the richest country in the world. When this assistance—for whatever reason—was not forthcoming in the anticipated amount or failed to produce quickly visible success, the attitude of the poor man toward his rich uncle turned sour. To a significant degree, the anti-Americanism of the Third World is the product of poverty and protracted economic difficulty.

This situation offered the Soviet subversion centers new and welcome opportunities for intensifying anti-American activities throughout the world, but to attribute contemporary anti-Americanism solely to Communist subversion would be to close one's eyes to the primary sources. Anti-Americanism induced by the intelligence centers of the Soviet bloc is only a secondary phenomenon encouraged by the economic, political, and social problems of the non-Communist world. Although special operations can occasionally deepen and advance anti-American sentiments, such feelings cannot be artificially generated where objective conditions are lacking.

Although mistakes and errors on foreign policy have offered Soviet-bloc disinformation centers many opportunities for exploitation, it would be a moralistic simplification to say that American errors were the only source of inspiration. Existing nationalism, the complicated and sometimes erroneous manner in which nations perceive each other, long-established biases and stereotypes—all create favorable conditions for an institution aimed at disrupting international understanding.

Every nation has a certain image of itself and of other nations as well. Every day these images are cultivated by press, radio, television, and other communication media. National images are basically misleading, and many social scientists claim that they lead to improper conclusions and assumptions. A special operation attacking America in a country where the American image has

already been extremely negative has, naturally, a much better chance of success than in a country where the American image is balanced or positive.

For a long time Soviet-bloc countries paid little attention to the behavioral sciences, and disinformation specialists of Czechoslovakia's Department D, for example, had no theoretical background in social psychology. They were guided by intuition only, but even that primitive approach brought positive results if the operation's message coincided with and supported existing anti-American biases.

For several years the radical anarchistic segment of the New Left has been a force of considerable destruction. While it criticizes the institutions and values of the mature industrial societies, it also has deep contempt for Soviet political structure. It seems that the romantic dreams of radical students find their greatest expression and satisfaction in the very acts of destruction and revolution rather than in the preparation of positive political programs to be realized through revolution. Street demonstrators sometimes carry portraits of Ché Guevara and Mao Tse-tung, rarely Marx or Lenin, but never of Brezhnev or Kosygin. Worship of the process of revolution and a pronounced anarchistic strain led the militant segment of the New Left to repudiate the Czechoslovak democratization process in 1968. To student radicals, the Czechoslovak revival seemed to be based on uninspired reformism linked with illusions of formal bourgeois democracy, a movement of the petty bourgeois layers of society, indifferent to the problems of the Third World. They rebuked the democratization movement for stressing the profit motive in proposed economic reforms. Despite the similarity between this reproof and charges leveled by Soviet leaders and propagandists, such a resemblance hardly constitutes grounds for proclaiming ideological identity between Moscow and the New Left.

The emergence and stormy expansion of the New Left surprised both Eastern and Western establishments. From a practical political standpoint, the Soviet Union dismissed the possibility that the New Left could become a decisive element in the socialist revolutionary process. Such a role, according to Moscow ideologues, must be filled step by step by a Communist Party

if the revolution is to be considered socialist. Thus, Moscow accepted and welcomed the radical threat to stability and harassment of the capitalist establishment for tactical reasons but was unwilling to recognize the New Left as a partner and ally.

Official bloc propagandists have difficulty interpreting the activities of the New Left. Student demonstrations, riots, and police measures in Western countries are presented to the Communist public as proof of the decadence of Western society, the discontent of its broad segments, and the brutality of "capitalist police regimes." At the same time, however, Soviet propaganda avoids deep objective analysis, for excessive information might incite students to similar action against the Communist establishment. In past years, several Soviet intellectuals have discovered the chasm separating the New Left and the Soviet establishment. Soviet physicist Pyotr Kapitsa, calling on Soviet philosophers and theoreticians to examine life in the Soviet Union more closely, admitted in a speech delivered to the presidium of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in June 1969 that present Soviet ideas have practically no influence among Western revolutionary youth. The Washington *Post*, June 25, 1969, reported that Kapitsa said: "We must not be afraid to admit that at present our ideologists stand isolated from this revolutionary process and in practice have no influence on it." Kapitsa's appeal was not and could not be successful. The attraction of Soviet ideology for the New Left would require a total reversal of both ideology and policy, the prerequisites for which are lacking at this time.

The present Soviet political stance permits bloc intelligence services to incite and exploit the radical student movement of non-Communist countries in various—mainly anti-American—actions where circumstances allow. In practice this can happen very rarely, since Soviet intelligence agents find very few among the young Western radicals who would be willing to contribute their revolutionary élan to the practice of controversial espionage methods to Soviet advantage. The antagonism between the Soviet totalitarian conception of social revolution and the utopian vision of social justice held by the New Left is too strong to facilitate the mass penetration of Soviet intelligence activities in the West. Because general ideological identity is lacking, the pro-

portion of student revolutionaries who decide to work for the Soviet intelligence service does not exceed the percentage of agents recruited from other social strata, and there remain only the traditional forms of recruitment through pressure. Some student groups in West Germany, and especially in West Berlin, infiltrated by East German intelligence agents, are an exception. One should seek the rationale not in the attractiveness of the Soviet concept of socialism but in the complex problems of a divided Germany. Although Soviet-bloc intelligence services have also succeeded in some instances in infiltrating Latin American student groups and inciting them to anti-American demonstrations, such activities have been quite limited.

In past years the world has seen a striking incidence of terror as a method of political struggle. Hijacking, kidnapping, and assassination have become commonplace. These actions parallel East European intelligence operations in the fifties, although Soviet-bloc operations during that period were mainly directed against emigré political leaders and defectors rather than at political or diplomatic representatives of non-Communist countries. Special operations plans prepared in 1965 made no mention of direct assistance or direction of Communist guerrillas in Latin America or in the Near and Middle East. But this in itself does not rule out Soviet influence. Bloc intelligence services calculate the high risks connected with direct involvement with terrorist organizations. Influence through nonintelligence channels—especially ideological influence and political influence—is safer and surer. The Soviet Union can publicly take on the role of sympathetic observer and negotiate important questions with the leadership of underground organizations safe on home territory. Individual terrorist actions are delegated by Moscow to the underground organizations. The ideological subordination to Moscow of Communist underground organizations also takes precedence over direct management by intelligence agents because the latter course, rather than permitting enlarged action capabilities and broadened mass movements, would, on the contrary, limit their scope as a consequence of necessarily tighter conspiratorial methods. Moscow, no longer the sole center of international communism but now the competitor of Peking, can gain the upper hand only by effective ideological influence.

What is the present role and perspective of special operations in the context of Soviet foreign policy? Special operations are neither the sole nor the most effective form of Soviet efforts toward the disintegration of the non-Communist world. The organizational brain center of Soviet foreign policy, including subversive activities, is the Presidium and Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR and at a lower level the corresponding apparatuses in any given satellite country. The decisions on foreign policy made at this center can influence the balance of forces between East and West far more effectively than could special operations conducted by any individual intelligence service.

Thus, Soviet-bloc intelligence services are one of many foreign policy instruments. Whatever the allowance for independent initiative and the formulation of destructive operations in the non-Communist world, all activity must ultimately conform to the center's foreign-policy strategy and tactics at any given moment. The goal of special operations is to weaken the non-Communist world, primarily the United States. Special operations directed at disinformation and influence of public opinion, mainly in developing countries, have achieved the greatest successes in the last decade. Operations aimed at directly deceiving the decision-makes or major capitalist countries were of more dubious value; hardly any of them survived the exacting evaluation and criticism of qualified enemy intelligence and counterintelligence services.

Taken individually, special operations have limited impact on the over-all balance of power. Their formulators, acknowledging this, try to remedy the problem with mass production of disinformation, relying on its cumulative effect. In sum, special operations can on occasion negatively influence the interrelationships of non-Communist countries, augment anti-American feelings, and thus create maneuvering room for official Soviet foreign policy.

In the 1960s Soviet-bloc disinformational activity was institutionalized; an element of systematic disruption of the normal information flow appeared in the sphere of international communications. However, the success of special operations hinged on extraordinarily favorable circumstances—above all the powerful international wave of anti-Americanism—and the political inex-

perience of the young developing nations, incapable of effectively analyzing and protecting themselves against the intrigues and worldwide games played by Moscow.

The majority of past special operations relied on forgery, an approach which is not inexhaustible. In the fifties, the German Federal Republic was the primary target for a flood of forgeries. The West German market was soon saturated with disinformation to the extent that after several years it became increasingly difficult to introduce a new forgery into the West German media and even more difficult to insure that printed copy would have impact. It is reasonable to anticipate that a similar although slower saturation process is occurring in the developing countries.

The success or failure of future operations emanating from the Soviet-bloc disinformation center also depends on the quality of the Soviet intelligence apparatus and its capacity to overcome the stereotyped nature of previous disinformation production. This presupposes a shifting in the center of gravity of special operations from inexpensive propaganda and disinformational actions in the direction of more exacting influence operations that utilize highly placed Soviet agents within non-Communist countries with acceptance of the concomitant enlargement of political and operational risks.

The struggle between East and West, including the battle for world public opinion, will continue to take new forms, and the activity of intelligence services will accompany that struggle; but neither of the rival sides will gain by self-aggrandizing propaganda or a flood of empty words. The present and future social, political, and economic problems of the world cannot be solved by international intrigues. Only sincere positive and constructive actions such as economic cooperation and aid without political pressure, an attempt to understand the problems of other nations, and respect for their sovereignty and right to create their own political and economic systems can help to solve the world's problems. Herein lies a strategy of defense and an element of hope for a democratic world.

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S U R C

LADISLAV BITTMAN, in diving suit, designed and actively participated in Operation Neptune. Bundles of captured Nazi documents were planted in a Bohemian lake and unwittingly "discovered" by scuba divers and a TV crew. The find made headlines, and the documentary made in good faith by the TV team was shown all over Europe. The result of the operation was an extension of the statute of limitations on the prosecution of Nazi war criminals and embarrassment of the West Germans.

LADISLAV BITTMAN was an officer in the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service from 1954 to 1968. He received a Doctor of Law degree from Prague's Charles University in 1954. His book on the 1934 Nazi *Putsch* in Austria, *The Chancellor Was the First To Die,* was published in Prague in 1968. Bittman's involvement in the democratization movement in Czechoslovakia and his refusal to accept the Soviet invasion brought him into exile in the United States.

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